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The aim of this study is to examine the influence of consumer preferences for overseas green products and the implementation of blockchain technology on the performance of a supply chain, which comprises an overseas manufacturer and a domestic e-commerce platform. This research endeavors to identify the optimal pricing decisions and strategies for both the manufacturer and the platform in the context of the expanding e-commerce and globalization of the economy.

The authors propose and analyze four distinct models based on the selection of selling contracts by the manufacturer and the adoption strategy of blockchain by the platform, using game theory to obtain the optimal solutions for these models.

The authors show that consumer migration promotes the manufacturer's green inputs, while the expansion of green consumer proportion is not conducive to it. They also show that blockchain technology has the potential to effectively limit manufacturer cannibalization. Interestingly, the study reveals a cascading effect of advantage where the manufacturer's profit variation trend changes only with the integration of pricing power advantage and blockchain technology inputs. This effect suggests that the equilibrium strategy is achievable under the agency contract with blockchain adoption, while Pareto improvement can be obtained with blockchain technology under both selling contracts.

This research could be extended in several possible directions. First, future work could explore outsourcing strategies for overseas manufacturers. Second, more types of consumer heterogeneity and different risk preferences could be considered. Third, this study can be extended by further exploring the design of mechanisms under asymmetric demand information to make the model more realistic.

The authors examine the impact of market segmentation and consumer preferences on green supply chain decisions, and analyze supply chain members' strategic choices for selling contracts and blockchain adoptions. The research also sheds light on the theoretical underpinnings and practical applications of green supply chain development and blockchain applications.

Contracting is an important issue in supply chain management. In this paper, the authors aim to discuss and compare the manufacturer's contracting options when the retailer faces a traditional newsvendor problem with a fixed retail price: a wholesale price only contract, a wholesale price discount contract, a returns policy contract, and a returns policy with the wholesale price discount contract. The paper also aims to examine how these contracting options affect decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer, as well as the supply chain efficiency.

Models are developed based on the manufacturer's four contracting options. The manufacturer's optimal wholesale prices have been obtained. The ordering decisions of the retailer are discussed in each of the manufacturer's four contracting options. The paper also uses numerical examples to illustrate the author's managerial insights and results.

As compared to the wholesale price only contract, it is found that implementing a wholesale price discount policy effectively encourages the retailer to order more product and enhances the retailer's profit at the expense of lowering the manufacturer's profit. It is also found that when the manufacturer offers a returns policy and if this policy cannot enhance the retailer's profit, a returns policy with the wholesale price discount contract can lead to a win‐win situation for both the manufacturer and the retailer.

The research provides managerial insights on how different contracts affect decisions and efficiency of the supply chain.

Manufacturers increasingly seek new ways to add customer value and differentiate. However, in business markets such efforts often remain relatively unsuccessful, leading to a large number of services offered and higher costs, but with limited corresponding returns. Based on extensive expert interviews and case study research, this paper studies how suppliers in the highly commoditized metalworking industry try to realize new types of customer value. The paper identifies “ideal” value positions pursued by Belgian contract manufacturers and service providers in order to survive in an industry characterized by fierce price competition from low labor cost countries. Further, the paper shows how companies can migrate to these “ideal” value offerings. Key success factors and potential traps for each ideal type are identified. Market strategy transition necessitates an internal “alignment” strategy and an external “coevolution” with chain partners.

This study aims to investigate how bricolage and improvisation increase the opportunities for supply chain integration of contract manufacturers. Connecting bricolage/improvisation with resource dependence theory offers an appropriate theoretical lens with which to understand the increasing focus on the view that bricolage and improvisation are feasible ways to create desired resources for contract manufacturers. Such resources can then enhance the autonomy of contract manufacturers in supply chain by building contract manufacturer–supply chain partner relationship interdependencies.

Given that the primary focus of the study was whether and how contract manufacturers respond to resource constraints, namely, bricolage and improvisation and environmental uncertainty as a moderating effect of fastener contract manufacturers' supplier/buyer integration, only firms that had contractual agreements involving manufacturing services for original equipment manufacturer and/or original design manufacture data were included in this population. This study selected a population from a list of 674 fastener firms provided by the Taiwan Industrial Fastener Institute in 2020 using a mailed survey to test the hypotheses. By the beginning of 2022, 165 completed questionnaires were returned, and the total useable sample was 158.

Hypotheses are tested using 158 contract manufacturers of the Taiwanese fastener industry. Results show that bricolage can lead contract manufacturers to initiate supplier and buyer integration. The moderating effect of environmental uncertainty further strengthens the above positive relationships. Without the moderating effect of the environmental uncertainty, improvisation leads contract manufacturers to initiate only supplier but not buyer integration. However, when the moderating effect of environmental uncertainty is included, improvisation leads contract manufacturers to initiate only buyer integration.

This finding highlights the importance of the environmental uncertainty when contract manufacturers adopt bricolage/improvisation to initiate supply chain integration.

This study aims to examine the value of the call option contract in hedging the risks in the supply chain. The decentralized supply chain without call option contract is first studied as the criterion model for evaluations. This paper addresses several questions: What will be the optimal manufacturer’s production quantity, retailer’s ordering and pricing policies in the presence of random demand and random yield by applying the downconversion approach? How will the call option contract influence the optimal decisions for the members of the supply chain? Can the risk from randomness be divided among the members in the supply chain through the call option contract?

This paper considers a two-level decentralized supply chain under random yield and random demand in which the manufacturer takes advantage of the downconversion approach with two scenarios, with and without option contract. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no article or study uses the downconversion approach in a supply chain regarding random yield and random demand. Furthermore, the paper considers pricing with option contract in the supply chain, which makes this article stands out significantly from other articles in the literature.

This study shows that the downconversion approach would reduce the risk caused by the random yield, which appears to be the appropriate method for the environmental goal of the supply chains. Moreover, adopting a call option contract can increase flexibility and mitigate risks, resulting in more expected members’ profits.

To simplify the model, the authors assume one manufacturer and one retailer, so extending the model to consider multiple retailers instead of one retailer and inventory sharing between them would be interesting. Considering the option and exercise prices as decision variables would be important future research topics. Put option and bidirectional option contracts could be investigated in the future. Another extension is modeling asymmetry of information in supply chain.

This paper provides managerial insights on dealing with both demand and yield risks in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain. The manufacturer has a random yield production and produces two types of vertical products: low-end and high-end. To reduce waste caused by the random yield, the manufacturer uses a downconversion approach in which low-end products are made by converting the defective high-end products. The manufacturer purchased a shortage of high-end products from the secondary market (i.e. emergency sourcing). High-end products are sold through the retailer, and low-end products are sold directly by the manufacturer. The customer demand for high-end products in the end market is random and depends on the selling price, and the customer demand for the low-end products in the secondary market is independent and random. The retailer contracts the manufacturer with the call option to obtain high-end products to meet a random demand; in fact, by using the call option contract, the authors try to balance the risks between two members. Two scenarios of with and without call option contract are proposed. After the high-end product demand is observed, the retailer would exercise the option order quantity in the call option contract scenario and then place an instant order with the manufacturer if necessary. In each scenario, the manufacturer and the retailer make their decisions simultaneously (static game) to determine the retailer’s optimal ordering and pricing policies and the optimal production quantity of the manufacturer (Nash equilibrium) by maximizing their expected profits. Finally, the impact of the model parameters on the supply chain is expressed through numerical examples. The numerical analysis shows that the call option contract provides greater profit than the wholesale price contract.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the implications of outsourcing at the operational planning level, i.e. how the operational planning function is complicated owing to the strategic outsourcing decisions that have been made in the past.

First, a literature review on outsourcing is conducted. Second, two case studies at three pharmaceutical companies are conducted to gather insights into the planning of outsourced operations.

The paper finds that nothing has been documented in the literature on outsourcing at the operational planning level. Moreover, a number of implications of outsourcing at the operational planning level are discussed. One of the main insights is that in an outsourcing relationship, the order process consists of different, hierarchically connected, decisions in time, hence requiring a richer and more developed communication and ordering pattern than is commonly assumed.

The results seem to be generalizable to the pharmaceutical industry. However, future research should determine whether these results replicate in other industries.

The literature on outsourcing has mainly focused on the strategic outsourcing decision. The paper contributes to a better understanding of the implications of outsourcing at the operational planning function, which has not been studied before.

The highly competitive electronics manufacturing marketplace demands that suppliers provide low‐cost, high‐quality products to their customers in a timely fashion. Shortened product life cycles and increasingly global competition have caused traditional manufacturers to focus on their company core competencies, such as product design and development, choosing to outsource the actual manufacturing of their products to contract manufacturers. Although the decision to outsource can have both positive and adverse effects on key areas of the manufacturing supply chain, one positive effect is that the manufacturer’s supply chain agility is increased. Outsourcing has caused an increase in the amount of information that is shared between supply chain partners. As a result, a greater reliance on suppliers and alliance partners has become essential for company survival. We examine the ways in which contract manufacturing has increased the agility of the electronics manufacturing supply chain.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of carbon permit allocation rules (grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism) on incentive contracts provided by the retailer to encourage the manufacturer to invest more in reducing carbon emissions.

The authors consider a two-echelon supply chain in which the retailer offers three contracts (wholesale price contract, cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract) to the manufacturer. Based on the two carbon permit allocation rules, i.e. grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism, six scenarios are examined. The optimal price and carbon emission reduction decisions and members’ equilibrium profits under six scenarios are analyzed and compared.

The results suggest that the revenue-sharing contract can more effectively stimulate the manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions compared to the cost-sharing contract. The cost-sharing contract can help to achieve the highest environmental performance, whereas the implementation of revenue-sharing contract can attain the highest social welfare. The benchmarking mechanism is more effective for the government to prompt the manufacturer to produce low-carbon products than the grandfathering mechanism. Although a loose carbon policy can expand the total emissions, it can improve the social welfare.

These results can provide operational insights for the retailer in how to use incentive contract to encourage the manufacturer to curb carbon emissions and offer managerial insights for the government to make policy decisions on carbon permit allocation rules.

This paper contributes to the literature regarding to firm’s carbon emissions reduction decisions under cap-and-trade policy and highlights the importance of carbon permit allocation methods in curbing carbon emissions.

A lack of visibility into the manufacturer’s production cost information impedes a retailer’s ability to maximize her own profits, especially when market demand is uncertain. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the use of an option contract within a one-period two-echelon supply chain in the presence of asymmetric cost information.

Based on the principal-agent model, the retailer, acting as a Stackelberg leader, offers a menu of option contracts to mitigate the risk of uncertain demand and reveal asymmetric production cost information. The optimal contract in asymmetric and symmetric information scenarios is derived. Finally, the impact of production costs on the optimal contracts and the actors’ profits is explored by numerical experiments.

By comparing the optimal equilibrium solutions in two scenarios, the authors show that asymmetric cost information has a large impact on the optimal option contract and profits. In addition, information rent is affected by the type differential. The results prove that the level of information asymmetry plays a vital role in option contracts and profits.

Different from the existing literature on private demand information, this paper considers a supply chain with asymmetric cost information in the context of option contracts. Interestingly, not only the production cost but also the probability of a low production cost can affect the option strike price. In addition, from the perspective of the manufacturer, a high cost does not always bring a high information rent. These findings can provide some guidance to decision-makers.

In the paper, the authors study the simultaneous influence of incentive compatibility and individual rationality (IR) on a multi-echelon supply chain (SC) under uncertainty. The authors study the impact of contract sequence on coordination strategies of a serial three-echelon SC consisting of a supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer in an uncertain environment.

The authors develop a game-theoretic framework of a serial decentralized three-echelon SC. Under a decentralized setting, the supplier and the manufacturer can choose from two contract types namely, wholesale price (WP) and linear two-part tariff (LTT) and it leads to four different cases of contract sequence.

The study show that SC coordination is possible when both the supplier and the manufacturer choose LTT contract. This study not only identifies the influence of contract sequence on profit distribution among SC agents, but also establishes cut-off policies for all SC agents for each contract sequence. This study also examine the influence of chosen contract sequence on optimal profit distribution among SC agents.

Three-echelon SC coordination under uncertain environment depends upon the contract sequence chosen by SC agents.

This study results will be helpful to managers of various SCs to take operational decisions under uncertain situations.

The main contribution of this study is that it explores the possibility of coordination by supply contracts for three-echelon SC in a fuzzy environment.