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Al‐Qaeda poses a major challenge to western democracies with its international networks and suicide attacks; it has been involved in some of the most horrific terrorist attacks across the world. As a result the UK, similar to many other countries, has enacted hard‐line counter‐terrorism legislation that has had an impact upon Muslim community relations with law enforcement agencies. This paper aims to examine the glorification offence under the Terrorism Act and its implications for free speech.

The paper is designed to examine counter‐terrorism legislation in Britain and in particular the offence of glorification and the impact it has had upon Muslim communities using empirical case studies and theoretical evidence.

It is found that Muslim communities feel that their freedom of speech, thought and expression have been seriously curtailed as a result of the glorification offence and has led them to feel a sense of alienation and stigma which has manifested itself in the community by not trusting law enforcement agencies and counter‐terrorism policies.

In order to build trust with the Muslim community law enforcement agencies such as the police need to ensure that they do not disproportionately use their power of arrest under the guise of combating terrorism. Therefore, there is a need for law enforcement agencies to improve their internal and external structures through a process of engagement and understanding Muslim communities which would help rebuild trust and confidence.

The paper examines counter‐terrorism legislation and provides a theoretical framework for how policy should be shaped in the area of counter‐terrorism. Currently the literature available concerning the new government reforms and the glorification offence under the Terrorism Act is limited and thus this paper provides a unique contribution towards understanding this offence in more detail and the impact it may have upon Muslim communities and civil liberties.

The 2006 General Assembly adoption of the United Nations (UN) Global Counter-terrorism strategy marked the first time all member states ratified a collective counter-terrorism (CT) agenda. Building on the 2000 Millennium Development Goals, the strategy incorporated Amartya Sen's capability-based approach to development. This promised human-oriented and holistic methods for countering terrorism and violent extremism, in contrast to the post-2001 ‘hard security’ context of the United States–led Global War on Terror (GWOT). Although the first pillar of the strategy emphasised human rights and social progress over isolated economic growth, poverty, violence and retrogression in conflict zones since 2006 have led to the deaths of millions. Combined with resource scarcity and environmental devastation, insurgency-related conflicts have resulted in 70 million people displaced worldwide in 2019, while the politically violent phenomena of extreme right-wing nationalism and neo-jihadism remain prevalent. Reflecting on the social and economic outcomes of the GWOT, this chapter evaluates development-related discourses and activity in UN-led initiatives to counter and prevent violent extremism and terrorism. In doing so, it accounts for the impacts of UN CT measures on contemporary patterns ‘in phenomena described in policy arenas as ‘violent extremism’ and ‘terrorism’, including ‘neo-jihadism’ and right-wing extremism, in Global North and Global South contexts.

Post-9/11 a first order terrorism narrative has been widely asserted. In this chapter, I explore the development of second order terrorism narrative or ideal-type.

The chapter begins by providing a brief synopsis of three highly mediated Australian counter-terrorism operations and of shortcomings in incident counting. It also relies on some U.S. research on counter-terrorism prosecutions in support.

In first order terrorism, crime appears as a spectacular irruption or original sin on a tabula rasa of innocence and there is a clean division between us and them, non-state and state, victim and offender. In the second order terrorism narrative there is a contrasting claim that 9/11 is blowback, in kind, for U.S.-led interventions and does not offer a clean division between how we and they behave, blurs non-state and state culpability in big crimes, and sees victims and offenders trading places over time. As we adjust our perspective from the presumptive first order to second order event-acts, terrorism and counter-terrorism, event-act and interdiction, is merged as one.

The concept may be useful in accounting for assumptions pertaining to this category of crime, including its relation with precaution and security.

The purpose of this paper is to examine evolution of the American strategy toward terrorism in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001. In other words, this study revolves around a key question: How and why the American security strategy toward terrorism evolved in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 2001? Based on the neorealist approach in international relations, this paper attempted to answer that question: first, through defining the concept of terrorism and how the Americans perceive it; second, via pinpointing the characteristic of the American counter-terrorism strategy before September 11 attacks; and third, through examining the effects of those terrorist attacks on that strategy.

The nature of the subject of this study calls for reliance on the analytical descriptive approach to highlight the role and strategy of the USA in the fight against terrorism following the events of September 11, in addition to the use of the system analysis methodology, which can identify the inputs and outputs of the system that had an impact in formulating the US counter-terrorism strategy.

This study has come up with seven findings. The first finding was that the 9/11 attacks served as a turning point of the US counter-terrorism strategy and restructured its agenda. Confronting the communist threat had been its primary objective, until terrorism came to the fore and became its first and foremost priority. The USA vowed that terrorism is its enemy and waged the war on terror to thwart its risk as a global threat. The second finding revolves around the idea of double standards in the American foreign policy. True to its long-standing tradition of favoring its own interests, in complete disregard of the interests of any other party, the USA continued to uphold the double-standards policy.

This study adds a new study to the Arab Library in the field of counter-terrorism studies, national security strategies and American foreign policy. In addition, the researcher seeks to complete the scientific effort to study the US strategy against terrorism, with a clear impact on the development of the situation in the region. This study contributes to the study of how one of the great powers in the international system, the USA, deals with the terrorist organizations that have become widespread in the Arab region.

Purpose – This chapter highlights how counter-radicalization, as a manifestation of diffuse securitizing, impacts the work of Muslim civil society organizations (CSOs) in Canada.

Methodology – The author presents how Muslim communities and their civil society representatives experience and adapt to the pressures from counter-radicalization policies. Data for the analysis are drawn from 16 semi-structured, anonymized interviews with managers and board members of prominent Muslim CSOs that are based in urban centers in Canada with high density of Muslim populations.

Findings – Though counter-radicalization policies are advanced under the rubric of community-orientedness and risk governance, security discourse and practice constructs radicalization as a problem within Muslim communities treating them as suspects who are “potentially radical.” Despite this framing, Muslim CSOs are cooperating with state security agencies in counter-radicalization efforts but are doing so cognizant of the immense power the state exerts over them in such “partnerships.” CSOs are raising questions about the selective nature of security practice which views Muslims as dangerous and violent but fails to fully acknowledge their reality as victims of Islamophobic violence. CSOs are using anti-racism, anti-oppression, and rights-based frames to call out the discriminatory treatment of Muslims under national security.

Originality/Value – The author’s study contributes to a community perspective in counterterrorism and counter-radicalization research that is dominated by analyses from “above.” By sharing the experiences of Canadian Muslim CSOs under counter-radicalization, the author illustrates the practice of “diffuse securitizing” and how it limits the work of civil society in liberal democracies.

Procedural justice is important for fostering peoples’ willingness to cooperate with police. Theorizing suggests this relationship results because procedural justice enhances perceptions that the police are legitimate and entitled to be supported. The purpose of this paper is to examine how legitimacy perceptions moderate the effect of procedural justice policing on Muslims’ willingness to cooperate with police.

Survey data from 800 Muslims in Australia are used.

This study shows Muslims’ procedural justice perceptions are positively associated with two types of cooperation: willingness to cooperate with police in general crime control efforts; and willingness to report terror threats to police. Muslims’ perceptions of police legitimacy and law legitimacy also influence willingness to cooperate. Specifically, police legitimacy is more important for predicting general willingness to cooperate with police, while law legitimacy is more important for predicting Muslims’ willingness to report terror threats. Importantly, legitimacy perceptions moderate the relationship between procedural justice and both types of cooperation. Specifically, procedural justice promotes cooperation more strongly for those who question the legitimacy of police or the legitimacy of counter-terrorism laws, but the moderation effects differ across the two cooperation contexts. The findings have implications for procedural justice scholarship and for counter-terrorism policing.

The current paper examines an under-explored aspect of legitimacy; it examines police legitimacy perceptions, but also examines how people view the legitimacy of laws police enforce (i.e. law legitimacy). It is argued that perceptions about law legitimacy can also impact people’s willingness to cooperate with police.

The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that to what extent the Iranian criminalisation of terrorism financing meets the international standards of counter-terrorism financing regime, particularly the Financing Convention and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations, and what is the main impediment for Iran to integrate at the international level to combat terrorism financing. Also, it tries to rate the Iranian criminalisation of terrorism financing in accordance with the FATF technical compliance rating.

This subject is analysed from an Iranian perspective by undertaking fieldwork through collecting documents in Iran and using the official documents, statements and laws, particularly the Iranian Law of Combating Financing of Terrorism (2018) from both Persian and English sources.

Iran’s terrorism financing offence is not completely in line with international counter-terrorism financing regime because of an exemption for the struggle of individuals, nations and national liberation movements with the aim of countering domination, foreign occupation, colonisation and racism. The Iranian support for national liberation movements is derived from the Constitutional Law that requires Iran supports the struggles of the oppressed for their rights against the oppressors anywhere in the world. As a result, the FATF Recommendation 5 (criminalisation of terrorism financing) would be rated partially compliant.

No article exists specifically on this research field. To the author’s knowledge, this paper, for the first time, examines the Iranian criminalisation of terrorism financing. It rates the criminalisation (Recommendation 5) based on the FATF technical compliance rating because no mutual evaluation has been conducted to date. The paper is useful for academicians, law enforcement, policymakers, legislators and researchers.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the unintended consequences, financial exclusion, of counter-terrorism financing regulations in terms of their impact on financial inclusion and, consequently, the creation of an ineffective counter-terrorism financing framework. A further aim is to make recommendations to mitigate these unintended consequences.

This subject is examined by using the practices of a range of countries and organisations. The interdisciplinary approach of the paper is highlighted, which comprises criminal law, banking law, international law and human rights law.

Financial exclusion is a focal point that results in ineffective counter-terrorism measures which are caused mostly by the formal financial sector, in particular, the banking system. The financial exclusion also leads to counter-productive counter-terrorism financing through a low risk-appetite, de-risking, de-banking, financial exclusion and using unregulated or less-regulated and supervised financial systems.

No article comprehensively analyses financial exclusion as a consequence of counter-terrorism financing framework. The paper examines the process of counter-terrorism financing regulations, which leads to financial exclusion. In addition, the impact of financial exclusion on all relevant actors, such as individuals, correspondent banking relationships, money and value transfer services, charities and virtual currencies, is examined.

Purpose – To examine how John Stuart Mill’s harm principle can guide debates surrounding definitions of radicalization, extremism, and deradicalization.

Methodology/Approach – This chapter begins by surveying definitional debates in terrorism studies according to three identified binaries: (1) cognitive versus behavioral radicalization; (2) violent extremism versus non-violent extremism; and (3) deradicalization versus disengagement. The author then interprets Mill’s harm principle and assesses which interpretation researchers and policy-makers should favor.

Findings – Applying the harm principle suggests that researchers and policy-makers should prefer behavioral over cognitive radicalization, violent over non-violent extremism, and disengagement over deradicalization. This is because government intervention in people’s lives can be justified to prevent direct risks of harm, but not to change beliefs that diverge from mainstream society.

Originality/Value – This chapter extends previous work that applied the harm principle to coercive preventive measures in counter-terrorism. It makes an original contribution by applying the principle to definitional debates surrounding radicalization and counter-radicalization. The harm principle provides researchers and policy-makers with a compass to navigate these debates. It offers an analytical method for resolving conceptual confusion.