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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the value of corporate political connections resulting from the revolving door of employment between political office and the for-profit corporation. The authors test whether there is value to firms from political connections provided by the appointment of former politicians to corporate boards or management teams. The authors also test to see if passage through the door in the other direction, from the corporate world to public office, generates value for firms. Do firms whose former employees gain public office earn excess returns following their appointment or election to these positions?

The methodology used in this study focusses on an empirical analysis of the political connections of US firms over the sample period 1996-2011. The analysis emphasizes the wealth effects associated with the announcement of hiring former politicians to corporate boards or the gaining of political office by former corporate employees.

The authors find that politicians becoming corporate directors is 2.5 times more common than corporate executives gaining public office. The authors determine that industries with extensive government regulation most often hire former politicians. The authors find that the office held by former politicians matters. The authors find that longevity in a cabinet position is important while formal Congressional or Senate leadership positions are not. Surprisingly, the authors determine the longer politicians are out of office, the more value they are able to provide to the firm. Finally, the authors discover that firms which hire former politicians have significantly positive long-term abnormal returns, but firms whose managers enter politics do not.

This study is highly original in its examination of political connections resulting from door swing in both directions. Further, the analysis of longevity, time out of office, and position held adds to the contributions made by this study.

We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible “stewards” rather than “agents” of the state.

We test this view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerated not for maximizing equity value but for increasing the value of state-owned assets.

Managerial compensation depends on political connections and prestige, and on the firms’ contribution to political goals. These effects were attenuated since the market-oriented governance reform.

Economic reform without reforming the human resources policies at the executive level enables the autocratic state to exert political power on corporate decision making, so as to ensure that firms’ business activities fulfill the state’s political objectives.

As a powerful social elite, the state-steward managers in China have the same interests as the state (the government), namely extracting rents that should adhere to the nation (which stands for the society at large or the collective private citizens).

As China has been a communist country with a single ruling party for decades, the ideas of socialism still have a strong impact on how companies are run. The legitimacy of the elite’s privileged rights over private sectors is central to our question.

Chinese executive compensation stimulates not only the maximization of shareholder value but also the preservation of the state’s interests.

Many multinational corporations that originate from emerging economies (emerging market multinational corporations (EMNCs)) opt for acquiring a target firm in a developed market to expediently upgrade their strategic capabilities. To successfully achieve their strategic goals in the developed markets, EMNCs may use market actions and nonmarket actions to mitigate the potential risk derived from the national political differences between their home emerging economy and host developed economy. This paper aims to extend the legitimacy-based view of political risk to study the influence of political animosity – defined as misalignment of the host-home countries’ national interests – on the EMNCs’ market and nonmarket strategy in a developed market.

In this paper, we examine all EMNCs that made cross-border acquisitions of the USA targets from 2005 to 2011. The final sample consists of 252 acquisitions originating from 25 emerging markets. This paper used Tobit regression analysis to test the direct and moderating hypotheses.

Facing a high level of political animosity between their home country and the host developed economy, EMNCs use a market strategy by acquiring less ownership stake in the developed market, as well as engage in a nonmarket strategy by increasing lobbying activities. In addition, because of the heightened legitimacy concerns of developed market shareholders, cross-listed EMNCs have a greater tendency than non-cross-listed EMNCs to improve their legitimacy through their market and nonmarket strategy.

The current paper sheds light on EMNCs’ international strategy in developed markets by examining both market and nonmarket actions. EMNCs are shown to be strongly motivated to engage in acquisitions in developed markets so they can acquire invaluable strategic resources, such as brands and distribution channels, to compete with the developed market multinationals. A sophisticated ownership strategy and corporate political activities are invaluable for EMNCs to catch up with developed market multinationals.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the role that corporate political positioning taking is playing in exacerbating political polarization and to suggest that, by contrast, corporations could also play a role in healing some of the increasing divides in democracies around the world.

The paper looks at recent examples of companies taking political positions on controversial public issues and public reactions to those positions in the media.

The author’s analysis suggests that with each subsequent political position announced by companies, the stakes for more extreme and noisy pronouncements become higher and higher. This threatens to be an unsustainable journey, and companies will need to find new ways to communicate their commitment to customers and other stakeholders.

While there has been wide discussion of the increasing propensity of companies to take public positions on social and political issues, the author believes this is the first viewpoint to examine the consequences of this trends over the longer term and its impact on polarization.

The primary purpose is to investigate the relationship between narcissism and managers' overconfidence in listed companies' risk-taking.

In this study, two criteria of signature and reward are used to measure manager's narcissism; manager's overconfidence, using multiple regression models and finally to measure companies' risk-taking by using companies' monthly returns. Multiple regression is employed to test the model using a sample of 890 firm-year participation on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2017 with panel data and model with fixed effects.

The findings indicate that the CEO's narcissism and the board of directors positively and significantly affect corporate risk-taking. Also, managers' overconfidence has a positive and significant relationship with corporate risk-taking.

The results of this study identified other factors affecting companies' risk-taking. This study also contributed to the development of the literature on narcissism, overconfidence and corporate risk-taking.

The purpose of this experimental study is to examine the effects of climate change corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate social advocacy (CSA) messages on public perceptions of companies and collective action intentions.

This study employs a 2 (message type: CSA vs CSR) × 2 (environmental issue: single-use plastics vs renewable energy) × 2 (company: Target vs Walmart) plus control online experimental design.

There were no main effects of message type on outcomes; however, green consumer identity moderated the relationship between message type and green purchase intention as well as negative word-of-mouth.

This study responds to calls by scholars to empirically compare the effects of CSR and CSA messages. Additionally, we consider group-level processes, like ingroup identity, in influencing strategic communication outcomes.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

This study aims to investigate how corporate lobbying affects the relationship between collaboration networks and innovation.

The study incorporates insights from the corporate political strategy perspective into the social network research to examine how firms utilize non‐market mechanisms as a way to manage uncertainty. In particular, using data from 291 US pharmaceutical firms, the authors study the moderating effects of corporate lobbying on the relationship between collaboration networks and firm innovativeness.

The results show that corporate lobbying moderates the relationship between network centrality, structural holes, and network size, and firm innovativeness.

The study integrates social network and corporate political strategy research in the case of collaboration networks. Integrating social network and corporate political strategy literatures provides us with new insights into what determines success of firm innovativeness. The study shows that in addition to network structures, firms must consider other variables such as government regulation in fostering their innovativeness.

This study aims to examine how the political career concerns of top executives affect corporate environmental practices.

Based on rent-seeking theory, this work uses empirical analysis to investigate the impact of top executives’ political connection and political promotion on corporate environmental information disclosure (EID). Data were collected from Chinese listed firms in heavily polluting industries in the Shanghai Stock Market in 2014–2016.

The results reveal that the highly politically connected top executives are more likely to be promoted in their political positions than their counterparts. However, the firms under the management of these highly politically connected executives show low level of EID. The results suggest that the political motivations of top executives with political connection hinders corporate EID.

This paper extends literature system about the impact of executives' rent-seeking on corporate EID by examining the informal mechanisms in terms of political connection and political promotion. It provides insights for studies of corporate environmental strategies and governmental environmental responsibility.