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Remuneration policies may differ from country to country, and their effect on bank stability could be due to the legal framework. Therefore, this study aims to investigate how the legal system impacts the relationship between CEO compensation and bank stability across countries.

To test the study hypotheses, the authors use panel data of 74 banks operating in ten OECD countries during the period 2009–2016 and apply the generalized moments method regression model to better remediate the endogeneity problem.

The findings confirm that a country’s banking regulations significantly affect its bank stability. Common law countries have less bank stability than civil law countries. This result can be interpreted by the fact that, in common-law countries, banks’ CEO are strongly protected by the law, so they allocate a large part of bank assets to risky loans to improve their variable remuneration.

The research can help policymakers understand bank stability in one country. Any legal reform would require prior knowledge of how risk-taking may arise in executive compensation.

The contribution is to explain the controversial effect of executive compensation on bank stability in the framework of legal theory. The authors argue that regulators should monitor compensation structures and that the country’s legal origin of law shapes the CEO compensation structure and is a determinant of bank stability. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no studies exploring this field. So, this study tries to shed more light on the dark side of CEOs’ behavior when undertaking risky projects to maximize their remuneration.

This paper aims to investigate the effect of governance mechanisms and firm performance on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in relation to the Jordanian business environment. This study also examines the moderating role of gender diversity.

The sample is drawn from the annual reports of 68 Jordanian firms between 2015 and 2019. This paper uses the ordinary least square regression. It also uses the generalised method of moments approach to control any endogeneity issue and analyses the data in depth. In addition, it uses a dynamic model to address concerns regarding causality in the study’s models.

The results show that governance mechanisms and firm performance have an impact on CEO compensation. Furthermore, the outcomes indicate that gender diversity significantly and positively moderates the association between firm performance and CEO compensation. These findings enhance and support agency theory in the context of Jordan.

The study’s results have significant implications for policymakers, shareholders, investors, academicians and the public in the developing Jordanian market. The findings also support more monitoring and inspection to prevent the occurrence of opportunistic management behaviour and ensure that CEO remuneration packages are appropriately designed.

This study provides a unique understanding by explaining the impact of governance and performance on CEO compensation in a developing country such as Jordan. Besides that, the current study extends prior studies in Jordan significantly.

The main goal of this study is to determine the role of employee commitment in the relations between the compensation system and turnover intentions of employees in the Republic of Serbia, as well as to investigate whether there is a mediating effect of employee commitment in this relation.

The primary methodology implemented in the research was data gathering, obtaining theoretical research works on the proposed relations and empirical studies based on the PLS-SEM, analysed by IBM SPSS Statistics and SmartPLS data processing software. The data for the analysis was obtained from a total sample of 764 employees, collected in the Republic of Serbia via an online questionnaire.

The results indicated a positive statistically significant relationship between the formative construct (compensation system) and reflective construct (commitment), as well as a negative statistically significant relationship between the compensation system and reflective construct (turnover intentions). Employee commitment partially mediates the relationship between the compensation system and turnover intentions of employees.

The study was conducted in Serbia and is thus rooted in the specific national context which is characterized by high power distance and high uncertainty avoidance and more collectivistic society with feminine values more expressed. Most of the previous investigations related to the mentioned constructs were performed in companies from more developed countries, including Western Europe and the United States of America, whereas there has been no such research conducted in Serbia to date. The results portrayed a mismatch between the expected relations regarding the attitudes of employees to the rewards and the proposed national context. Modern companies in Serbia need to follow a modern reward mechanism to build stronger commitment and decrease turnover intentions. Moreover, in most earlier research works, compensation was examined in terms of satisfaction with rewards, while this study was based on questions related to perceptions of employees toward HR compensation practices (“The organization offers me”-type questions), not related to their satisfaction. Further, in the majority of previous research works, the compensation system was examined as a variable in combination with other HR processes (staffing, training and development, career development, employee relations, HR planning, communication, etc.), as a HPWP, while in this case the authors used only the practice of compensation (reward elements and employee performance evaluation) to investigate relations with commitment and turnover intentions.

Given the serious question raised by the subprime of the 2008 global financial crisis over the rising practices of excessive rewarding of executives in the USA and European firms, the executive pay-performance nexus has emerged as a popular topic of debate in the contemporary corporate finance research. Conducted mostly on the Anglo-Saxon contexts, research outcomes have been inconclusive and dichotomous. Considering this backdrop, this study aims to investigate the endogenous relationship between executive compensation and risk taking in the context of the USA.

Using a large sample of non-financial firms from 2010 to 2020 based on panel data and two-stage least square regression. In this study, the riskier corporate decision is measured as book leverage and ratio of R&D expense to total assets. Chief executive officers’ (CEO) experience and age are used as instrumental variables, and these are expected to influence compensation incentives and, hence, affect firm riskiness indirectly. Firm size, return on assets and CEO turnover are reported to affect compensation and corporate decisions, therefore, included as control variables. Given that higher executive compensation is related to riskier corporate decision in firms, this study incorporates total wealth (i.e. accumulated equity related compensation) as an additional proxy of compensation, and this selection is justifiable by the perfect contracting notion of the agency theory.

The results of this study show a significant positive and increasing nexus among compensation and riskier corporate decisions. Besides, the compensation level proxied through the percentage of each form of compensation in total compensation is very important as greater equity and greater salary diminishes risk taking.

The outcomes of this study have useful implications for firm stakeholders and policymakers.

The level of pay measured by the percentage of each type of compensation in total compensation is of utmost importance as it can increase or decrease risk taking in corporate decisions.

Digital labor platforms (DLPs) are transforming the nature of the work for an increasing number of workers, especially through extensively employing automated algorithms for performing managerial functions. In this novel working setting – characterized by algorithmic governance, and automatic matching, rewarding and punishing mechanisms – gig-workers play an essential role in providing on-demand services for final customers. Since gig-workers’ continued participation is crucial for sustainable service delivery in platform contexts, this study aims to identify and examine the antecedents of their working outcomes, including burnout and engagement.

We suggested a theoretical framework, grounded in the job demands-resources heuristic model to investigate how the interplay of job demands and resources, resulting from working in DLPs, explains gig-workers’ engagement and burnout. We further empirically tested the proposed model to understand how DLPs' working conditions, in particular their algorithmic management, impact gig-working outcomes.

Our findings indicate that job resources – algorithmic compensation, work autonomy and information sharing– have significant positive effects on gig-workers’ engagement. Furthermore, our results demonstrate that job insecurity, unsupportive algorithmic interaction (UAI) and algorithmic injustice significantly contribute to gig-workers’ burnout. Notably, we found that job resources substantially, but differently, moderate the relationship between job demands and gig-workers’ burnout.

This study contributes a theoretically accurate and empirically grounded understanding of two clusters of conditions – job demands and resources– as a result of algorithmic management practice in DLPs. We developed nuanced insights into how such conditions are evaluated by gig-workers and shape their engagement or burnout in DLP emerging work settings. We further uncovered that in gig-working context, resources do not similarly buffer against the negative effects of job demands.

The purpose of this research is to reveal the impact of public legal protection on the efficiency of internal corporate governance in banks. In addition, this research proposes a new corporate governance index that could be employed by the banking sector to evaluate the performance of their internal corporate governance mechanisms.

Orbis database, annual reports and direct questionnaire are used to collect corporate governance data of 127 banks from 14 countries during 2020. The Mann–Whitney U-test is employed to compare the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms based on three subsamples of countries having different legal protection levels (weak, middle and strong).

This research suggests a new corporate governance index for banks based on seven constructs and 62 variables. This new non-parametric index could be used by bankers to improve the monitoring process and enhance the overall performance of banking. The results of this research show that the existence of a strong public legal protection environment within a specific country enhances the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms in the banking sector and thus, leads to improve the protection of shareholders, depositors and other relevant stakeholders. However, in countries that are characterized by weak legal protection level, the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms is very low and there are possibilities of entrenchment, expropriation and extraction of private benefits. These findings could be interpreted within the prediction of agency, moral hazard, asymmetric information, political and entrenchment theories.

This research paper provides information that bankers and other relevant stakeholders in the banking sector working in MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) and European countries. A strong public legal protection level could improve the efficiency of internal corporate governance mechanisms within banks.

A green innovation strategy is an important step for enterprises to balance economic and environmental. As the executors of strategic decisions, the attitude and capabilities of senior managers determine the effectiveness of implementing green innovation. Therefore, this paper aims to explore the relationship between executive compensation incentives and green innovation.

Based on the data of heavily polluting enterprises listed in China's A-share market from 2015 to 2020, this study constructs an OLS model with fixed effects of time and industry, and uses the mediation three-step method to verify the correlation between executive compensation incentives, innovation openness and green innovation. Meanwhile, the grouping regression was used to test the moderating effect of environmental regulation on executive compensation incentives.

The empirical results show that executive salary incentives promote green innovation and equity incentives inhibit green innovation; the openness breadth partially mediates the relationship between salary incentives, equity incentives and green innovation, while the openness depth only partially mediates the relationship between equity incentives and green innovation; and environmental regulation positively moderates executive incentives.

Due to sample selection and variable measurement, the study lacks certain generality. Therefore, future research needs to further analyze the internal factors affecting green innovation from multiple dimensions.

This study provides a new evidence for analyzing how executive compensation measures affect green innovation, and further enhances the mediating mechanism of open innovation.

This study has significant theoretical implications for examining the intra-firm factors that affect green innovation.

The study examines the mediating role of accounting information quality (AQ), a proxy for firms' information risk, in firms' business strategy and the cost of equity (COE) nexus to highlight how AQ provides a mechanism through which a company's business strategy affects its COE.

The research study utilises data from 12,100 firm-year observations of United States (US) non-financial firms from 2001 to 2017, drawn from multiple databases, and employs the bootstrapping method of mediation analysis to test the indirect effect of AQ on the business strategy–COE relationship. The authors rely on Miles and Snow's two pure business strategy typologies, prospectors and defenders and use innate accrual quality and implied COE models to measure AQ and COE, respectively.

The results suggest that AQ partially mediates the relationship between business strategy and COE. The authors document that while innovative-oriented prospector firms have a lower AQ and a higher implied COE, efficiency-oriented defenders are associated with a higher AQ and lower COE. The higher (lower) COE of prospector (defender) firms is observed to be partly due to their lower (higher) AQ. The results indicate that while the idiosyncratic risk implied in firms' strategic orientation can directly influence their COE, the business strategy implications on firms' COE can be indirect through their AQ, a source of information risk.

Due to data limitation, it was not possible to measure all possible methods of measuring implied COE.

The paper highlights the role of firm's business strategy in pricing decisions by investors.

The paper contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence that AQ, a proxy for information risk, is a mechanism through which business strategy affects firms' COE. The authors thus complement extant literature to empirically test the information risk effect inherent in strategic orientation on security pricing.

This study aims to investigate the impact of dividend policy on a firm’s participation in corporate social responsibility (CSR)-related activities in the context of Pakistani firms. Furthermore, the role of the board governance mechanism in dividend policy-CSR is investigated.

The study’s sample consists of 115 nonfinancial Pakistan Stock Exchange-listed firms from 2010 to 2021. A multidimensional financial method is used to assess the firm’s CSR engagement, and dividend policy is assessed using the dividend payout ratio and dividend yield. The authors used the fixed effect model and the random effect model to fulfill the study’s objectives. Furthermore, the system-generalized method of moment estimation technique is used to test the robustness of the result. In addition, the authors perform reverse causality analysis and investigate the effect of financial constraints on the dividend policy–CSR relationship.

The authors find that dividend policy has a significant positive impact on CSR. The authors also find that dividend policy is significantly positively associated with components of CSR, i.e. donation, employee welfare and research and development. Furthermore, the authors find that the board governance mechanism strengthens this positive relationship between dividend policy and CSR.

The government and authorities must mandate or at least encourage enterprises to pay dividends as doing so not only keeps shareholders happy but also encourages firms to make CSR initiatives to balance stakeholders. Furthermore, the regulator should take steps to strengthen the board governance structure as it strengthens the positive dividend policy–CSR relationship.

Although little previous research has focused on the CSR-dividend policy link, the authors believe that this is the first study to look at the influence of dividend policy on CSR and the moderating impact of board governance mechanisms in an emerging country, namely, Pakistan.

In this study, the authors demonstrate the inherent connections between bank risk-taking, performance and executive compensation in the banking sector of China by developing a theoretical model and performing empirical tests with simultaneous equation models.

The authors construct a multi-task principal-agent model to capture agency problems in China, and the model can be extended to various cases. In empirical tests, simultaneous equation models are used to examine the theoretical predictions by eliminating endogenous concerns efficiently compared with the methods in the existing literature.

The results indicate that the regulator fails to provide bank managers with positive incentives to control risk, whereas the compensation guidance policy (2010) proposed by the CBRC alleviates this problem in China. Additionally, the authors established that shareholders reward bank managers for better and more stable performance. The authors propose the introduction of restricted stock options into the compensation design, as the existing compensation design fails to balance the performance and risk-taking of banks.

First, the executive compensation structure and details in China are not available. In addition, the equity-based incentive compensation is forbidden. Therefore, this paper cannot provide more details about how the compensation structure affects bank manager behaviours. Secondly, the database consists only 25 listed commercial banks. Luckily, the assets of these banks could account for the vast majority of China's banking assets. The authors also expect that new methodologies such as machine learning and deep learning will be adopted in the research on bank risk management.

First, the regulator should optimise the compositions and payment rule of bank executive compensations. Secondly, it is advisable to adopt restricted deferred share reward or stock option compensation in due course. Thirdly, the regulator can require the banks that undertake excessive risks and troubled by moral hazard to increase the independent director proportion on the bank board according to the authors' empirical tests that higher independent proportion prevents the risk accumulations effectively. Fourthly, except for absolute compensation, the gap between executives' salary and average employee's income should be taken account.

This study provides a theoretical framework that incorporates the manager behaviours, executive compensation and bank regulations, and it provides empirical tests by solving endogenous concerns. Additionally, this study examines the effects of China's compensation guidelines issued in 2010. The authors believe that this study adds value to the existing literature by illustrating the compensation mechanism in China.