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Contracting is an important issue in supply chain management. In this paper, the authors aim to discuss and compare the manufacturer's contracting options when the retailer faces a traditional newsvendor problem with a fixed retail price: a wholesale price only contract, a wholesale price discount contract, a returns policy contract, and a returns policy with the wholesale price discount contract. The paper also aims to examine how these contracting options affect decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer, as well as the supply chain efficiency.

Models are developed based on the manufacturer's four contracting options. The manufacturer's optimal wholesale prices have been obtained. The ordering decisions of the retailer are discussed in each of the manufacturer's four contracting options. The paper also uses numerical examples to illustrate the author's managerial insights and results.

As compared to the wholesale price only contract, it is found that implementing a wholesale price discount policy effectively encourages the retailer to order more product and enhances the retailer's profit at the expense of lowering the manufacturer's profit. It is also found that when the manufacturer offers a returns policy and if this policy cannot enhance the retailer's profit, a returns policy with the wholesale price discount contract can lead to a win‐win situation for both the manufacturer and the retailer.

The research provides managerial insights on how different contracts affect decisions and efficiency of the supply chain.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how customers’ self-control affects their purchase decisions and to discuss the pricing decisions of the retailer under different forms of contract.

The authors use the literature on hyperbolic discounting to model customers’ self-control problems. In this framework, the authors examine how the customers’ self-control affects the optimal pricing decision and the selection of the optimal contract form when there is a supplier and a retailer in the supply chain.

The study’s results show that when wholesale price contract is compared with buyback contract, buyback contract is better when customers’ self-control is weak; when quantity-discount contract is compared with wholesale price contract and buyback contract, although quantity discount can encourage customers to purchase more units of products, but both wholesale price contract and buyback contract can be better than quantity-discount contract in some cases. Additionally, the authors demonstrate that revenue sharing contract can increase the supply chain’s profit. The authors also find that sometimes customers’ preplan will lead to the result that the supplier produces more unhealthy products.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to analyze the decision-making of the retailer by developing an analytical framework combining customer’s self-control and supply chain contract. These results have important implications for the supplier and the retailer that sell vice goods.

The authors investigate the manufacturer's choice of discount schemes in a supply chain with competing retailers.

Using a game-theoretic model, the authors build two discount frameworks and compare and analyze the effects of different discount schemes on the performance of supply chain members.

The authors find that the retail price (market demand) in the quantity discount scheme is always higher (lower) than that in the market share discount scheme. The authors also find that the retailers' preference for discount schemes is antithetical to the manufacturer's preference in most cases. However, under certain conditions, there will be a win-win situation where Pareto-optimization occurs between the manufacturer and retailers when they choose the same discount scheme.

On the one hand, the authors assume that the two retailers are symmetrical in market size and operation efficiency. It would be interesting to study the effect of different discount schemes on retailers when the retailers have different market sizes or operating efficiency. On the other hand, the authors study the manufacturer's choice of discount schemes in a supply chain with one common manufacturer and two competing retailers. However, in practice, there exist other supply chain structures. Future research can examine the problem of choices of discount schemes in other different supply chain structures.

This paper help retailers and manufacturers to choose the best discount schemes.

This paper suggests that a high discount scale is not always beneficial (detrimental) to retailers (the manufacture).

The authors build two discount schemes (the quantity and the market share) in a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers, and the authors focus on the effects of different discount schemes on the competition between two retailers. By comparing the two discount schemes, the authors study which discount scheme is the better choice for the manufacturer when facing competing retailers.

This paper considers a new class of problems arising in the distribution side of supply chains. It considers cooperative market expansion and price negotiation by wholesalers and manufacturers in a class of franchise‐type distribution markets. For wholesalers, expanding the coverage of geographically dispersed markets while retaining profitability of business requires new levels of price discounts from manufacturers. Manufacturers, on the other hand, attempt to limit such discounts to maintain a resale price to retailers. A successful negotiation results in a set of spatial markets with appropriate wholesale prices for each wholesaler. A sequential method is proposed for this purpose, assuming that the manufacturers and wholesalers are co‐operative and they exchange relevant information. The suggested process uses two optimisation models and is illustrated with a case study.

In this paper, the authors study the production and pricing decisions of a remanufacturing supply chain composed of a supplier, an assembler and a remanufacturer, in which the remanufacturing of components requires patent licensing from the supplier.

The authors consider three different models with government subsidy for remanufacturing: (1) no government subsidies; (2) the government subsidizes the remanufacturing behavior of the supplier and (3) the government subsidizes the remanufacturing behavior of the remanufacturer and use the Stackelberg game model to solve and analyze the equilibrium wholesale prices of components and the equilibrium outputs of new and remanufactured products under three subsidy modes.

The results show that the equilibrium wholesale prices of two kinds of components decrease with the unit patent licensing fee and the unit government subsidy, and the equilibrium quantity of the remanufactured products under the three modes is obviously higher than that of the new products.

Finally through numerical simulation, it is found that the equilibrium profits of the supplier, the manufacturer and the supply chain increase monotonously in relation to the unit government subsidy, while the optimal profit of the assembler in relation to the unit government subsidy tends to decrease first and then increase.

Members in a supply chain account for corporate social responsibility (CSR) in different ways. This paper considers a socially responsible supply chain in which the manufacturer innovates in a sustainable product while the retailer exhibits CSR concerns. This paper aims to investigate how socially responsible behavior, namely, sustainable innovations or CSR concerns, affects the pure profit, environmental impact and social welfare, in such a socially responsible supply chain.

This paper first constructs an integrated case as a benchmark and then develops a Manufacturer-Stackelberg game in a decentralized scenario. The pure profit, environmental impact and social welfare are confirmed and analyzed in centralized and decentralized cases. Moreover, two unique coordinating contracts, i.e. wholesale price discount contract and revenue-sharing contract, are used in this socially responsible supply chain.

Analytical analysis shows that, under certain conditions, the optimal CSR strategies hold for maximizing pure channel profit, minimizing environmental impact and maximizing social welfare. Whether the performance in a centralized case outnumbers that in a decentralized case depends on the CSR concerns level and environment-friendly degree of the product. In addition, it is found that a wholesale price discount contract is better for the retailer whereas a revenue-sharing contract is better for the manufacturer in pure profit to improve coordinating efficiency.

These results can offer managerial implications to the socially responsible supply chain in terms of pricing decisions, CSR strategies and sustainability innovations. Specifically, under certain conditions, placing more CSR concerns level increases pure channel profit and the social welfare. A balance between the pure profit and the social welfare is hereby achieved for the two socially responsible individuals by designing a proper contract.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is among the first studies so far to combine the CSR concerns strategy and sustainability innovation into a socially responsible supply chain.

This paper attempts to analyze the relationship between the complementarity degrees of imperfect complementary products and sales strategies and give appropriate sales strategies for a two-stage supply chain.

With respect to two-stage supply chain consisting of two manufacturers who produce imperfect complementary products and one retailer who sells the products, aiming at bundling sales strategy, the authors define complementarity elasticity of products and use it to measure the degree of complementary between two products. Based on Stackelberg game and cooperation, the authors analyze the relationship between the complementarity degrees of imperfect complementary products and appropriate sales strategies.

As the impact of complementarity degree on sales strategy decision-making is better, the authors can pinpoint out which sales decision-making is optimal and which bundling sales strategy is the best for a two-stage supply chain. Considering that the degree of complementarity has a significant impact on the product sales strategy, the authors can point out which sales decision-making is optimal, that is, which bundled sales strategy is the optimal in the secondary supply chain of selling complementary products.

An innovative bundling can expand the sales of existing products and new products. It helps a retailer transcend and defeat competitors by reducing marketing expenses while increasing profits. Proper use of bundling can improve consumers utility and create an overall positive effect for both the enterprises and consumer.

The research can help some retailers to make many appropriate bundling sales strategies.

Trade promotions are manufacturer incentives directed to retailers rather than to consumers, aiming at influencing retailer's sales, prices and merchandising practices. Although they are a growing element in the promotional mix of food manufacturers worldwide, trade promotions often raise concerns about their impacts on performance and coordination in the food supply chain, which in turn affect retail food prices. This paper aims to measure the influence of market power on the outcomes of trade promotions negotiated between food manufacturers and supermarkets.

The paper employs Rangan's conceptual model to develop hypotheses about the links between three dimensions of market power (size, brand and institutional power) and trade promotion budgets and their allocation between discount‐ and performance‐based types. The paper employs trade promotion data collected from 36 supermarkets in the USA to statistically test these links.

The results suggest that brand, size, and institutional power of food manufacturers and retailers affect trade promotion budgets and their allocation among discount‐ and performance‐based types. Food manufacturers have relatively more control over their trade promotion budgets whereas retailers may have more influence on the allocation decisions.

The findings can help food manufacturers and retailers identify institutional, brand and size variables that may help them leverage trade promotion negotiations. The results are relevant to policymakers, in particular for the study of antitrust and performance issues in the food distribution system.

This paper aims to investigate the effect of hunger marketing strategy on supply chain pricing and coordinate the supply chain through a two-period pricing model.

According to a two-period pricing model with hunger marketing strategy, the authors investigate two different scenarios: the centralized system and the decentralized system. The optimal or equilibrium solutions are calculated and compared in two different scenarios.

First, the hunger marketing strategy can improve the total profit of the supply chain by increasing the retail price and the total sales volume. Second, the hunger marketing strategy aggravates the double marginalization effect. Third, the authors introduce the revenue-sharing contract and characterize the conditions under which the revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain and be accepted by both the members.

First, the authors suppose the same retail price in two periods for mathematic simplicity; second, they do not consider the discount factor for the revenue during the two periods.

This paper provides a guide to policymakers in terms of product pricing and supply rate.

First, the authors suppose the same retail price in two periods for mathematic simplicity; second, they do not consider the discount factor for the revenue during the two periods.

The paper attempts to discuss the optimal pricing decisions under the decentralized and centralized decision and analyze the influence of online reviews and in-sale service on dual-channel supply chain. Finally, the authors design a two-part tariff coordination mechanism.

To deal with this pricing conflict problems of dual-channel supply chain consisting of dominant manufacturer and a retailer, considering the fact that online reviews and in-sale service are important factors on consumers’ purchase decisions, the authors establish some basic models and exploit them to discuss the optimal pricing decisions under the decentralized and centralized decision and analyze the influence of online reviews and in-sale service on dual-channel supply chain. Finally, the authors design a profit-sharing coordination mechanism.

The results show that the optimal online direct selling price is positively correlated with product perceived quality obtained from online reviews and negatively correlated with the in-sale service. The traditional retail price is positively correlated with the in-sale service and weakly correlated with online reviews. For the manufacturer and retailer, whether decentralized decision or coordination contract, their profits increase with the increase of the in-sale service in a certain range and quality perceived from spontaneous online reviews. Online reviews and in-sale service are important factors on consumers’ purchase decisions. Positive in-sale services and online reviews can provide consumers with a better shopping experience, thereby promoting their enthusiasm for shopping and improving their quality of life. The two-part tariff coordination mechanism improves the profits of the manufacturer and the traditional retailer, respectively, through the transfer fee.

The proposed approach can well analyze the channel conflicts and pricing problems between retailers and manufacturers with respect to product offline price and online price. The analysis and results can inform decision-making for manufacturers and retailers.