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The purpose of this paper is to explain the rule recently published by the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission that establishes a timetable for the mandatory clearing of interest rate and credit default swaps through a clearinghouse.

The paper discusses the structure of cleared trades in swaps, the classes of interest rate and credit default swaps that are subject to mandatory clearing under the CFTC's new rule and the affirmative and negative specifications for each class, the phased approach adopted by the CFTC for the mandatory clearing compliance schedule, and the end‐user and inter‐affiliate exemptions from the mandatory clearing requirement.

“Centralized clearing,” a process in which bilaterally negotiated trades of derivatives have to be given up to a centralized clearinghouse, is a cornerstone of the new global regulatory system for derivatives. Its proponents argue that centralized clearing will help to mitigate systemic risk by helping counterparties identify and net positions. The paper outlines the clearing rules in the USA for interest rate and credit default swaps.

The paper provides expert guidance from experienced financial services lawyers.

The increased use of checks in nonlocal payments at the end of the nineteenth century presented problems for their clearing and collection. Checks were required to be paid in full (at par) only when presented directly to the drawn-upon bank at its counter. Consequently, many, primarily rural or small-town, banks began to charge remittance fees on checks not presented for collection in person. Such fees and the alleged circuitous routing of checks in the process of collection to avoid them were widely criticized defects of the pre-Federal Reserve payments system. As the new Federal Reserve established its own system for check clearing and collection, it also took as an implicit mandate the promotion of universal par clearing and collection. The result was a bitter struggle with non-par banks, the numbers of which initially shrunk dramatically but then rebounded. A 1923 Supreme Court decision ended the Fed’s active (or coercive) pursuit of universal par clearing, and non-par banking persisted thereafter for decades. Not until the Monetary Control Act of 1980 was universal par clearing and true monetary union, in which standard means of payment are accepted at par everywhere, achieved.

This paper aims to discuss the European Commission’s proposal for a central counterparty (CCP) recovery and resolution regulation. In this respect, the paper comments the consequences, risks and attention points for CCPs and their authorities.

This paper focuses on the proposed rules surrounding CCP recovery and resolution. The paper first familiarizes the reader with the risk management procedures currently obliged before discussing the resolution and recovery provisions foreseen in the proposal.

The proposed regulation commands significant requirements for CCPs and for their regulators. Not only will CCPs have to draft a recovery plan but also a resolution authority will need to be assigned. The latter will have the task, in consultation with a resolution college, to draft a resolution plan. When a resolution is inevitable, authorities will need to assure the continuation of the CCP’s critical functions, thereby warranting financial stability and investor protection.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, there are no other papers that provide a holistic overview of the newly proposed regulation and describe the choices to be made during a CCP’s resolution. This paper will be of interest to all CCPs and their stakeholders, such as their regulators, clearing members and their clients and other linked financial market infrastructures.

This paper aims to apply blockchains (BCs) for trade clearing and settlement in a realistic clearinghouse. The purpose is to demonstrate the feasibility and scalability of this approach.

The study uses account BCs and trading BCs as building blocks for trade clearing and settlement. Careful design is made to ensure that this approach is feasible and scalable.

A design has been proposed that can process hundreds of thousands of trades for a clearinghouse and it addresses performance, privacy and scalability of realistic trade clearing and settlement. The design has been implemented and experimented in a clearinghouse for over two months and processes over 3B real transactions from an exchange. The first month was to experiment with the system with historical data, the second month was to experiment with real-time data during market trading hours. The system performed as designed and intended.

This is the first large research paper that applied BCs for clearing in the world. The authors applied the system to a clearinghouse and processed over 3 billion transactions, equivalent to 13 years of London Stock Exchange transaction volume, demonstrating that BCs can handle a large number of transactions.

The design can be duplicated to many clearinghouses in the world, and this also paves the way BCs can be used in large financial institutions.

An implication is that other trading firms, clearinghouses and banks can apply the same technology for trade clearing, ushering the way BCs can be used in institutions. As clearing is a core function in business transactions, this has significant implications. The design can be discussed and improved in various communities.

As this is the first application of BCs to large clearinghouses that uses unique BC designs. This has significant value. Many studies have been performed but few have been reported in the scientific community. The system has been implemented, experimented and demonstrated in public for months.

Systemic risk propagated through over‐the‐counter (OTC) derivatives can best be managed by a public‐private central counterparty clearing house. The purpose of this paper is to outline the market microstructure necessary for such a clearing house.

The paper proposes using an request for quote platform with an active permissioning system that uses analytic approximations based on Monte Carlo simulation to estimate default risk and a two‐part pricing scheme to efficiently price that risk.

It is found that comprehensive clearing for complex and standardized derivatives is feasible using the clearing framework.

This research is limited by the authors' ability to give empirical examples. The paper gives a short example with data, but given the constraints on length, cannot go into more detail.

This comprehensive clearing structure, in contrast to current proposed government regulations, will not drive out the “good” with the “bad” OTC derivative instruments.

This is the only paper the authors are aware of that outlines a detailed framework for clearing all OTC derivatives.

A spate of micro‐cap stock fraud cases in the 1990s has led the SEC to focus on the conduct of clearing brokers whose introducing firms acted as underwriters or market makers of new small‐cap issues. This article outlines the SEC's regulatory and enforcement guidelines regarding the clearing brokers, and shows that the agency's position encourages the continued growth of clearing arrangements while giving it flexibility to sanction clearing firms in appropriate cases.

The purpose of this paper is to answer a specific research question: How have EU and US regulators translated the idea of central clearing into law?

A meticulous legal research is carried out. First, the pre‐crisis regulatory regime for credit default swap (CDS) is reviewed, from a securities law angle as well as from a comparative Euro‐American perspective. Next, the regulatory processes leading to the adoption of the central clearing regulations are discussed. Thereafter, a material comparative analysis is made of the provisions related to central clearing in the EU and US regulatory initiatives. Finally, the paper is concluded with an evaluation of both legislations in the light of all previous analyses.

The research first shows that central clearing regulations rely on a series of presumptions, both concerning the gravity of counterparty risk threats and the necessity of central clearing. Additionally, the EU and US clearing regulations are similar with regard to the broad innovations they introduce, i.e. the mandatory central clearing of a variety of over‐the‐counter derivatives and counterparty risk management requirements for central clearing institutions and for non‐cleared swaps. However, the specific content of the provisions often differs. Furthermore, both legislations are limited to enouncing broad principles. This is also the case for the crucial provisions related to counterparty risk management. Therefore, these provisions in se do not guarantee the proper regulation of counterparty risk management practices. Consequently, much is to be expected from the implementing measures adopted by regulatory institutions.

The paper provides an overview of those provisions in the European and US regulations that specifically concern central clearing for CDS. It is one of the first papers which does this in a very well‐structured and clearly written manner. Also it is one of the first to provide a clear comparison between the provisions in the EU and the US regulations.

This paper investigates the impact of moving Central Counterparty Clearing Houses (CCPs) that clear euro-denominated transactions to the Eurozone after the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union. Prior to Brexit, the City of London had a dominant position in euro-clearing, but in the aftermath of Brexit, clearing houses might decide to move to the EU27. This paper aims to investigate the impact of moving euro-clearing to the EU27.

This paper provides an economic, political and legal investigation based on desk research. It studies the relevant materials, as they relate to the functioning of Central Counterparty Clearing in the aftermath of Brexit, with specific attention to the potential shift of locations and oversight.

The development of a EU27 financial hub and the possibility to increase oversight over euro-denominated financial transactions, which were partly at the roots of the financial and Eurozone crisis, could strengthen the market shaping of European financial markets. However, localizing euro-denominated transactions in Europe could potentially give rise to efficiency losses and a higher risk for companies and investors. Furthermore, the European regulatory framework currently faces certain weaknesses, obstructing the regulatory potential of the EU.

As the Brexit negotiations are not yet finished, this paper does not intend to set out a definite outcome of the processes currently taking place.

Shifting locations and oversight of CCPs as a result of Brexit could lead to the establishment of a large financial centre within the EU-27. At the same time, it is to be expected that such a development will have a significant impact on the financial infrastructure of the City of London.

There exists an important trade-off with regard to shifting locations that need to be at the forefront of the discussions and the negotiations when dealing with Brexit. This seems to be neglected in a lot of the current policy debates. This paper takes stock of the ongoing debate and how it relates to the functioning of CCPs.

The paper discusses the main features of Hongkong Clearing's new ‘compulsory’ stock borrowing programme, the reasons behind its implementation, the risk exposure of lenders and the borrower (ie Hongkong Clearing), and problems associated with the lack of collateral for loaned stocks and possible solutions.