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This essay investigates the meaning of rationality in Michel Foucault's notion of “governmental rationality,” both in what he takes rationalities to be and in how they relate to practices of governing. I try to resolve these questions in a sympathetic manner by detailing some of the social dynamics implicit in practices of governing. Pierre Bourdieu provides means to connect such practices with a detailed understanding of social struggle and resistance to power. These insights reveal strong lines of continuity between governmental rationality and collective political resistance to it. On this basis, I suggest a new path of investigation into forms of popular sovereignty as relatively neglected examples of governmental rationality.

Behavioral decision research focuses on cognitive biases and other barriers to economic rationality. However, if cognitive biases are costly to eliminate, the second-best solution to bounded rationality may be less rationality rather than more. I define the concept of behavioral rationality and discuss two extreme forms of strategizing, which I call Romantic and Mercenary. Using twentieth century humanitarian Albert Schweitzer as a case study, I discuss the optimization of economic and behavioral rationality. I argue that the success of behavioral strategy as a field does not depend on removing cognitive biases but on helping people deliver more effective strategic actions.

This chapter explores dominant ideologies theoretically in an organizational setting. A framework is developed to advance our understanding of how ‘dominant ideological modes of rationality’ reflect predictability through the reproduction of accepted truths, hence social order in organization. Dominant ideological modes of rationality constitute professional identity, power relations, and rationality and frame prevailing mentalities and social practices in organization. It is suggested that members’ categorization devices structure and constrain social practices. Supplementing the existent power literature, the chapter concludes that professional identity produces rationality, power and truth – truth being the overarching concept assembled through the rationalities assembled in professional members’ categorization devices. Research and managerial implications are discussed.

This paper argues that since the utility function representation of the individual is derived from standard rationality theory, the view that rationality is bounded implies that individuality should be seen to be bounded as well. The meaning of this idea is developed in terms of two ways in which individuality is bounded, with one bound associated with bounded rationality in Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory and another bound associated with bounded rationality in Simon’s thinking. The two bounds on individuality are argued to be employed in agent-based modeling and social identity theory. How bounded individuality might be formally modeled is illustrated in an account of Kirman’s Marseille fish market analysis.

Austrian economist Ludwig Mises’s central role in the socialist calculation debates has been consensually acknowledged since the early 1920s. Yet, only recently Nemeth, O’Neill, Uebel, and others have drawn particular attention to Mises’s encounter with logical empiricist Otto Neurath. Despite several surprising agreements, Neurath and Mises certainly provide different answers to the questions “what is meant by rational economic theory” (Neurath) and whether “socialism is the abolition of rational economy” (Mises). Previous accounts and evaluations of the exchange between Neurath and Mises suffer from attaching little regard to their idiosyncratic uses of the term “rational.” The paper at hand reconstructs and critically compares the different conceptions of rationality defended by Neurath and Mises. The author presents two different resolutions to a detected tension in Mises’s deliberations on rationality: the first is implicit in Neurath’s, O’Neill’s, and Salerno’s reading of Mises and faces several interpretational problems; the author proposes a divergent interpretation. Based on the reconstructions of Neurath’s and Mises’s conceptions of rationality, the author suggests some implications with respect to Viennese Late Enlightenment and the socialist calculation debates.

This paper aims to review 69 studies related to Muslim consumer behavior and determine the relationship between these topics and Islamic rationality. In addition, this paper elaborates on Al-Ghazali’s Islamic rationality model.

A text analytics approach is used to map 69 studies on Muslim consumer behavior. In addition, the historical-critical and inductive approach is used to identify Muslim scholars’ concepts and opinions regarding Islamic rationality, especially Al-Ghazali.

This study confirms that Muslim consumer behavior is in line with the concept of Islamic rationality proposed by Al-Ghazali. This is evidenced by a strong awareness of Islamic morals and values, which fosters a high commitment to halal products.

The findings of this study will provide essential benefits in the development of Islamic rationality theory, which can then be used as an alternative in explaining Muslim consumer behavior and also can be used as a reference for stakeholders in the industry to mainstream halalfication on products offered in the Muslim market.

The value of originality in this study lies in identifying the relation between Islamic rationality and Muslim consumer behavior, and this effort was confirmed through 69 selected studies related to Muslim consumer behavior.