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Purpose: This study analyses how investments and specific financial factors affect the financial performance of businesses in Kosovo. Exploring the relationship between investments and financial performance and their impact on performance volatility, performance is assessed using return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) investments.

Methodology: Quantitative methods using secondary data from audited financial statements of Kosova manufacturing and commercial enterprises cover a 3-year period (2019–2021), involving 40 enterprises with 120 observations. Statistical tests such as descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, linear regression, Hausman–Taylor regression, fixed effects, random effects, and generalised estimating equations (GEE) model are applied. The study also utilises ARCH–GARCH analysis to assess the relationship between investments and performance volatility.

Findings: Investments positively impact the financial performance of Kosova businesses and significantly reduce performance volatility. Long-term liabilities, retained earnings, and short-term liabilities also play a role in reducing asset return volatility, while cash flow from financial activities increases it. Investments, cash flows from financial activities, long-term liabilities, short-term liabilities, retained earnings, and solvency affect equity return volatility.

Practical Implications: The study sheds light on how investments and financial factors influence the financial performance and volatility of Kosova businesses. Policymakers can use these insights to create policies that foster the development of commercial and manufacturing enterprises, given their importance in Kosovo’s economy.

Significance: This research provides valuable insights for business managers to enhance investment strategies and improve financial performance. Policymakers can rely on this academic study to enhance the economic environment and promote the growth of businesses in Kosovo.

Factor investment is booming in global asset management, especially environmental, social, and governance (ESG), dividend yield, and volatility factors. In this chapter, we use data from the US securities market from 2003 to 2019 to predict dividends and volatility factors through machine learning and historical data–based methods. After that, we utilize particle swarm optimization to construct the Markowitz portfolio with limits on the number of assets and weight restrictions. The empirical results show that that the prediction ability using XGBoost is superior to the historical factor investment method. Moreover, the investment performance of our portfolio with ESG, high-yield, and low-volatility factors outperforms baseline methods, especially the S&P 500 ETF.

This chapter analyzes how the internal environment determines corporate dividend decisions. First, dividend policy is influenced by strategic and financial issues. Corporate strategies are developed by top managers to achieve firms' missions, visions, and long-term goals while business strategies are designed by middle managers to maintain firms' competitive advantages. These strategies affect corporate dividend decisions through corporate performance and business operations. In addition, many financial characteristics are important determinants of dividend policy. Financial characteristics are classified into three groups, namely performance-related issues (e.g., firm profitability, free cash flow, and stock liquidity), leverage-related issues (e.g., debt ratio, asset tangibility, business risk, and firm size), and investment-related issues (e.g., investment opportunities and firm maturity). Firms with high profitability, free cash flow tends to pay more dividends. Stock liquidity may have a positive effect on dividend payments through lowering costs of equity; however, it may also have a negative effect through weakening the signaling motive. Moreover, firms with high debt ratio, low asset tangibility, high business risk, and small size face higher costs of external financing. Therefore, they have low incentives to pay dividends. When firms have more investment opportunities, they are more likely to restrict dividends and save cash for their investment projects and vice versa. Second, internal stakeholders may influence corporate dividend policy since their benefits are closely related to dividend decisions. Shareholders, directors, the chief executive officer, and employees have different characteristics, positions, and hold various proportions of shares. Therefore, they create pressures on dividend decisions to protect their wealth.

Introduction: Why companies pay dividends and the determinants of dividend policy are considered an unresolved dividend puzzle. To reach a consensus over the puzzle, researchers must investigate the factors affecting dividend policy by incorporating all the determinants into a single research effort.

Purpose: We examine the dividend policy determinants of Sri Lankan firms, explicitly focusing on the banking, finance, and insurance (BFI) sectors.

Methodology: This study uses the quantitative approach applying the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) system to examine the dividend policy determinants by obtaining secondary data from 51 listed BFI organisations in Sri Lanka.

Findings: The analysis disclosed that the variables of changes in revenues, firm size, liquidity, corporate tax, business risk, and profitability have a positive relationship with dividend yield, whereas investment opportunities, leverage, change in revenues, corporate tax, and firm size impact positively on the propensity to pay dividends in BFI organisations in Sri Lanka. Our findings opine that managers in the BFI industries should prioritise changing their dividend policies by paying close attention to factors, such as dividend yield, changes in revenue, firm size, liquidity, corporate tax ratio, business risk, and profitability because the dividend policy is critical to retaining current investors and luring new ones.

This chapter presents both main arguments of dividend policy theories and their empirical evidence. According to Miller and Modigliani (1961), dividend decisions are not relevant to firm value in a perfect capital market. Nevertheless, there are several market frictions in the real world (e.g., information asymmetry, agency problems, transaction costs, firm maturity, catering incentives and taxes). Therefore, academics use them to develop theories which help them explain corporate dividend decisions. Particularly, signaling theory considers dividend payments as a signal about firms' future prospects since outside investors face information disadvantage. “Bird-in-hand” theory argues that investors prefer dividends to capital gains since the former have lower risk than the latter. Agency theory is developed from the conflict of interest between corporate managers and shareholders. Corporate managers have high incentives to restrict dividend payments. Furthermore, transaction cost theory and pecking order theory posit that firms prefer internal to external funds. This drives firms to hold more cash and pay less dividends. Life cycle theory explains dividend policy by firm maturity. Mature firms have fewer investment opportunities, and thus, they tend to pay more dividends. Catering theory states that dividend decisions are based on investors' demand. Firms pay more dividends since investors prefer dividends and assign higher value to dividend payers. Tax clientele theory argues that firms that have corporate dividend policy rely on the comparative income tax rates for dividends and capital gains. Under the tax discriminations against dividends, firms tend to restrict their dividends in order to increase their stock prices.

We study the potential effects of pension underfunding on corporate investment, financial constraints and improved employee bonding using 10 Pacific-Basin countries (including the United States, Australia, and eight Asian countries) at heterogeneous economic development stages and different regulatory environments. We document that corporate pensions are significantly underfunded in most countries of our sample in the period of 2001–2017, when interest rates were ultralow in most countries. In addition, firms from countries with stronger employee protection and more generous retirement benefits tend to show higher levels of underfunding in their defined benefit (DB) pension plans. To the extent of pension underfunding imposing constraints on corporate investment, we find that firms in these countries can face more constraints on investment when their pension is underfunded.

This chapter analyzes how the macro-environment determines corporate dividend decisions. First, political factors including political uncertainty, economic policy uncertainty, political corruption, and democracy may have two opposite effects on dividend decisions. For example, firms learn democratic practices to improve their corporate governance, but dividend policy may be the outcome of strong corporate governance or the substitute for poor corporate governance. Second, firms in countries of high national income, low inflation, and highly developed stock markets tend to pay more dividends. A monetary restriction (expansion) reduces (increases) dividend payments, as economic shocks like financial crises and the COVID-19 may negatively affect corporate dividend policy through higher external financial constraint, economic uncertainty, and agency costs. On the other hand, they may positively influence corporate dividend policy through agency costs of debt, shareholders' bird-in-hand motive, substitution of weak corporate governance, and signaling motive. Third, social factors including national culture, religion, and language affect dividend decisions since they govern both managers' and shareholders' views and behaviors. Fourth, firms tend to reduce their dividends when they face stronger pressure to reduce pollution, produce environment-friendly products, or follow a green policy. Finally, firms have high levels of dividends when shareholders are strongly protected by laws. However, firms tend to pay more dividends in countries of weak creditor rights since dividend payments are a substitute for poor legal protection of creditors. Furthermore, corporate dividend policy changes when tax laws change the comparative tax rates on dividends and capital gains.