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Independent audit oversight is a prerequisite for restoring public confidence in financial reporting and auditing after the past accounting scandals and the financial crisis. By analysing and comparing the independence of the audit oversight boards of 27 European Member States and the USA, this study aims to provide insights into the question of how independent “independent” audit oversight boards are.

Independence is measured in terms of the organisational compositions and regulatory competences of the audit oversight authorities. The data were collected through an e-mail questionnaire that was sent to all European oversight authorities, and by analysing legal provisions of various regulators. The results are analysed and visualised by a Partial Order Scalogram Analysis with Coordinates, which allows conclusions about the similarities of various systems and their relative levels of independence. Both measurements are then equally combined into one value of material independence, which is used to rank the oversight authorities.

Although all countries encounter similar pressures to establish profession-independent oversight systems, this study identifies how differently “independence” has been translated in regulatory outcomes. While all countries claim to possess formal independent oversight bodies, there is a visible gap between countries with comparatively strong independent oversight authorities and systems in which accounting bodies still maintain far-reaching regulatory influence. At the same time, the results question the role of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as the globally perceived benchmark of an entirely independent regulator.

This study focuses on formal independence rather than de-facto independence. Future research has, therefore, to address how these formal arrangements have evolved in regulatory practice.

Policy makers around the world perceive independent oversight as one of the essential elements of regulatory reforms aiming at restoring public confidence in the aftermath of past accounting scandals. This study enables the comparison and benchmarking of national specific regulatory designs with other forms of independent oversight.

Although the role of independent regulation is a recurring theme in accounting research, a systematic and encompassing comparison of the intertwining of audit oversight authorities and the accounting profession has not yet been provided. This study takes a first step towards providing a quantifiable measure of the formal independence of audit oversight authorities by mobilizing concepts, methods and prior findings from the field of public policy research.

This paper analyses the establishment and evolution of a public oversight body (POB) – the Egyptian Audit Oversight Unit (AOU) – and its implications for local auditing firms and practices.

Primary data were gathered from 34 semi-structured interviews (including follow-up ones) between 2014 and 2020. Secondary data was obtained through publicly available documents and internal memos. Drawing on Debord's (1967) Society of the Spectacle, the insights focus on the POB's conception, materialisation and evolution in a context characterised by weak regulatory structures.

Through a series of acts, the findings reveal how the AOU first accepted the image of “international best practice” oversight (the “metaphorical”), followed by the construction of the local structure and décor replicating a United States (US) style POB archetype (the “transformational”) by primarily relying on visible processes/procedures. Yet, these mechanisms emphasised the spectacular nature of oversight, with little improvement for practice and limiting itself to “cracking down” on smaller local firms. A final stage (the “performative”) reveals how the AOU seeks to expand its activities beyond its original mandate without challenging the image-driven nature of its oversight.

The paper offers two key contributions. First, it reveals how actors, through a combination of symbolic and tangible measures, create a new performative reality of public oversight. Second, it advocates Debord's “spectacle” to complement other theoretical lenses, with a view to illuminating the materialisation stages that bridge the gap between proclaimed oversight policies and actual practices (including conscious and unconscious omissions) within a given political economy context.

In this study we examine the oversight responsibilities of audit committees in the post Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) era. The results show that audit committee oversight responsibilities assigned and disclosed in proxy statements expanded post‐SOX compared to pre‐SOX. We design a survey instrument to measure the difference between the perceived oversight responsibilities of audit committee members and the oversight responsibilities actually assigned in the proxy. Our results indicate that although audit committees made a substantial commitment to increase their assigned responsibilities over the period of 2001 to 2004, they still need to do more to meet the many additional challenges facing them in a post‐SOX environment. Overall, our results suggest that the intent of SOX‐for audit committees to be more involved and active in the oversight role of an organization‐is becoming institutionalized. These results should be interesting to policy makers, a variety of interest groups, and accounting researchers.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the conduct of the audit committee (AC) in terms of its oversight role of audit quality in the UK.

This study uses semi-structured interviews with 11 AC members and 11 audit partners.

The findings show that the conduct of the AC in relation to audit quality involves the assessment of the contents of the reports prepared by the external auditors for the AC. Furthermore, the oversight of audit quality by the AC involves a thorough assessment of the presentation of the external auditors during the interaction and communication between the two parties. This illustrates the AC’s role as an effective monitoring mechanism when overseeing the audit quality. However, the conduct of the AC in overseeing four major areas (independence, appointment, remuneration and effectiveness of audit process) related to audit quality, as recommended by the UK Code of Corporate Governance, provides mixed results. The findings highlight the ceremonial role of the AC in those areas, which demonstrates the limited supporting role of the AC in enhancing audit quality. Furthermore, it is suggested that the effectiveness of the oversight role is influenced by the quality of the chairman of the AC and the quality of the relationship between the AC and the external auditors.

This study contributes to the existing literature by providing additional insights into the conduct of the AC in overseeing audit quality as well as additional evidence concerning the role and effect of the AC in relation to audit quality as prescribed by the UK Code of Corporate Governance.

This study aims to examine the structural power wielded by the audit committee (AC) and the various bases of its power, whilst also exploring the behavioural tactics used by the AC to leverage its power in the oversight of the external audit.

Empirical evidence was drawn from semi-structured interviews with external auditors and AC members in Malaysia.

The AC’s structural power is derived from its formal and network position in the organisation. The AC possesses three forms of organisational-based power (legitimate, coercive and informational) resultant from its formal position, and these combine with the AC’s personal power (will and expert). The AC uses its personal power base to develop trusting relationships and to promote the exchange of information with other key corporate governance actors in the network position. Furthermore, the AC applies at least four behavioural tactics (assertiveness, ingratiation, rationality and coalition formation) to exercise its bases of power.

This study attempts to describe the AC’s structural sources of power, its organisational and personal power bases, and the behavioural tactics it uses when exerting its power.

Through a case study on the governance structures of the UN, the purpose of this paper is to develop a critique of Public and Private Bureaucracies Transaction Cost Economics (PPBTCE) (Williamson, 1999) as a theoretical lens to analyze internal oversight structures.

The authors explore “probity” and “independence” transactions’ attributes through historical narrative case-based research to answer the question – Why did numerous attempts to strengthen the governance of UN internal oversight structures not relieve “probity” hazards?

The analysis shows that at the UN increasing and strengthening the governance of oversight structures, i.e., incentives, did not relieve probity/ethics hazards as predicted in PPBTCE. Secretaries-General and UN General Assembly, entities charged with oversight powers, systematically trumpeted the UN Charter, breaching probity/ethics and disregarding the supervisory independence prerogative of internal oversight structures, hence failing to contribute to the “common good” and to protect the UN mission.

This paper is the first application of PPBTCE to internal oversight transactions within an International organization context testing probity and independence attributes. The authors find that “independence” outweighs the “asset specificity” attribute whenever decisions on the governance of internal oversight arise. As far as sourcing decisions are concerned, the authority of the sovereign and the independence of the judiciary as well as quasi-judiciary transactions are not transferable attributes and, thus, cannot be contracted along with the actors’ ethics. PPBTCE should be modified to include, e.g. “virtues ethics” behavioral assumption as a transaction costs’ reduction device and explanatory framework for “probity” hazards, abandoning the opportunism behavioral assumption.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether corporate governance structures influence the audit process in terms of audit fee pricing for regulated companies.

The paper first reviews prior literature and identifies factors within the categories of client size, audit risk, audit complexity, auditor‐related issues and corporate governance characteristics that are likely to influence audit fees of banking clients. It then regresses these variables on audit fees using an ordinary least square regression model for a sample of US listed bank holding companies (BHC).

The paper finds no significant association between most corporate governance variables and audit fees, suggesting that governance agents do not require additional assurance from the auditor, given close oversight by regulators. It also observes a negative association between audit committee independence and audit fees, implying that auditors reduce their effort and thus audit fees in the presence of an independent audit committee because they perceive that such committees reduce control and financial reporting risks.

In contrast with prior findings based on non‐regulated companies, governance agents in regulated companies such as BHC do not demand a more extensive audit. This reflects a substitution effect of regulatory oversight for internal governance monitoring. The paper also shows that BigN auditors modify their audit strategies in response to corporate governance mechanisms. Modifying audit strategies in accordance with the strength of governance mechanisms is consistent with recommendations in professional standards and would enable auditors to address risks more appropriately, thereby increasing audit quality and efficiency.

An increasing number of earnings restatements along with many allegations of financial statement fraud committed by high profile companies (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia) has eroded the public confidence in corporate governance, the financial reporting process, and audit functions. The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 was an attempt to regain confidence and trust in corporate America and the accounting profession. The Act addresses corporate scandals and the perceived crisis in the auditing profession. Some of its provisions relate to the audit committee oversight function over corporate governance, financial reporting, internal control structure, internal audit functions, and external audit services. This study examines three types of audit committee disclosures: the annual report of the audit committee; reporting of the audit committee charter in the proxy statement at least once every three years; and disclosure in the proxy statement of whether the audit committee had fulfilled its responsibilities as specified in the charter. This study conducts a content analysis on audit committee disclosures of Fortune 100 companies.

This study examines whether the presence of audit committees for US commercial bank registrants (SEC Form 10‐K filers) significantly affects the likelihood of adoption by certain non‐US commercial bank registrants (SEC Form 20‐F filers). Results of a logistic regression analysis of 31 US commercial bank registrants with audit committees and 31 non‐US commercial bank registrants without audit committees suggest that demand for oversight protection in the sample non‐US commercial banks is more likely to increase as the total market capitalization (size) increases. Additionally, this paper investigates whether the presence of audit committees for non‐US commercial bank registrants (Form 20‐F filers) increases their transparency with a concomitant effect on infusion of foreign equity investment. Results of a logistic regression analysis suggest that the presence of audit committees does not significantly affect the likelihood of an increase in the banks’ American depository receipts.

To investigate some unanswered questions and issues relating to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and to consider the implications of this rule making model that was created in an environment of corporate financial collapses for a jurisdiction without such an environment.

This paper uses text analysis by the authors as a basis for commentary and opinion on the need for and reaction to The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act 2002 (SOX). It is a pragmatic approach to issues which the authors feel has not been sufficiently considered.

It is clear to the authors that significant questions arise with the creation of a regulatory framework designed with public perception in mind. The issues have been in existence long before the passage of SOX. There are more questions than answers at this stage, particularly in light of the international implications of SOX.

Changes in the practice of auditing and reporting issues for all companies that sell shares in US markets will be affected. New Zealand is provided as an example of the implications for international convergence of PCAOB like regulation boards that may be created as an alternative framework to the current self‐regulation of auditors. Much consideration should be given to the implications of the new regulatory framework before its imposition on jurisdictions where the environment does not call for such “drastic” change.

Much has been written on the PCAOB, but without consideration necessarily of the international implications. In particular, the tensions facing small countries such as New Zealand have not been discussed, which seek to be part of the international community of capital markets. This paper seeks to fill some of these gaps.