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The purpose of this study is to examine the association between the combined roles of chief executive officer (CEO)-chairman titles (CEO duality) and investment efficiency, defined as a lower deviation from expected investment for targeted S-curve firms used to propel an innovation-driven economy. This study also aims to investigate the moderating effect of financial reporting quality on this association.

This paper focuses on the ten targeted S-curve industries – under the definition of the Thailand 4.0 model – listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) from 2000 to 2019. Data related to CEO/chairman titles and investment supports were manually collected from the annual reports, the SET market analysis and reporting tool database and the company websites. Financial data used to estimate investment behaviors and discretionary accruals were extracted from 1999. The study analyzes unbalanced panel data using fixed-effects regressions. Additional tests embrace replacing the sample with nontargeted firms, partitioning into granted and nongranted firms, adding CEOs’ demographic moderators, using alternative variable measures and analyzing for lagged independent variables.

The main findings show that CEO duality reduces overinvestment but worsens underinvestment in targeted firms. Financial reporting quality (FRQ) appears to strengthen CEO duality in mitigating extreme spending but has no impact on the association between CEO duality and underinvestment. Additional results, for example, conclude that CEO duality has no association with both over- and underinvesting at nontargeted firms, but its effect becomes positively significant on overinvestment when financial reporting quality is high. The negative association between CEO duality and overinvestment is found only in government-granted and targeted firms. FRQ encourages CEO duality in lowering overinvestment among targeted firms without grants. CEOs’ female and serviced early years appear to elevate those main findings.

These findings assist innovative corporations in choosing a proper leadership structure to cope with investment inefficiency. The research gives the government and regulatory bodies an insight into the qualifications of the leadership structure and financial information that helps them put forward effective policies.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is among the first to establish the association between CEO duality and investment efficiency for innovation-driven firms in a transforming economy. The study fills the gap in the literature on management, accounting and finance by unveiling the interplay between dual leadership and financial reporting in affecting the efficiency of investments.

The direct nexus between board characteristics, earnings management (EM) practices and dividend payout is examined in this study, followed by an examination of the indirect mediation impact of EM practices in the nexus between board characteristics and dividend payout. It aims to provide new empirical evidence from the Jordanian market, which is an emerging market.

The study population consists of all service firms that were listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) between 2012 and 2019. Due to the lack of availability of their complete data during the period, four service firms were omitted from the population; hence, a sample of 43 service firms was acquired over the time frame (2012–2019), yielding a total of 344 firm-year observations. Moreover, panel data analysis was employed in this study, and data for the study were acquired from yearly reports as well as the ASE's database.

Based on the GMM estimator findings, board size and independence have a negative and significant influence on the EM, but CEO/chairman duality has a positive and significant impact. Simultaneously, the impacts of female representation on the board of directors and the number of board meetings were both positive but insignificant. The findings also found that four board characteristics, including board size, female representation on the board of directors, CEO/chairman duality and the number of board meetings, had a significant negative or positive effect on dividend payout, while board independence did not. Additional findings show that EM practices have a direct negative insignificant effect on dividend payout, whereas EM practices partially mediate the relationship between board characteristics and dividend payout.

The current study's limitation is that it only searched in Jordanian service firms listed on ASE from 2012 to 2019 to fulfill the study's objectives; thus, we urge that future work explores the study models for other sectors, whether in Jordan or other growing markets such as the Middle East and North Africa.

The findings of this study may be utilized by analysts, investors and other strategic decision-makers to enhance Jordan's financial market's efficiency and efficacy. These findings will improve policymakers' willingness to impose appropriate constraints, perhaps boosting Jordan's financial market performance and efficacy. These findings may also help investors make more enlightened judgments by utilizing board characteristics and EM factors that predict firm dividend policy.

Contradictions in the results of earlier investigations inspired the current study, with the findings filling a gap in the existing literature. This study differs from previous studies by constructing a novel research model and analyzing the mediating influence of EM in the nexus between board characteristics and dividend payout.

The aim of this study is to understand how board structure, size of audit committee (AC), gender diversity and ownership structure influence banks’ performance in Pakistan. This study also aims to examine how various dimensions of governance differently affect the different measures of bank performance.

This study used panel estimation techniques to quantify the impact of various elements of corporate governance on bank performance by taking annual data of 19 Pakistani banks for the period 2013–2020. The corporate governance is measured by board size, CEO duality, AC size, ownership structure and gender diversity. To get the robust results, this study measures bank performance by considering different indicators, namely, return on assets, earning per share, technical efficiency (TE) and total factor productivity. The empirical investigation is based on several well-known and well-accepted governance theories such as the agency theory, the stewardship theory, the tokenism/critical mass theory and the information asymmetry theory.

The findings of the study reveal that the size of board and ACs both significantly improve profitability and productivity, whereas they decrease TE. Further, the findings suggest that most of the indicators of gender diversity significantly deteriorate the performance of banks. However, ownership structure significantly improves banks’ earnings per share and TE. This study further illustrates that CEO’s duality does not have any significant impact on bank performance. This finding holds true for all the performance measures considered for this study.

The findings are of great importance to various stakeholders, especially to policymakers to know about the factors influencing different measures of performance. Specifically, based on these findings, they can devise the result-oriented strategies to enhance the financial and real performance of banks. The findings also suggest that both investors and owners should take into consideration the governance indicators while evaluating banks’ performance by using accounting, market-based, efficiency and productivity measures.

This research adds to the vast body of existing knowledge about the effectiveness of corporate governance by investigating how the different dimensions of corporate governance and gender diversity influence bank performance in a developing country, namely, Pakistan. Further, this study elaborates the domestic rules/regulations, governance theories and governance framework and practices and tries to link the empirical findings with them for better understanding the role of governance in determining the performance of the banking sector of Pakistan.

The purpose of the study is to examine the relation between board structure and firm performance variability in an international setting. The authors further explore the effect of national culture in shaping such relations.

The authors’ international sample contains 4,911 firms across 49 countries over the 2002–2017 period. The authors use national culture values on individualism and power distance developed by Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2011). The authors focus on within-firm, over-time variability of firm performance and estimate multivariate linear regressions with fixed effects. The authors address the endogeneity concern using the instrumental variable approach, and the authors’ results are robust to alternative measures of variables and different subsamples.

The authors find that firms with larger board size, greater board independence and less powerful CEOs have less variable performance. Individualism has a magnifying effect while power distance has a mitigating effect in shaping such relations.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is among the first to answer the call of Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) for research on corporate boards in an international setting. It is also one of the few studies which examine the variability of firm performance, while the majority of existing literature focuses on the level of firm performance. Most importantly, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to explore the role of national culture in shaping boardroom interactions that affect the decision-making process of corporate boards, which, in turn, affects firm performance variability.

The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of an exogenous corporate governance shock that curbs Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) power on the relationship between CEO narcissism and earnings management practices.

The authors performed a quasi-experiment using a differences-in-differences approach to examine Brazil’s duality split regulatory change on 101 Brazilian public firms during the period 2010–2022.

The main findings indicate that the introduction of duality split curtails the positive influence of CEO narcissism on earnings management, suggesting that this corporate governance regulation may act as a complementary corporate governance mechanism in mitigating the negative consequences of powerful narcissistic CEOs. Further robustness checks indicate that the results remain consistent after using entropy balancing and alternative measures of CEO narcissism.

In emerging markets, where governance systems are frequently perceived as less than optimal, policymakers and regulatory authorities can draw insights from this enforcement to shape governance systems, reducing CEO power and, consequently, improving the quality of financial reporting.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to examine whether a duality split mitigates the influence of CEO narcissism on earnings management. Thus, this study contributes to the corporate governance literature that calls for research on the effectiveness of external corporate governance mechanisms in emerging markets as well as the CEO narcissism literature that calls for research on moderating factors that could curtail negative consequences of narcissistic CEO behavior.

This study aims to investigate the direct nexus between board characteristics, corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure and the cost of equity capital (CEQ). This is done by using agency theory, stakeholder theory and signalling theory, followed by an investigation into the indirect mediation impact of CSR disclosure in the board characteristics-CEQ nexus. It intends to present new experimental evidence from Jordan’s developing economy.

The study’s target population was services companies registered on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) between 2012 and 2020. As a result, the population and sampling of this study are represented by all services companies for whom complete data are available over the period, with a total of 43 services companies yielding 387 company-year observations. Data for our study were obtained from their annual disclosures and the ASE’s database.

The main findings demonstrated that board size, board gender variety and the number of board sessions positively affect CSR disclosure significantly. In addition, three board characteristics (i.e. board size, board independence and board gender variety) significantly negatively affect CEQ. Besides, CSR disclosure significantly negatively affects CEQ and it fully mediates the relationship between two board characteristics (i.e. board size and board gender variety) and CEQ, whereas it partially mediates the nexus between board independence, CEO/Chairman duality and the number of board sessions of board characteristics and CEQ.

This study varies from earlier studies, in that it builds a new research model by looking at the mediating role of CSR disclosure in the nexus among board characteristics and the CEQ.

This study aims to examine the impacts of board chairman characteristics on the decision to finance with debts.

Based on historical data from 173 active nonfinancial firms listed on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Stock Exchange Markets during 2012–2019, this research uses ordinary least squares (OLS) and dynamic system-generalized methods of moments to test its hypotheses. The final dataset comprises 1,384 firm-year observations from 10 major nonfinancial industry classifications.

Results indicate a negative impact of board chairman ownership on the decision to finance with retained earnings (RE). Negative effects of the chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) from the same family on the decision to finance with RE, whereas positive effects of the chairman and CEO from the same family on the decision to finance with debts are observed. In addition, a negative effect of the chairman from a royal family on the decision to invest with debts is found.

Many board chairmen characteristics, such as age, gender, experience, education level, periodic change and ethnicity, are unaddressed. Financial decisions (FDs) are also limited to two decisions (internal financing with RE and external financing with debts).

Findings of this study provide an improved understanding of the role of chairman characteristics in FDs in GCC. Investors and lenders dealing with companies in GCC markets benefit from the authors' results because of the effects of chairman characteristics on FDs when making investment decisions in company stocks.

The study clarifies how each of the three board chairman characteristics (i.e. chairman ownership, chairman and CEO from the same family and the chairman from the royal family) affects FDs, especially the decisions to finance with debts and RE.

The phenomenon of “broken rungs” has prevented most women from attaining managerial positions relative to men. Despite this gender disparity in management, female executives are more likely to enhance shareholder trust due to higher ethical standards, which can be hypothesized to mitigate the negative impact of family ownership on firm value. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the moderating role of female ownership and female directors in mitigating the unfavorable effects of family ownership on firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q and the Market Value of Equity (MVE).

Multiple linear regression is applied to examine the proposed hypotheses, as well as other vital factors, such as board independence (BI), the dual chief executive officer (CEO)–chairman role (CEO duality) and control variables (i.e. firm size, firm age, leverage and investment ratio).

The results revealed that female directors could buffer the negative impact caused by family ownership, leading to higher firm value, when given a sufficient level of female ownership or the appointment of more female directors, regardless of female ownership levels. Otherwise, female ownership cannot help overcome the negative effects of family ownership in Thai-listed firms. This study also sheds light on corporate governance elements that impact firm value. CEO duality reduces the value of Thai-listed companies, whereas board independence increases firm value.

The managerial roles for women should be promoted in Thai-listed enterprises. The government can support new laws, policies and programs for embracing a cross-cutting gender perspective. Female network initiatives enable women to advance in their managerial careers.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study intends to fill the research gap by investigating how female directors and owners can moderate family ownership’s influence on the value of firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), which is one of the emerging capital markets.

The board structure (BS) is pivotal in modern corporate governance (CG). This study aims to investigate BS variables (BSIZE, BIND and chief executive officer [CEO] duality) and their correlation with risk-taking behavior indicators, enriching the understanding of how CG shapes financial institutions’ (FIs) decision-making in Pakistan.

By scrutinizing data from 67 financial entities listed on the Stock Exchange of Pakistan spanning from 2011 to 2022 through panel data regression techniques, the research emphasizes that BS holds a substantial influence over the risk tendencies exhibited by these firms.

Key findings suggest that board size has a positive influence, aligned with previous CG research. Smaller boards perform better and avoid excessive risk-taking, contrasting some negative relationship claims. More independent directors are recommended to curtail risk and financial disruption. Holding both CEO and chair roles reduces risk exposure, resonating with reputational and employment risk theory. It is essential to recognize that BS’s impact on risk-taking is nuanced and context-dependent.

Policymakers, scholars, practitioners and investors working in the market for financial companies might greatly benefit from the empirical findings of this study. Imposing mandates on FIs to uphold adequate capital reserves functions as a safeguard against unforeseen losses, thereby diminishing the probability of unwarranted risk-taking.

Prior studies in this domain predominantly focus on nonfinancial sectors. In addition, existing research often explores the relationship between BS and firm risk-taking solely within the banking sector, overlooking other FIs. This study contributes by using a comprehensive data set encompassing all types of FIs, thus extending the existing literature.

Corporate governance principles are living a positive momentum in light of the megatrends reshaping the world. An effective company based on sound governance principles can prevent issues and corporate scandals as the company ensures greater transparency and accountability. Accordingly, this paper aims to investigate the relationship between shareholder-oriented corporate governance mechanisms, value and performances in the real estate sector.

This paper investigates the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, performance and value in a sample of 111 USA real estate firms. After collecting data from 2014 to 2018, this paper tests the research hypothesis using the linear fixed-effect model.

The results demonstrate a positive impact of shareholder-oriented corporate governance mechanisms on performance and value. In particular, firms with no chief executive officer (CEO) duality and staggered board mechanisms and recognizing excess variable compensation to the firms' executive have a significantly higher Tobin's Q, return on assets (ROA) and price-to-book performance.

The implications are twofold: on the one hand, this motivates shareholders to establish new corporate control mechanisms to maximize value, attract more capital and improve operating performance. On the other hand, this allows investors to direct the investors' resources toward real estate firms with effective corporate governance mechanisms that may return higher performance and value.

Focusing on the real estate industry, where governance is expected to have a lower impact due to solid regulation, especially in real estate investment trusts (REITs), the research allows the formulation of industry-specific inferences that may be generalized for the general market.