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Most prior studies investigating determinants of CEO compensation in nonprofit hospitals ignore how managerial ability affects compensation. This study aims to examine whether CEOs with greater ability to manage corporate resources efficiently receive more payment in nonprofit hospitals.

This study employs a sample of 764 observations from 85 Pennsylvania nonprofit hospitals for the period 2010–2020.

This study finds a positive and statistically significant association between managerial ability and CEO compensation. The results are robust to alternative measures of managerial ability.

The measure of managerial ability proposed in this study could be used by boards of directors to quantify, evaluate and benchmark CEO ability. The results are also relevant to policymakers, stakeholders and the public interested in understanding the determinants of CEO compensation in nonprofits.

This study is among the first to use a more precise measure of managerial ability, which captures the unobserved manager-specific aspects of CEO ability. In addition, this study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that CEO's ability to manage hospital resources efficiently plays an essential role in designing executive compensation contracts.

This study aims to investigate the impact of top management team (TMT)'s gender diversity on corporate social performance (CSP). It sheds light on inconsistent results in literature by testing the moderator effects of chief executive officer (CEO) managerial ability and corporate governance (CG) on such impact.

A dynamic panel estimator is applied to an international sample of 8640 firm‐year observations from 2013 to 2017.

The author finds reliable evidence that the critical mass of at least three women leaders has a positive impact on the firm's CSP. Obtained results suggest, moreover, the deterrence effects of CEO managerial ability and CG tools (board independence, board gender diversity, the presence of a corporate social responsibility committee and family control) on the women leaders' contribution to the firm's CSP level. These results remain consistent with alternative measures for women leaders and CEO managerial ability. However, findings are lost when women achieve the CEO position, the chairperson position or both positions, which imply that men and women leadership styles are closely similar rather than different. Furthermore, women leaders' effect on CSP seems dependent (do not) on the country (industry) which a firm belongs to.

From a practical standpoint, the study highlights the importance of fostering the achievement of a critical mass of women leaders and the combination of CEO managerial ability – educational/professional backgrounds – and CG attributes to improve the firm's CSP. The study has important implications for investors and regulators. If investors wish to increase CSP, they should ask for more gender diversified TMTs. Furthermore, this study supports regulators in their efforts to increase senior women's quotas by providing empirical evidence of better social outcomes under leader gender diversity. The study’s evidence is also useful for companies in setting the criteria to identify CEOs who can support their strategic decisions.

By studying the impact female leaders have on CSP under CEO managerial ability and CG as moderators, this study is the first to display complementarities and substitutions between CEO's managerial ability and selected CG attributes in the promotion of CSP by female senior executives. Furthermore, it fills the void on how TMT's gender diversity impact CSP. In fact, while it is conventionally considered that women are more likely to engage in socially responsible activities, sensitive findings of this study shed light on the brighter side of female executives when they achieve the CEO, the chairperson position or both positions.

This chapter investigates whether core competence of managers and their expansive (vs. specialized) managerial style affects firms' innovative ability, capacity, and efficiency. Using exogenous CEO departures as a natural experiment, it establishes a causal link between managerial capability and innovation. Importantly, it reveals that firms with talented managers receive significantly more nonself citations; make significantly lower self-citations and lesser citations to the others, indicating novel and explorative innovation achievements. Also, managers with higher general (specialized) ability are cited more (less) by patents from a wider range of fields. Lastly, career concern is identified as a mechanism linking higher ability and innovation.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of managerial ability on informative earnings management (hereafter IEM) and to examine the moderating role of the chief executive officer and board of commissioner relationship (hereafter CEO-commissioner relationship) and board independence between managerial ability and IEM.

Sample consists of 864 firm-years listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. Informative earnings management is measured by the relationship between discretionary accruals and earnings growth. Managerial ability is measured by data envelopment analysis. This research uses firm-effect logistic regression to perform the data analysis.

Based on firm-effect logistic regression, managerial ability increases IEM. It confirms the managers’ stewardship behavior where managers tend to engage in IEM and provide higher quality information for shareholders. The result also shows that the absence of a CEO-commissioner relationship and higher board independence leads higher ability managers to engage more in IEM. It confirms the role of corporate governance to reduce managers-shareholders conflict (in the context of agency theory) or to facilitate higher ability managers to act as both controlling and minority shareholders’ stewards (in the context of stewardship theory) by engaging more in IEM and providing higher-quality information.

This research contributes to filling the previous studies gap that provides conflicting results on managerial ability and earnings management by considering earnings management motivations, CEO-commissioner relationship and board independence. This research also contributes to providing new evidence of managerial ability, IEM, CEO-commissioner relationship and board independence, especially in Indonesia.

This paper examines the role of managerial discretion in the relation between managerial ability on the level of corporate cash.

Conjoining the upper echelons theory's premises and the theoretical framework of cash holdings, we posit that the managerial ability's effect on cash policy varies with managerial discretion using firm-level data. To test the empirical prediction, we employ a linear regression model with fixed effects with a sample of US listed firms from 1980 to 2016.

The findings reveal that the positive association between the ability of chief executive officers and corporate cash savings is weakened by firm-level managerial discretion. The results are robust to various additional analyses, namely lagged independent variables regression, reduced form regression and granger causality test. Overall, the findings are generally consistent with the cash holding motives yielding transaction and precautionary demand for money. However, our findings also shed light on whether managerial discretion moderates or exacerbates agency problems related to top executives' cash holding policies.

This work's distinct characteristic is the investigation of the joint effect of managerial talent and discretion on a firm's cash holding, which remains unexplored in the literature.

This paper aims to consider the effect of the chief executive officer’s (CEO) ability on the amount of cash stock at the firm level.

The empirical hypothesis is examined via fixed-effect regression models using data from US incorporated firms.

Consistent with the upper echelon theory and cash holding motives, the results reveal that able CEOs are associated with an increased level of cash stock, ceteris paribus. Further analysis shows that the association between CEO ability and firm cash holding is more profound for financially sound firms. The authors also demonstrate that firm size significantly affects the relationship between CEO ability and cash management. The results are robust to various sensitivity analyses and additional tests.

This work is subject to limitations inherent in the use of relevant proxies. Thus, the study implements several model specifications to ensure the validity of findings in a more generic context. Future research should investigate the board structure’s role and the monitoring procedures on the CEOs’ cash holding behavior as a natural extension to this study.

The insights derived from the study are expected to advance the decision-making process of cash policies and CEO selection for shareholders, business executives and investment strategists.

Overall, the study provides new evidence that CEO ability is a contingent factor of corporate cash stock.

The purpose of this study is to contribute to the debate in the literature about generalist CEOs by exploring the effect of board governance on CEO general managerial ability, focusing on one of the most crucial aspects of the board of directors, board size. Prior research shows that smaller boards constitute a more effective governance mechanism and therefore are expected to reduce agency costs.

The authors estimate the effect of board size on CEO general managerial ability, using a fixed-effects regression analysis, propensity score matching, as well as an instrumental-variable analysis. These techniques mitigate endogeneity greatly and make the results much more likely to show causality.

The results show that firms with smaller board size are more likely to hire generalist CEOs. Specifically, a decline in board size by one standard deviation raises CEO general managerial ability by 15.62%. A lack of diverse experiences in a small board with fewer directors makes it more necessary to hire a CEO with a broad range of professional experiences. Furthermore, the agency costs associated with generalist CEOs are greatly diminished in firms with a smaller board. Hence, firms with a smaller board are more inclined to hire generalist CEOs.

Although prior research has explored the effects of board size on various corporate outcomes, strategies and policies, this study is the first to investigate the effect of board size on CEO general managerial ability. This study contributes to the literature both in corporate governance and on CEO general managerial ability.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of founding-family firms on managerial ability.

Founding-family firms are determined by founder and/or family involvement as block holder and as in the firm board. Managerial ability is estimated by data envelopment analysis. Research samples consist of 412 manufacturing firm-years listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange. Analysis data use random-effect regression as the main analysis and Huber-White regression as an alternative analysis.

This research finds that founding-family firms have a negative effect on managerial ability. Further, the result shows that lower managerial ability occurred when founding-family firms led by founder and professional CEOs, when other family members involved in the ownership and the board have higher family ownership. It indicates that founding-family firms concern more about family interest, such as family reputation, rather than business needs and best management practice.

Limitation of this research does not occur if the founding-family firms are managed by first, second, third, etc., family generation. Future research expected to consider family generation in founding-family firms management.

This research can be used by founding-family firms in Indonesia as consideration of management policy formulation that can improve managerial ability.

This research provides new evidence if founding-family firms promote lower managerial ability in emerging market such Indonesian market where family businesses are the root of private businesses which have a major contribution to economics.

This study aims to examine the effect of managerial ability on real earnings management (hereafter REM) in family firms.

The sample consists of 864 firms-years listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange. REM is measured by abnormal activities. Managerial ability is measured by data envelopment analysis. Data analysis uses random-effect regression analysis.

Family firms reduce the possibility of higher ability managers to engage in REM. Compare to non-family firms, higher ability managers in family firms are more likely to engage in REM to improve future earnings.

This research only uses efficiency score data envelopment analysis to measure managerial ability while the managerial ability is, by nature, multi-dimensional and unobservable. This research also does not find the role of professional Chief Executive Officer (hereafter CEO) in the family firms in REM behavior because does not consider the professional CEO motivation (e.g. compensation structure).

This research is expected to help family firms formulate managers' selection based on managerial ability. This research also is expected to help investors and creditors to put their funds in the family firms with higher ability managers that reduce earnings information distortion.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this research is the first research that examines the managerial ability on REM in Indonesian family firms. This research also contributes to fil the findings gap in managerial ability and REM.

This research aims to examine the moderating role of green chief executive officer (CEO) in the effect of managerial ability (MA) on environmental performance (ENV).

This research’s sample consists of 197 manufacturing firm-years that are listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange and the Program Penilaian Peringkat Kinerja Perusahaan Dalam Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup (PROPER) participants. Data analysis use industry- and year-effect regression analysis.

The result shows that MA improves ENV when led by a green CEO. It indicates that a green CEO with higher MA considers environmental responsibilities as a valuable investment to create business competitive advantages and sustainability.

First, this research only uses the PROPER participants as the research sample. Second, by nature, MA measurement errors might still exist because it is hard to determine the MA with qualitative factors. Third, this research does not split the environmental responsibilities into a wider spectrum, such as environmental–business, environmental–regulation or environmental–ethical spectrum.

This research provides new evidence that higher MA by green CEO increases ENV in Indonesia. This research also gives a contribution to fill the inconsistent previous findings of MA and ENV.