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The current study seeks to contribute to current self-regulation research by first exploring the association between the cost of self-regulation and firm self-regulation. The mediating role of association membership and firm slack is additionally explored.

Longitudinal analysis of firm-initiated product recalls for 15 manufacturers in the USA automobile industry from 1966 to 2012 has several important findings regarding the motivations for firm self-regulation.

The influence of industry associations and firm absorbed slack both contribute to firm self-regulation.

The current study begins to address the importance of firm characteristics in predicting self-regulation activities. The bulk of existing research has examined self-regulation at the industry level as an activity performed as a result of the adoption of formalized industry sanctioned standards of practice. This research contributes to such work by examining firm proactivity in the absence of such formal standards.

A large literature studies why firms self-regulate and “signal green.” However, it has ignored that regulators have enforcement discretion, and may act strategically. We fill this gap. We build a game theoretic model of whether a firm should signal its type through substantial self-regulation. We find self-regulation is a double-edged sword: it can potentially preempt legislation, but it can also lead regulators to demand higher levels of compliance from greener firms if preemption fails. We show how self-regulatory decisions depend upon industry characteristics and political responsiveness to corporate environmental leadership. We have made a number of simplifying assumptions. We assume activist groups cannot challenge regulatory flexibility in court, and that regulatory penalties are fixed and are not collected by the regulator. Firms with low compliance costs confront a tradeoff regarding self-regulation. They can blend in with the rest of the industry, and take few self-regulatory steps. This reduces the risk of regulation somewhat, and preserves their ability to obtain regulatory flexibility should regulation be imposed. Alternatively, they can step up with substantial self-regulation. This better mitigates the risk of regulation, but at the risk of signaling low costs and becoming a target for stringent enforcement should regulation pass. Recent work has found negative market reactions to corporate claims of voluntary emissions reductions, despite the conventional wisdom that it “pays to be green.” We offer a new explanation to scholars and managers: regulatory discretion may undermine the ability of industry self-regulation to profitably preempt mandatory regulatory requirements.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a better understanding of the mechanisms by which symbolic commitment to self-regulation influences corporate environmental performance through the adoption of substantive actions.

Using a sample of Chinese listed private firms in manufacturing sectors, this paper empirically investigates whether and how corporate symbolic commitment to environmental self-regulation really improves the consequences of corporate activities with respect to environmental issues under the current Chinese context. A moderated mediation analysis is employed to test the hypotheses and examine the relationships proposed in the research framework.

The authors argue that making a commitment to environmental self-regulation could motivate firms to implement effective means of being green. The intriguing and robust results show that firms with higher ranking environmental commitment are more likely to use political connections to obtain resources (green subsidies), and then improve environmental performance.

The results of this study provide a snapshot of the mechanism between symbolic promises and real outcomes.

The authors theorize about and test both direct and indirect effects of commitment to self-regulation on real outcomes which provide empirical evidence for the incipient but growing understanding of self-regulation.

The current research aims to explore how the implementation of new regulatory forms contributes to firm self-regulation.

Longitudinal analysis of firm-initiated product recalls for 15 manufacturers in the US automobile industry from 1966–2012.

Examining firm-initiated product recalls for 15 manufacturers in the US automobile industry from 1966–2012 has several important findings regarding how the introduction of specific regulatory forms contributes to firm-initiated vehicle recalls. Firms are not likely to self-regulate in response to surveillance or standards-based regulation while information-based regulation results in a greater likelihood of firm self-regulation.

This result suggests that even at the product level; firms become increasingly motivated to self-regulate as regulators introduce information-based regulations.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the regulation of advertising by considering market‐driven firms (those seeking to keep within the boundaries set by social and industry norms) and market drivers (those seeking to stretch boundaries to gain a competitive advantage). Thought is also given to the costs of regulation and tolerance to the social purse, and the benefits gained by compliance and violation.

The authors develop a conceptual argument for boundary stretching where market drivers are present in a marketplace dominated by market‐driven firms. The authors then apply a game theory model to examine the conditions, the firm responses, and Government responses. In doing so the authors investigate incentives for non‐compliant behavior in a self‐regulated market and show that a firm can achieve a market advantage by stretching advertising boundaries.

Results suggest that when government takes a “wait‐and‐see” approach of partial tolerance, then the market driver can become the focal point for the market‐driven, and a shift will take place in the regulatory boundary. If the government is the boundary shifter then social engineers are taking advantage of artificial boundaries they know will not be enforced, with implications for campaigns such as drink‐driving, smoking, and domestic violence. Also, the market driver will gain a competitive advantage by entering a market‐driven marketplace through boundary shifts, even after incurring an initial penalty.

The research demonstrates a need for research into marketing regulation to consider firm types, violation types, and tolerance levels. The study contributes to our understanding of marketer activity with two implications; first the firm is shifting the boundaries and redefining the market focal point as themselves, rather than violating the boundaries and setting themselves outside the rules. Second, depending on the level of tolerance that government has with the regulation of advertising, there is a cost to both the social purse and to market‐driven firms associated with boundary shifters.

A market driver, looking for growth opportunities, should try to enter markets dominated by market‐driven firms, and which have self‐regulation, while market driven firms should either look for regulatory protection or act collectively to wield power over third parties – for example forcing media outlets not to carry market driver advertising.

By introducing the concept of boundary stretching and allowing for market drivers and market driven firms, the authors show the effects of regulation (or tolerance) in a realistic setting and allow for the real‐world dynamics of a marketplace where new ideas create new focal points for social acceptance. This study also provides a clear illustration of the usefulness of game theory in marketing studies.

Globalization increases concerns about national governments’ ability to regulate firms’ environmental conduct because firms can avoid complying with stringent environmental regulations by locating polluting operations in countries with low regulations. Business self-regulation is increasingly seen as a force that can counterbalance the decreasing power of governments in the global economy. Previous research identified external stakeholder pressures as an important determinant of business self-regulation. In this chapter we explore how firm capabilities affect the likelihood that firms self-regulate their environmental conduct by adopting ISO 14000 environmental standards. Our findings show that firm capabilities are indeed an important determinant of self-regulation in the global economy. We discuss implications of this finding for governments, other stakeholders, and business decision makers.

This paper provides a perspective on the field of nonmarket strategy. It does not attempt to survey the literature but instead focuses on the substantive content of research in the field. The paper discusses the origins of the field and the roles of nonmarket strategy. The political economy framework is used and contrasted with the current form of the resource-based theory. The paper argues that research should focus on the firm level and argues that the strategy of self-regulation can be useful in reducing the likelihood of challenges from private and public politics. The political economy perspective is illustrated using three examples: (1) public politics: Uber, (2) private politics: Rainforest Action Network and Citigroup, and (3) integrated strategy and private and public politics: The Fast Food Campaign. The paper concludes with a discussion of research issues in theory, empirics, and normative assessment.

Debate is growing around the expansion of risk-based regulation. The regulation scholarship provides evidence of regulatory failure of the risk-based approach in different domains, including financial regulation. Therefore, this paper aims to provide cautionary evidence about the risk of regulatory failure of risk-based strategy in the financial regulation while using enterprise risk management (ERM) as a meta-regulatory toolkit.

Based on interview data gathered from 30 risk managers of banks and five regulatory personnel, combined with secondary data, this study mainly explores the challenges for meaningful use of ERM based self-regulation in regulated banks. The evidence helps to assess the risk of regulatory failure of the risk-based regulation while using ERM.

The evidence reflects that regulated banks face diverse challenges arising from both peripheral and internal environments that limit the true internalization of ERM-based self-regulation. Despite this, the regulator uses this self-regulation as a meta-regulatory toolkit under the risk-based regulation to achieve the regulatory aims. However, the lack of true internalization of ERM based self-regulation is likely to raise the risk of regulatory failure of risk-based regulation to achieve the regulatory goals. Risk-based regulation is an evolving strategy in the regulatory regime. Therefore, care should be taken while using ERM as a regulatory toolkit before relying on it substantially.

The paper provides empirical insights about the challenges for effective use of ERM as a meta regulatory toolkit that might be useful practically both to the regulators and regulated firms.

This paper aims to examine, through a qualitative study, how auditor independence is socially constructed within the network of individuals involved in the realization of ISO 14001 audit engagements – ISO auditors, consultants, and managers of certified companies. The paper analysis focuses on the sense-making strategies used by actors within the network to develop and sustain trust (or doubt) in professional independence.

This study is predicated on a theoretical perspective centered on sense-making processes and the construction of inter-subjective meanings around claims to expertise. Interviews were conducted with 36 Canadian practitioners – including ISO auditors, managers of certification bodies, accreditation inspectors, consultants, and corporate environmental managers – to better understand how confidence into auditor independence is constituted in the flow of daily life within the small group of people involved in the surroundings of ISO 14001 audit engagements.

Practitioners use a range of sense-making strategies to construct and maintain the belief that IS0 14001 audits meet the professional requirements of auditor independence. As such, the constitution of confidence involves stereotyping, distancing, storytelling and procedural mechanisms that are collectively mobilized in the production of a culture of comfort surrounding the concept of auditor independence.

Through interviews with a range of actors involved in the achievement of ISO 14001 audits, the study provides insight into the production of meaning related to one of the chief claims surrounding auditing expertise, that of professional independence. This paper also points to a lack of self-criticism in the ISO auditing community since practitioners seem disinclined to adopt a reflective attitude of professional skepticism towards the claim of auditor independence.

Regulations and complying with regulation are a considerable burden on small firms, which consistently report that regulation is an obstacle to growth. Regulation for small business includes financial and psychological costs and worry about non‐compliance. Accordingly, regulation inflation raises increasing difficulties in understanding and complying with new regulation. Time and resources are diverted from running or growing the business. This paper explores self‐regulation as a mechanism for resolving the problems of regulation.

The authors first sets out the “regulation problem” as seen by the research community and by small business. The analysis explores the issues associated with small business regulation and compliance. They show that “imposed” regulation is expensive and may not be very effective. They continue by examining the nature of self‐regulation and consider a case study: the auto trade.

Self‐regulation can have beneficial effects. All regulation need not be top down control and command and self‐regulation can be effective if done well.

Self‐regulation seems to offer a number of advantages over legislation for small businesses, but it appears that a number of conditions need to be met if they are to be seen as effective. The authors discuss the implications and benefits of SFROs as an alternative way of assuring regulatory compliance.

Self‐regulation presents an attractive solution to some of the problems encountered by small business regulation through providing a credible, flexible and cost effective alternative to command and control legislation.