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Independent audit oversight is a prerequisite for restoring public confidence in financial reporting and auditing after the past accounting scandals and the financial crisis. By analysing and comparing the independence of the audit oversight boards of 27 European Member States and the USA, this study aims to provide insights into the question of how independent “independent” audit oversight boards are.

Independence is measured in terms of the organisational compositions and regulatory competences of the audit oversight authorities. The data were collected through an e-mail questionnaire that was sent to all European oversight authorities, and by analysing legal provisions of various regulators. The results are analysed and visualised by a Partial Order Scalogram Analysis with Coordinates, which allows conclusions about the similarities of various systems and their relative levels of independence. Both measurements are then equally combined into one value of material independence, which is used to rank the oversight authorities.

Although all countries encounter similar pressures to establish profession-independent oversight systems, this study identifies how differently “independence” has been translated in regulatory outcomes. While all countries claim to possess formal independent oversight bodies, there is a visible gap between countries with comparatively strong independent oversight authorities and systems in which accounting bodies still maintain far-reaching regulatory influence. At the same time, the results question the role of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as the globally perceived benchmark of an entirely independent regulator.

This study focuses on formal independence rather than de-facto independence. Future research has, therefore, to address how these formal arrangements have evolved in regulatory practice.

Policy makers around the world perceive independent oversight as one of the essential elements of regulatory reforms aiming at restoring public confidence in the aftermath of past accounting scandals. This study enables the comparison and benchmarking of national specific regulatory designs with other forms of independent oversight.

Although the role of independent regulation is a recurring theme in accounting research, a systematic and encompassing comparison of the intertwining of audit oversight authorities and the accounting profession has not yet been provided. This study takes a first step towards providing a quantifiable measure of the formal independence of audit oversight authorities by mobilizing concepts, methods and prior findings from the field of public policy research.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss literature and empirical evidence on regulatory independence especially in telecommunications and to suggest reforms of this institution.

The paper comprises a survey of the literature plus new empirical evidence on de facto independence.

The study finds that independence has a positive and significant, but modest, impact on network penetration, once de facto issues and endogeneity are taken into account.

De facto independence can only be superficially approached with quantitative methods and the instruments used to correct for endogeneity are far from perfect.

Regulatory agencies may find ways to improve their effectiveness.

The paper provides ideas on how to solve the dilemma between expertise and accountability in the particular field of telecommunications regulation.

The paper provides data about the vulnerability of independent regulation in telecommunications in Latin America until 2010.

The paper aims to examine disputed interpretations of “key meanings” between the audit regulator and Big 4 firms during a highly contentious regulatory debate, showcasing their use of “strategies of resistance” to achieve their intended outcomes.

A qualitative analysis is performed of the discourse in a South African audit regulatory debate, set within the country's unique political and historical context. The analysis is informed by the theoretical construct of a “regulatory space” and an established typology of strategic responses to institutional pressures.

The study’s findings show how resistance to regulatory intentions from influential actors, notably the Big 4 firms, was dispelled. This was achieved by the regulator securing oversight independence, co-opting political support, shortening the debate timeline and unilaterally revising the interpretation of its statutory mandate. The regulator successfully incorporated race equality into its interpretation of how the public interest is advanced (in addition to audit quality). The social legitimacy of the Big 4 was then further undermined. The debate was highly contentious and unproductive and likely contributed to overall societal concerns regarding the legitimacy of, and the value ascribed to, the audit function.

A deeper appreciation of vested interests and differing interpretations of key concepts and regulatory logic could help to promote a less combative regulatory environment, in the interest of enhanced audit quality and the sustainability and legitimacy of the audit profession.

The context provides an example, contrary to that observed in many jurisdictions, where the Big 4 fail to actively resist or even dilute significant regulatory reform. Furthermore, the findings indicate that traditional conceptions of what it means to serve “the public interest” may be evolving in favour of a more liberal social democratic interpretation.

This article critically examines the multiple rationales for telecom, IT, media convergence regulation, on the one hand, and multisector utility regulation, on the other, and the practical questions of implementation they pose, with a view to contributing to informed policy and regulatory decisions. Both options involve substantive as well as procedural issues, not necessarily separable. The conditions that may affect the creation of convergence and multi‐sector regulation, ranging from underlying commonality of inputs and the behaviour of regulated firms to considerations that are specific to the regulatory process such as scarcity of regulatory resources and safeguards for regulatory independence, are examined. It is concluded that ICT and media convergence issues are primarily about improving the efficiency of market economies, and how changes in regulation can facilitate this process. Multi‐sector regulation issues are primarily about establishing the efficiency and effectiveness of regulation, so it can be a catalyst for network and economic development. They arise from an initial diagnosis of different problems, and represent different priorities and pathways to achieving a very similar set of development objectives.

In many countries state ownership of public utilities is being abandoned in favour of private ownership with state regulation. To prevent monopoly abuse, regulatory structures are being created for the telecommunications, gas, electricity and water and sewerage sectors. From 1984 the UK privatised its major utilities and introduced a form of regulation that is proving to be a model for other countries. This paper looks at the performance of UK privatised utilities and the role of regulation in improving performance. It also considers the important subject of regulatory governance. The paper concludes that regulatory governance depends on the institutional context of regulation and that one country’s regulatory system cannot be successfully transferred to another country with a very different set of institutional constraints without appropriate adaptation.

The paper highlights what are currently the most relevant aspects in the debate surrounding the possible reform in the institutional setup of financial markets regulation and supervision, not least about the future role of Central Banks. As a preliminary question, the definition of financial stability is addressed. Then, the importance of stability for the economy and the specific role of regulators and supervisors and possible regulatory failure are discussed. On this basis, a possible evolving design for regulation and supervision on a national and a European level has to be checked against optimality, taking into account the different objectives of state intervention into the market. Finally the state of play in the institutional reform of European financial market legislation is described.

The purpose of this paper is to present a cross-country qualitative comparative analysis of telecom regulatory frameworks of five countries with that of India. Adopting an institutionalist approach, this paper contributes to understanding of how institutional frameworks in these five countries are structured as compared to that in India so as to ensure division of the authority and scope of the regulator vis-a-vis that of the ministry, and the bureaucracy; financial autonomy of the regulator; redressal of grievances of individual consumers; and modification in the framework to cater to convergence of telecom and broadcasting.

The study is based on literature review of research papers, secondary research and documents published by the regulators of the five countries. The research methodology used is qualitative comparative analysis case-based research of five countries. The variables for comparison have been sourced from the World Bank Handbook for Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory System. The researcher has adopted qualitative research method to bring forth the similarity, as well as the diversity in the regulatory setup of the five countries in comparison with India.

Analysis reveals that there is an absence of clear role definition for policy formulating body, the DoT and the regulatory body, the TRAI. The involvement of a number of bodies leads to duplication of regulatory functions in the TRAI, DoT and the Telecom Commission. Secondly, with respect to standards, compliance and spectrum management, the TEC and WPC function as divisions of DoT; however, the TRAI is entrusted with ensuring interoperability among service providers as well as spectrum management. This leads to duplication of regulatory functions and absence of a single authority. Lastly, funding of the TRAI is done through the departmental allocation given to DoT alone with no additional funds coming in the form of regulatory fees. This is seen to be specific to TRAI as other sector regulators in India have been empowered to collect fees from industry participants. The Indian framework shows two commonalities in comparison with the five countries; firstly, India has adopted self-regulation through the setting up of the Telco-consumer group-led consumer redressal process. The second similarity being convergence of the regulatory functions performed by the TRAI for the telecom as well as the information and broadcasting ministries, although the two ministries continue to function independently.

The paper furthers the understanding of the good practices in the design of telecom regulatory framework. It brings out the similarity and diversity in these frameworks. And, most importantly, it highlights limitations that the Indian telecom regulatory framework has in areas of role definition for the regulator, its autonomy and regulation of telecom-media convergence.

The purpose of this paper is to test whether financial crises themselves provide some degree of ex post discipline. In other words, is there learning from the mistakes associated with crises? The authors test this hypothesis on credit growth, a frequent contributor to banking crises.

The study uses statistical tests (comparison of means) on a sample of 72 banking crises, the onset of which occurred between 1980 and 2008. Tests for significance of the difference are conducted using Kolmogorov–Smirnov equality in distribution tests.

The results show that real credit growth fell substantially (relative to average) by about 8 per cent points from pre- to post-crisis periods, and that average banking regulation and supervision strengthens after a crisis.

This paper provides empirical support for the proposition that while financial markets may fail to give sufficient warning signals before a financial crisis, they may discipline governments to undertake reforms in the aftermath of a crisis.