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This chapter explores the origins, development, and organization of the main Portuguese capitalist groups throughout the fascist dictatorship, the Carnation Revolution, and the neoliberal European integration until the onset of the financial crisis of 2008. The Portuguese experience confirms that, far from the usual neoliberal view that presents the process of accumulation and concentration of capital as the result of fair market mechanisms, large capitalist groups emerge as a combination of three factors: privileged access to finance, State protection, and family inheritance. Furthermore, it is argued that, if capital is considered as embodiment of power relations and not as factor of production, the link between concentration/accumulation of capital and economic growth is appropriately lost. Concentration strategies can have a detrimental effect on the economy. In Portugal, the dominance of these large economic groups contributed to the development of a rentist economic structure that was contrary to the goals of productive and economic development.

Until the 2008 Crash, the prevailing economic orthodoxy, accepted across the broad political spectrum, was that inequality was a necessary condition for economic health. The evidence of the last four decades is that this trade-off theory – that you can have more equal or more efficient economies but not both – is incorrect. Not only do excessive concentrations of income and wealth bring social dislocation and breed public discontent with democratic institutions, but a number of studies have shown that inequality on today’s scale brings slower growth and greater economic turbulence. Although there is now a broad acceptance amongst global leaders that inequality poses significant risks for social cohesion and economic stability, there has been little or no action to match the high level verbal war against inequality. As a result, inequality has carried on rising within nations since 2008. In the United Kingdom, the gap between the top and bottom has continued to widen, in part because post-2010 governments have weakened the pro-equality role of the state. Tackling inequality is now one of the most pressing issues of the day – an economic as well as a social imperative – while reversing this four decade long trend will require a major restructuring of the pro-market economic models in place across most of the rich world.

The catch word “Globalization” has been defended by advocates for lifting people out of poverty and the inequality in the world. But it has been criticized by opponents for failing to solve the problem of poverty, inequality, and for increasingly creating wealth disparity. This raises the question. The fact is that the contemporary world exhibits very high levels of inequality of income and wealth both between countries and within countries. Wealth inequality is more pronounced than that of income inequality across the globe and within-countries. Evidence suggests that rising inequality and wealth disparity arising out of globalization drive is choking off the potential benefits to the poor. In this backdrop, a composite assessment has been made in the present chapter to answer the question “whether globalization with its particular ideology, the market fundamentalism has benefited many and whether the performance on the distributional front has really been impressive.” From facts and evidence, the study finds that inequalities in income and wealth, also in wages have widened in many developed, developing developed, and developing countries. Technological change and globalization are their main sources.

I find that median wealth plummeted over the years 2007–2010, and by 2010 was at its lowest level since 1969. The inequality of net worth, after almost two decades of little movement, was up sharply from 2007 to 2010. Relative indebtedness continued to expand from 2007 to 2010, particularly for the middle class, though the proximate causes were declining net worth and income rather than an increase in absolute indebtedness. In fact, the average debt of the middle class actually fell in real terms by 25 percent. The sharp fall in median wealth and the rise in inequality in the late 2000s are traceable to the high leverage of middle-class families in 2007 and the high share of homes in their portfolio. The racial and ethnic disparity in wealth holdings, after remaining more or less stable from 1983 to 2007, widened considerably between 2007 and 2010. Hispanics, in particular, got hammered by the Great Recession in terms of net worth and net equity in their homes. Households under age 45 also got pummeled by the Great Recession, as their relative and absolute wealth declined sharply from 2007 to 2010.

Industrial feudalism is a socio-economic formation of advanced capitalist countries in which society becomes stratified into closed, hierarchically-defined social groups. In the writings of Ludwik Krzywicki and Oskar Lange, industrial feudalism is associated with the dominance of monopoly finance capital. The chapter extends this analysis of twenty-first century capitalism in which social groups are differentiated by the kind of property that they own and hence the kind of credit to which they have access to prevent becoming déclassé. However asset inflation then inhibits upward social mobility, confining households to their inherited social class. This inhibits labour mobility. But the availability of credit for the propertied classes also defines attitudes towards state welfare provision.

The impact of the “Great Recession” on inequality is unclear. Because the crises in the housing and stock markets and mass job loss affect incomes across the entire distribution, the overall impact on inequality is difficult to determine. Early speculation using a variety of narrow measures of earnings, income, and consumption yield contradictory results. In this chapter, we develop new estimates of income inequality based on “more complete income” (MCI), which augments standard income measures with those that are accrued from the ownership of wealth. We use the 1989–2007 Surveys of Consumer Finances, and also construct MCI measures for 2009 based on projections of assets, income, and earnings.

We investigate the level and trend in MCI inequality and compare it to other estimates of overall and “high incomes” in the literature. Compared to standard measures of income, MCI suggests higher levels of inequality and slightly larger increases in inequality over time. Several MCI-based inequality measures peaked in 2007 at their highest levels in 20 years. The combined impact of the Great Recession on the housing, stock, and labor markets after 2007 has reduced some measures of income inequality at the top of the MCI distribution. Despite declining from the 2007 peak, however, inequality remains as high as levels experienced earlier in the decade, and much higher than most points over the last 20 years. In the middle of the income distribution, the declines in income from wealth after 2007 were the result of diminished value of residential real estate; at the top of the distribution, declines in the value of business assets had the greatest impact.

We also assess the level and trend in the functional distribution of income between capital and labor, and find a rising share of income accruing to real capital or wealth from 1989 to 2007. The recent economic crisis has diminished the capital share back to levels from 2004. Contrary to the findings of other researchers, we find that the labor share of income among high-income groups declined between 1992 and 2007.

The concept of productive/unproductive work is relevant for better understanding the current capitalist economy. As the contradiction between production and the appropriation of surplus value by financial capital becomes more pronounced as it expands, it exerts intense pressure on the appropriation and redistribution of the surplus value. It puts different factions of capital into growing conflict with each other and defines the boundaries of the current geopolitical map of power. The maximization of profits in the productive sector carries on until the possibilities of greater profits are exhausted and the rationale of the capitalist system of exploitation becomes virtually meaningless. The current level of technology with Artificial Intelligence eliminates at the same time any technical impediment to planning an economy. It also has the potential to create the objective conditions for making the move to the most democratic forms of participation in planning.

In theorizing the dynamics of social processes, dialectical thinking informs Marx's historical materialist inquiries and both – dialectics and historical materialist principles – inform his political–economic analysis. In conceptualizing empirical observations during this work, Marx (1973b, p. 101) assumes that the “concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse” and that “With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too” (Marx, 1992, p. 28). This methodological tack strives for the flexibility needed for analyzing patterns in long-term social development (the structure of history) as well as the logic of specific systems in their totality and flux (the history of structures).

The title of this book suggests the possibility that new ways of managing innovative processes may favour an evolution of the economy towards an altruistic model. This chapter argues that the acceleration of innovative processes at the turn of the millennium has produced, or at least has not avoided, phenomena of the concentration of wealth and power in which it is difficult to discern an altruistic root. It is observed that the cultural models developed to interpret innovative phenomena are also focused on the profit of individual companies and not on altruistic values. The author goes on to indicate the appropriateness of referring to less limited phenomenological models and suggests exploring an analogy of innovation with Darwinian evolution. An outline of this approach is provided.