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This study examines how creditor interventions after debt covenant violations affect corporate tax avoidance. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that creditor interventions increase borrowers' tax avoidance. This effect is concentrated among firms with weaker shareholder governance before creditor interventions and among those with less bargaining power during subsequent debt renegotiations. Our results indicate that creditors play an active role in shaping corporate tax policy outside of bankruptcy.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how changes in creditors' rights affect the dividend policy behavior of corporate firms.

The authors use the implementation of the bankruptcy and insolvency code (IBC) in India in 2016 as a quasi-natural experiment setup. Differential application of this law allows them to use the Difference in Differences approach to extract the marginal impact of change in creditors' rights on the dividend policy.

The authors show that firms responded to strengthening creditors' rights by decreasing their dividend payout. Further, the authors observe that this negative response is conditioned on firm leverage and the nature of the creditor, i.e. public or private. The firms with a greater leverage ratio and a greater proportion of private debt in the total debt in the pre-event period have shown greater response to the change in the law. Lastly, the authors show that stock markets positively respond to the observed decrease in dividends only when a corresponding decrease in the leverage accompanies such a decrease.

The authors contribute to the finance and law literature from several aspects. First, the authors extend this stream by bringing to light the dividend policy response of firms when they are subjected to a change in creditors' rights. Second, the authors also show how firm-level factors like financial policy and the nature of the creditor condition their response to IBC. Lastly, the authors also examine the market reaction to the dividend policy response of firms to the change in bankruptcy law.

The governing role of bank-appointed directors (BADs) on the boards of non-financial firms has a potential to reduce information asymmetry between the firm and non-bank lenders. This should increase the confidence of other creditors in firm activities, thus performing the certification role. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the certification role of BADs.

The authors test their hypotheses by using a panel of Indian non-financial firms. Our approach involves examining whether there is a significant difference in the number of different debt sources, the dispersion of debt among different debt sources, and leverage for BAD and Non_BAD Firms. The authors use univariate analysis and multivariate regression models to test the difference.

The authors find that firms with BADs on their board have (1) access to a higher number of different debt sources, (2) debt distributed evenly among different sources and (3) a higher debt ratio. Overall, our study provides supporting evidence for the certification role that BADs play on the boards of non-financial firms.

The authors contribute to the literature in two aspects. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the only study that examines the effect of the governing role of banks on the lending decisions of non-bank lenders. Second, our study is associated with the growing body of the governance literature in the emerging markets context by examining the interaction of financial policies and governance in an institutional framework, which is very different from that of the developed world.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of bank interventions on bond performance in relation to loan covenant violations.

This paper tests the following questions: do bondholders receive benefits from bank interventions? Is bond performance related to the probability of bank interventions? Is the turnover of a chief executive officer (CEO) associated with bank interventions and bond performance? Abnormal bond returns, the difference between bond returns and matched bond index returns are used to measure bond performance. An estimated outstanding loan balance is used to measure the probability of bank interventions. CEO turnover is identified from proxy statements and categorized into forced and voluntary CEO turnovers. Event studies and regression analysis were used to answer the above research questions.

This paper finds that both short-term and long-term bond returns increase after covenant violations, bond performance is positively related to the probability of bank interventions, forced CEO turnovers are positively associated with the probability of bank interventions and firms with forced CEO turnovers tend to have superior bond performance.

This paper is the first to explore the relation between bank interventions and bond performance.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the impact of the bank-appointed directors on the agency costs of debt by using the idiosyncratic risk of stock returns as a measure of agency costs of debt.

We use multivariate panel regression, event study and finally, propensity score matching approaches to test our hypothesis. The robustness of the results is tested for possible endogeneity issues by employing instrumental variable two-stage least square (IV-2SLS) technique.

Consistent with the efficient monitoring hypothesis, we find a negative relationship between the presence of the bank-appointed director and the idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns among Indian firms. This implies that such firms take up less risky investment projects.

We contribute to the literature from two aspects. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that examines the monitoring efficiency of creditors' governance. Hitherto, such examinations are done from the shareholders' perspective. Second, we examine the role of the bank-appointed directors on the board of non-financial firms in an emerging world context and find, contrary to the existing evidence in the US context, active monitoring role played by such directors.

The purpose of this study is to conduct an empirical investigation on how country-specific characteristics such as the quality of the institutional environment and the restrictiveness of capital control policy affect domestic financial sector’s ability to provide liquidity to the economy.

This study uses panel regressions on international banking data across 102 countries from Bankscope.

The results show that strong institutions and looser capital control in a country enhance the banks’ role as the liquidity provider to the economy. The study also finds that institutional quality and capital control have a dynamic effect that influences the creation of liquidity. Better institutions benefit the creation of liquidity in either under normal economic conditions or during economic downturn. Loosened capital control, as a result of financial openness, facilitates liquidity creation under normal economic conditions.

This study complements the research on the role of country-level institutions in financial and economic development and suggests a liquidity channel through which a country’s institutions can further economic growth. The study also provides evidence on the impact of a country’s control of capital flows on the role of banking sector in domestic economy.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation between various governance mechanisms and the transparency level by using a sample of the top 200 Chinese charity foundations on net assets.

Three types of governance forces are examined, including the board, the management and the capital providers. The Foundation Transparency Index (FTI), published by Chinese Foundation Center, is used as a proxy for the transparency level.

The evidences show that for the public foundations that can elicit fund from the public, providing compensation to the foundation managers could encourage them to increase the transparency level. Furthermore, the sophisticated donors also represent a useful governance force. For the non-public foundations that can only seek donors through private contacts, getting more members in their supervisory board and having more government grants are helpful in improving their transparency. The results are robust even after controlling for lagged FTI and other characteristics of foundations. And the transparency level is positively associated with the international connections for both types of foundations.

This research is based on a limited sample. The results can hardly generalize to the other smaller foundations. However, the results are still meaningful for to the legislators, regulators and managers of Chinese charity foundations. Because the result implies that the overseas donors are effective monitors that could improve the foundation transparency, the newly published law may weaken this governance force.

This is the first paper that studies the governance of Chinese charity foundations. By using a third-party index to proxy for the transparency, the results complement existing literature.

This study aims to discuss whether a new accounting policy can help enterprises withstand operating risks and whether corporate governance can play a supervisory role. Taiwan took the lead worldwide in allowing companies to distribute cash dividends from capital reserves. Compared with traditional cash dividends distributed from retained earnings, this move was aimed at maintaining the stability of cash dividends and helping listed companies address the risks of temporary downturns. However, the distribution of cash dividends from capital reserves may violate the principle of capital maintenance and damage creditors’ equity. The authors sought to examine whether corporate governance could play a supervisory role.

The present study targeted Taiwanese listed companies and cited data from the Taiwan Economic Journal. The study period was from 2011–2019. The authors tested the hypotheses using the least square method.

The results showed that ultimate controlling shareholders of listed companies can maximize their own interests through ownership arrangements, whereas corporate governance cannot play a supervisory role nor protect creditors’ equity. The findings provide insight on whether, in the development process of corporate governance, appropriate measures are taken to protect creditors’ equity in addition to shareholders’ equity, or achieve a good coordination of interests among all stakeholders.

The ultimate controlling shareholders or directors of a listed company would seek to maximize their own interests, and transfer the operating risks to creditors through the arrangement of dividend policy, thus harming creditors’ equity. However, independent directors cannot play a supervisory role. The authors inferred that corporate governance standards previously focused on the shareholder level or alleviation of the agency problem between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders but ignored creditors’ equity.

In October 2020, Zambia failed to make a $42.5 million interest payment on $1 billion in Eurobonds maturing in 2024, becoming the first African country to default on its debt obligations in the aftermath of COVID-19. Zambia's default highlights the fragmented nature of governance in sovereign debt markets. The Zambian default also underscores the continuing impact of colonial hangover in former colonies in Africa. Fragmented governance and colonial overhang create incentives for both debtors and creditors that contribute to cycles of sovereign debt. These cycles of debt pose a particular hazard to residents within countries that issue such debt. In African contexts, this has led to flows of funds for debt repayment that may significantly jeopardize the well-being of people who are already poor. Zambia's default also reflects the increasing need of African countries to navigate among different external actors, particularly China, which has given loans throughout Africa for varied projects, including infrastructure lending as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. The Zambian default draws attention to the significant amount of Eurobond debt African countries have incurred in recent years and the burdens that such debt may impose. The circumstances of Zambia's default, as well as recent disputes about external debt in Mozambique, reflect continuing issues about transparency and public scrutiny of sovereign debt transactions and the broader societal impact of debt internally within African countries and in relations between African countries and varied external powers.

This paper aims to revisit the Indian experience on corporate bankruptcy law to answer “why Indian corporate insolvency law structured differently from a manager-driven (pre-Insolvency Code) to manager-displacing model (post-Insolvency Code)?”

This paper is qualitative in nature. The paper analyses the prevailing theoretical wisdom in corporate insolvency law in India and examines the practices of Indian bankruptcy regime.

The authors argued, considering the corporate ownership composition, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 will not accomplish the intended objective (i.e. the “creditor primacy”). The findings refute with the evolutionary theory, i.e. debt and equity both will tend towards dispersion in outsider system of governance.

This paper put forward the imprint that Indian corporate insolvency regime is manager-displacing under Law on Books and manager-driven under Law on Practice.