The moderating role of duality split on the relationship between CEO narcissism and earnings management

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of an exogenous corporate governance shock that curbs Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) power on the relationship between CEO narcissism and earnings management practices.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors performed a quasi-experiment using a differences-in-differences approach to examine Brazil’s duality split regulatory change on 101 Brazilian public firms during the period 2010–2022.

Findings

The main findings indicate that the introduction of duality split curtails the positive influence of CEO narcissism on earnings management, suggesting that this corporate governance regulation may act as a complementary corporate governance mechanism in mitigating the negative consequences of powerful narcissistic CEOs. Further robustness checks indicate that the results remain consistent after using entropy balancing and alternative measures of CEO narcissism.

Practical implications

In emerging markets, where governance systems are frequently perceived as less than optimal, policymakers and regulatory authorities can draw insights from this enforcement to shape governance systems, reducing CEO power and, consequently, improving the quality of financial reporting.

Originality/value

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to examine whether a duality split mitigates the influence of CEO narcissism on earnings management. Thus, this study contributes to the corporate governance literature that calls for research on the effectiveness of external corporate governance mechanisms in emerging markets as well as the CEO narcissism literature that calls for research on moderating factors that could curtail negative consequences of narcissistic CEO behavior.

Citation

Azevedo, Y.G.P., Silva, M.C.G.e. and Nakao, S.H. (2024), "The moderating role of duality split on the relationship between CEO narcissism and earnings management", Corporate Governance, Vol. 24 No. 6, pp. 1237-1262. https://doi.org/10.1108/CG-06-2023-0229