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The purpose of this study is to review the reasoning of the judgment of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Versloot Dredging BV and another (Appellants) v. HDI Gerling Industrie Versichering AG and Others (Respondents) [2016] UKSC 45 in finding that there is no remedy or sanction for the use of fraudulent devices (so-called “collateral lies”) in insurance claims and to consider potential implications for underwriters.

The methodology is a typical case law analysis starting from case facts and the reasoning with short comments on legal implications.

Despite no sanction provided by law for the use of fraudulent devices, the room still opens for the underwriters to stipulate the consequence of using the fraudulent devices by the express term in the insurance contract.

The main implication from the judgment is that underwriters are likely to incur more investigating costs for insurance claims.

This work raises awareness of the marine insurance industry (especially underwriters) as to the approach of the English law towards the use of fraudulent devices.

Considering the changing dimensions of client influence in the emerging sub-market in Nigeria, different from previous general insinuations, this article examines the new strategies adopted by clients to influence estate surveyors and valuers (ESVs), factors that predispose ESVs to client influence and the effects of clients' influence on valuation outcomes and real estate markets in emerging sub-market, using Ibadan market as the study area.

The paper is situated within a client influence assessment framework, modified to reflect contextual incidents. Contextualization was made possible with the involvement of both practitioners and academic researchers. Validated copies of the questionnaire were administered to the registered practicing ESVs in an intact group during their monthly state (provincial) meeting and through direct delivery at their firms. Data collected were analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics.

Contrary to the previous studies, the authors found no significant relationship between ESV professional qualifications, the firm's staff strength and the frequency of clients' influence in valuation assignments. Hiding important information and clauses, begging, lobbying, and seeking undue favor and promises for future jobs or appointments are the influencing strategies clients employ to pressure valuer. The topmost factors are emerging sub-market and economic-induced factors, lack of due process, and adequate transparency on the parts of firms and Valuers. It was established that the new dimension of client influence leads to the mortgage valuation accuracy dilemma, discredit of professional confidence, default and financial distress, and generating mistrust in the property market.

The implication is the new dimension of client influence, different from the previous studies, thus calling for professional and policy attention. As real estate investment and transactions transcend globally, understanding the local sub-market condition is imperative.

The novelty of the paper is the exposition on the dimensions of client influence within the economy and the implication for the professional body regulatory policy.

Stockbrokers’ frauds in India frequently occur, causing investors significant financial loss. This study aims to unfold the various dubious practices adopted by stock brokers in the recent past to defraud investors and the necessary corrective regulations passed by the market regulator to prevent and detect fraud.

The authors conduct exploratory research using a collective model of literature review, case studies and regulatory changes.

The authors find tightening the system’s loopholes and strengthening the regulatory system using technology helps in the early detection and prevention of fraud. Media activism and investors’ awareness play a role in reducing incidences of fraud.

This study unfolds the practices followed by stock brokers to defraud investors, indicative of regulatory gaps and enforcement lapses. Regulators are evolving a robust system to curb these practices and make them on par with international standards. But, it has a long way to go.

Robust fraud detection and prevention mechanism is desirable to restore investors’ confidence in the stock market. Regulators should focus on investors’ protection and education and whistleblowers’ protection. Compared to the market regulators worldwide, the Securities and Exchange Board of India has less power to identify, detect and punish fraudulent brokers and needs to be empowered.

Besides the regulatory changes, strict enforcement and investor campaigns are required to increase public awareness and restore trust in the stock market to combat the recurrence of fraud.

This paper can be helpful to regulators, investors and financial intermediaries like stock brokers and aid in strengthening the reliability of capital markets and restoring investors’ confidence.

In developing countries, including achieving Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s (KSA) Vision 2030, housing loans for low-income employees are challenging and may thwart housing-related sustainable development goals (SDGs). Studies investigating housing finance inaccessibility for KSA Vision 2030 low-income earners and its impact on achieving housing-related SDGs are scarce. Hence, this study aims to investigate KSA housing financial inaccessibility and its effect on housing-related SDGs. Also, it offered suggestions for achieving housing provision in Vision 2030 and, by extension, improving housing-related SDGs.

The study adopted a virtual interview approach and covered Alqassim, Riyadh and Medina. The researcher engaged 24 participants who were knowledgeable about KSA’s housing finance and SDGs. They include selected low-income earners, academicians, financial operators and government ministries/departments/agencies. The study manually analysed the collated data through a thematic approach and presented the main themes.

Findings reveal that KSA’s low-income earners’ housing finance inaccessibility threatens Vision 2030 and housing-related SDGs. Inadequate funding of the Real Estate Development Fund, inability to make down payment, absence of collateral, insufficient household income and failure to recover the loan and associated charges from the auction were perceived major issues contributing to low-income earners’ house-loan rejection and recommended measures to improve achieving housing-related SDGs.

The study investigated the factors contributing to low-income earners’ housing loan rejection and its impact on achieving KSA’s Vision 2030 and housing-related SDGs from the participants’ perspective. The findings reveal that low-income earners’ housing finance accessibility has been compounded by the slow recovery from the post-COVID-19 pandemic.

Faced with the financing problem of small-medium enterprises (SMEs), China has attempted to establish as many as third party's collateral institutions. The paper aims to study the design of collateral arrangements including collateral fee rates, risk sharing, collateral capital requirements, types of collateral institutions and recollateral institution, etc.

The paper extends the model of Holmstrom and Tirole to develop the analytic framework of the theory of financing collateral. From the perspective of contract design, the paper establishes a moral hazard model focusing on the minimum capital requirement of the borrower under the condition of risk neutral and limited liability, while considering the structure of lender-collateral institution-borrower.

According to the research, only under certain conditions can third party's collateral arrangements tackle the financing problems of SMEs. Diversification, anti-collateral and linked-transactions are three means to improve financing conditions, but the most important way is efficient monitoring by collateral institutions, especially when it has relative advantage over the lender. In order to improve financing conditions of SMEs, China should rely more on efficient monitoring by banks not on excess development of collateral institutions, meanwhile relax rigid collateral supervision policies. Collateral institutions should be industry-specific, association or transaction-related type.

First, from the perspective of contract design, the paper analyzes the comprehensive institutional arrangements of third party's collateral considering mutual relationships of component elements and develops the analytic framework of the theory of third party's collateral, especially points out necessary conditions of its efficient arrangements. Second, the paper studies various efficient financing mechanisms under the institutional arrangements of third party's collateral and focusing on the role of monitoring and monitors, and the paper also has important policy implications, i.e. the paper should develop specific collateral institutions and promote monitoring role of credit institutions.

This study examines whether insider share ownership and personal share collateral affect corporate payout decisions.

This study estimates logit, Tobit and ordinary least squares regression models to explore how insider ownership is related to share repurchase probability, completion rates and the long-term performance following the repurchase announcements and how insider share collateral affects the above associations.

The results show that insider share ownership is negatively associated with the probability of announcing share repurchases and repurchase completion rates and is positively associated with the firm's post-announcement performance. This study further explores the incentive of insiders with high share collateral announcing share repurchases under a threat of margin call. For firms with a high percentage of insider share collateral, the results show that insider share ownership is associated with higher repurchase probability but is associated with lower repurchase completion rates and poorer post-announcement performance.

This study clarifies the interrelationships between insider ownership, insider share collateral and decisions in share repurchases and subsequent performance. This study provides evidence for both the convergence of interest and the entrenchment theories.

Examines the respective concepts of collateral warranties and latent defects insurance, and the strengths and weaknesses of each arrangement. Discusses the objective or protecting owner and occupier, the collateral warranty matrix, building‐specific advantages of LDI, and recent events in the LDI market. Concludes that the inherent uncertainties in collateral warranties are likely to result in increased appreciation and demand for latent defects insurance.

The purpose of this article is to determine the optimal use of collateral in order to maximize the borrower's wealth by reducing the interest rate payments. This analysis is to shed light on the fundamental question whether good or bad borrowers pledge more collateral.

The analysis bases on a simple firm value model similar to Merton's but with the additional feature that the borrower can bring in collateral. This article not only presents the case with perfect information between borrowers and lenders but also regards the consequences arising from asymmetric information.

A bad borrower, who is characterized by higher bankruptcy costs, riskier projects, and a lower contribution to the project value, typically pledges more collateral than a good borrower. These relationships base on the existence of perfect information between borrowers and lenders. If asymmetric information in terms of the project's riskiness or the contribution of the borrower to the project is present, these relationships invert and good borrowers tend to pledge more collateral. As a result, the allocation of information between a borrower and a lender is crucial for the optimal choice of collateral.

This research underlines the potential for firms to add firm value by pledging collateral because collateral reduces interest rates and therefore results in more attractive terms of the loan. On the other hand, further empirical research can be done to verify our theoretical finding that under perfect information bad borrowers pledge more collateral, while under asymmetric information primarily good borrowers use collateral.

This paper introduces a new motive for the use of collateral and explains – in contrast to many other theoretical models – why bad borrowers tend to pledge more collateral.

The purpose of this paper is to study land title’s credit effect from a financial inclusion perspective in China. The focus is both small land holding and poor farmers. Formal and informal finances are considered to test their differences in land title’s credit effect.

The authors use augmented inverse-probability weights of the doubly robust method to test the effect of land titling on the rural credit market by addressing self-selection, endogeneity and heterogeneity concerns.

Results show that the poor, non-poor and small land holders with land titles are willing to borrow more from formal financial institutions. Land titling increases loan accessibility for non-poor and small land holding farmers. As for informal financing, large land holding and non-poor farmers show a decrease in informal lending. Land titling has a financial inclusion effect for some farmers, but poor farmers’ credit restrictions are not entirely solved by land titling.

This is the first study that focuses on the financial inclusion effect of farm land titling in China.

The purpose of this study is to propose a model of competition between a formal lender (bank) and an informal lender (moneylender) with informational asymmetry between these two lenders. Further, the authors introduce capacity constraint on the lending capacity of the moneylender and assume that borrowers differ in risk and wealth.

The solution concept of Nash equilibrium has been used to derive the optimal strategies of the lenders.

The equilibrium strategies in most of the results depend on the difference between the expected returns from risky and safe projects where the risky project has higher expected returns. The credit market is segmented in terms of risk and wealth levels. Rationing of poor safe borrowers from the credit market is inevitable when the moneylender's capacity is sufficiently small, suggesting a low-income trap for them. Further, when moneylender has capacity constraint of some form, a zero-profit outcome is never a Nash equilibrium outcome.

There is a possibility of collusion between the lenders. However, the authors do not derive all possible outcomes under capacity constraint

When the informal lender has limited capacity, competition between formal and informal lenders may not alleviate credit rationing, instead aggravate the problem. Thus, the government should devise policies to ensure credit availability to resource poor households

While the literature models strategic interaction between lenders under the assumption of zero-profit (Bertrand Paradox) condition, this study shows that zero profit is not the only outcome under such a set-up. Also, in presence of capacity constraint of the moneylender, a zero-profit outcome is never a Nash equilibrium outcome for the lenders. There is an optimal contract at which the lenders differentiate in terms of repayment and collateral and earn positive profits under certain conditions.