To recognize and investigate the hypotheses that opportunistic behaviour of project participants in infrastructure public–private partnerships (PPPs) changes over the project’s life cycle. Case study methodology is adopted. The first Indian highway PPP project, awarded with negative grant, is used as the case context. Opportunistic behaviour is a continuous game played by the project stakeholders. Its manifestation depends on the vulnerability of the other party at that point in time in the project life cycle and the past display of opportunism. Because the study is limited to a highway project in an emerging economy, the findings may lack generalizability for which further research is recommended. PPP is increasingly popular. Stakeholders recognize that the existing ex-ante contractual arrangements that seek to mitigate opportunism are not enough for project success. This study addresses this difficulty by providing a closer understanding of how opportunistic behaviours evolve over projects’ life cycle and what steps are necessary to negotiate. Failure to address the antecedents of opportunistic behaviour in time leads to a competition to be more opportunistic, in which the common public gets short changed. This study is an attempt to advance understanding of stakeholders’ behaviour outside the ambit of contract. The extant literature is largely silent on the timing and vulnerability of opportunistic behaviour, viewing it as a static concept. The study demonstrates the changing nature of opportunism that manifests in different forms over the projects life cycle.
Garg, S. and Mahapatra, D. (2017), "Opportunism Galore: The Case of Delhi–Gurgaon Super Connectivity Limited", Leitão, J., de Morais Sarmento, E. and Aleluia, J. (Ed.) The Emerald Handbook of Public–Private Partnerships in Developing and Emerging Economies, Emerald Publishing Limited, pp. 489-512. https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-78714-493-420171018Download as .RIS
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