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The current research aims to explore how the implementation of new regulatory forms contributes to firm self-regulation.

Longitudinal analysis of firm-initiated product recalls for 15 manufacturers in the US automobile industry from 1966–2012.

Examining firm-initiated product recalls for 15 manufacturers in the US automobile industry from 1966–2012 has several important findings regarding how the introduction of specific regulatory forms contributes to firm-initiated vehicle recalls. Firms are not likely to self-regulate in response to surveillance or standards-based regulation while information-based regulation results in a greater likelihood of firm self-regulation.

This result suggests that even at the product level; firms become increasingly motivated to self-regulate as regulators introduce information-based regulations.

This study examines how firm product reputation functions as an internal and external expectations-setting mechanism shaping firm and external stakeholder behavior.

Longitudinal analysis of 17,879 recalls from 15 automobile manufacturers operating in the United States between 1967 and 2016.

Applying the behavioral theory of the firm (BTF) and signaling theory, this study’s findings suggest that product safety reputation creates variability in the likelihood of both voluntary and government-ordered recalls.

Performance expectations set by past product performance influence managerial decision-making such that products with a higher reputation for quality are more likely to be voluntarily recalled than are their less reputable counterparts. Similarly, regulators are more likely to order the recall of higher reputation products, suggesting that past product performance also influences enforcement behavior. Finally, the scope and severity of product defects are shown to interact with product reputation to influence the likelihood of government-ordered recall.

Firms and firm stakeholders make distinct decisions based on performance variations within firm product portfolios.

Overall firm reputation is important, but there are distinct dynamics that result in product performance variability within firm product portfolios that have important implications on issues such as product safety recalls.

This study's findings reveal that as an internal signal, managers' expectations of product performance can change their behavior following product safety defects. Specifically, voluntary product recalls are more likely for higher-reputation products than those with lower reputations for product safety. This suggests that firm behavior regarding product safety recalls is not consistent within their own product lines. Externally, this study’s findings suggest that product reputation also influences relationships with key stakeholders. Product reputation for quality was shown to be associated with an increased likelihood of government sanctions. Regulators will also be more likely to initiate punitive sanctions against higher-reputation products as the severity and scope of safety defects increase. Under such circumstances, higher-reputation products are more likely to face government sanctions than lower-reputation products. Hence, government regulatory behavior is subject to influence from performance signals such as product reputation.

This study aims to examine the implications of short-term and long-term reputation change because of government agency responses to firm product defects.

This study’s findings have important implications for both scholars and practitioners. From a scholarly perspective, the authors create a more fine-grained examination of reputation that may be used to assess various performance dimensions. From a practice perspective, managers must realize that reputation can be one of an organization’s most important resources as it meets each of the valuable, rare, inimitable and nonsubstitutable criteria associated with those resources capable of providing sustainable competitive advantage.

Analysis of 17,879 product recalls from 15 automobile manufacturers in the US suggests that firms with higher long-term reputations are more likely to face regulator sanctions when a reputation-damaging event happens. On the other hand, firms with higher short-term reputations are less likely to face sanctions in such circumstances. Finally, firms whose short-term reputation exceeds their long-term reputation are less likely to be sanctioned by regulators when reputation-damaging events occur.

There are several limitations that should be addressed. First, as our reputation measure is based on government investigations of potential defects, vehicles that have never been inspected are not included in the sample. Although this number is likely extremely low, omitting vehicles that have never been inspected leaves out some high-reputation firms from the sample. In addition, the study relies on a single-firm stakeholder that is capable of punitive actions.

From a practical perspective, this study’s findings encourage managers to think about the temporal aspects associated with firm reputation, and to realize that stakeholders may react differently when their expectations are not met depending on an organization’s relative long- and short-term reputations. From a theoretic perspective, the primary contribution of this study is to illustrate how long-term and short-term changes in reputation can provide mixed signals to firm stakeholders regarding future performance.

This study explores the temporal aspects of firm reputation by examining how government sanctions vary depending on firms’ long-term (10 years) and short-term (1 year) reputation. The findings of this study contribute to current reputation research by illustrating the variation in government responses to product defects as a function of short-term and long-term reputation. In doing so, the important role of the timing of firm performance is considered.

This study aims to examine conditions in which firm political market performance is associated with firm efforts to influence regulatory outcomes. Applying measures of political market performance based on firm performance in government enforcement actions and a firm’s ability to obtain favorable political outcomes, the authors make the case that political market performance is a key part of competitive political markets, which is associated with particular types of firm efforts to influence policy.

Longitudinal examination of nine automobile manufacturers during National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration crash tests reveals that firm performance in government enforcement activities is associated with greater efforts to cooperate with political suppliers, while declining firm performance in efforts to influence political outcomes is associated with increased firm opposition to political supplier actions.

Firm performance in government enforcement activities is associated with greater efforts to cooperate with political suppliers, while declining firm performance in efforts to influence political outcomes is associated with increased firm opposition to political supplier actions.

Performance in regulatory enforcement results in increased firm actions to engage regulators in the policy-making process, while performance in obtaining desired policy outcomes is associated with a greater focus on opposition to proposed standards. These results suggest that political demanders can take deliberate actions to either engage or oppose supplier actions based on political market performance.

The primary contribution of this research is to begin to examine the implications of performance dynamics within political markets. Adding the construct of political market performance to the political markets framework reveals that variations in political market performance can be associated with specific types of corporate political activity.

The purpose of this paper is to apply firm aspiration theory to explore how firms respond to government product ratings.

Longitudinal examination of nine automobile manufacturers during National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration crash tests in the USA.

Firms take specific external actions to influence the political mechanisms that support ranking schemes when product ratings are below those of rivals and when previously highly rated products decline. In addition, firms receiving rankings above those of their competitors are found to be less likely to take such action, even when their overall ratings declined. Similarly, firms seeing improvements in previously low-rated products will take fewer actions aimed at influencing the political mechanisms that support rating schemes.

The primary contribution of this research is in establishing when firm product ratings will result in actions to influence external ratings criteria. Previous research has shown that firms respond to organizational ratings by taking action aimed at improving subsequent performance. The current research builds on such work by applying aspiration theory in an effort to predict and explain when and why certain ratings will attract firm attention to the external mechanisms that support such ratings.

The purpose of this paper is to apply Frank Baum’s The Wizard of Oz to illustrate the individual identity issues that can arise as a result of institutional complexity in organizations. Using Baum’s text to tell the story of four faculty members seeking the city of Oz, which in our story is a university athletic department, reveals how individuals and organizational units deal with the tensions brought about by institutional complexity. In addition to providing an entertaining, perhaps infuriating account of the typical public university, this essay reveals the importance of understanding individual struggles to deal with organizational pluralism.

The authors use the well-established example of the university using Frank Baum’s The Wizard of Oz in allegorical form to illustrate the tensions that emerge from organizational units that deal with contradicting external environments as well as the sensemaking and search processes that can emerge for individuals dealing with the identity issues that can result from such tensions.

Internal tensions can emerge within organizations when there are contradictions among the various pressures such organizations generate. These tensions have implications on individual identity.

Individuals (in this case individuals from academic units) risk having their occupational identities compromised by divergent organizational units as these units attempt to legitimate their existence within the organization. The authors illustrate how individuals deal with such risks by engaging in search processes that seek to construct their identities and develop meaning for their actions.

The current study seeks to contribute to current self-regulation research by first exploring the association between the cost of self-regulation and firm self-regulation. The mediating role of association membership and firm slack is additionally explored.

Longitudinal analysis of firm-initiated product recalls for 15 manufacturers in the USA automobile industry from 1966 to 2012 has several important findings regarding the motivations for firm self-regulation.

The influence of industry associations and firm absorbed slack both contribute to firm self-regulation.

The current study begins to address the importance of firm characteristics in predicting self-regulation activities. The bulk of existing research has examined self-regulation at the industry level as an activity performed as a result of the adoption of formalized industry sanctioned standards of practice. This research contributes to such work by examining firm proactivity in the absence of such formal standards.

The purpose of this study is to integrate institutional theory with current research in corporate political strategy and political science to examine the relationship between organizations and regulatory agencies. It seeks to explore the limits of the power of the state to regulate organizations by comparing the historical timing of industry regulation of two different fields. It aims to examine two US regulatory agencies – the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

The paper presents a longitudinal analysis of two US regulatory agencies that illustrates differences in agency responses to firm resistance. Specifically, event history analysis and maximum likelihood estimation are used to examine the impact that firms in the commercial airline and automobile industry have in the rule‐making process of the FAA and NHTSA.

Distinct differences were found between the rule‐making context of the airline and automobile industries.

The study focuses on the rule‐making context of two regulatory agencies. Examining additional agencies in future studies would help confirm the results of this study. Moreover, because the study is limited to regulatory agencies in the USA, the results may not be directly generalizable to other nations.

This study emphasizes the importance of historical context and its impact on current industry conditions, particularly in regulation.

The purpose of this paper is to deal with the issue of market redefinition through an examination of a unique industry that has met with multiple obstacles: online gambling. The main research question is how markets get redefined when quantum technological change occurs, despite the lack of formal support and a highly fragmented industry structure, typical in online industries.

This industry lends itself to the analysis because of the intense competition for reconstruction of the field among state powers, professional associations, and global forces. The paper provides an archival and qualitative overview of the industry and identify the various forces competing for dominance in the market. It examines the competing logics in this industry and identify the sources and implications of such competition for emerging markets.

Both broad and specific contributions of this paper are discussed, namely the important role of professional and interest associations in industries without clear geographical boundaries, as well as the growing role for global moderating agencies.

The paper provides a timely example of the ways in which firms organize in the modern business environment. In addition, it discusses the volatile and complex power structure in a global economy. While the research is necessarily processual and does not provide for multiple settings, the extent of legal implications here can be generalized to much smaller differences in global markets.

This paper provides support for the idea that, contrary to many concepts of industry acceptance and growth, legitimacy is not a requisite condition for an industry to prosper.

This essay explores the critical vision of Francisco Barrera Lavalle about the Mexico’s Monetary Reform of 1905. In his critique, Barrera inserts an argument about the nature of the balance of payments in the Mexican economy: the disequilibria in Mexico’s trade balance were structurally recurrent given the characteristics of what the country exports: commodities and raw materials. Barrera believed that the authorities made the mistake of overvaluing the peso, assigning it a value higher than what silver currency was worth at the time on international markets. Barrera also dismissed the idea that monetary stability could be achieved by suspending the free coinage of silver currency. Finally, Barrera held that banks should be obligated to pay their banknotes in gold, as they were in Great Britain and in the United States, not in silver coins.