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To investigate some unanswered questions and issues relating to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and to consider the implications of this rule making model that was created in an environment of corporate financial collapses for a jurisdiction without such an environment.

This paper uses text analysis by the authors as a basis for commentary and opinion on the need for and reaction to The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act 2002 (SOX). It is a pragmatic approach to issues which the authors feel has not been sufficiently considered.

It is clear to the authors that significant questions arise with the creation of a regulatory framework designed with public perception in mind. The issues have been in existence long before the passage of SOX. There are more questions than answers at this stage, particularly in light of the international implications of SOX.

Changes in the practice of auditing and reporting issues for all companies that sell shares in US markets will be affected. New Zealand is provided as an example of the implications for international convergence of PCAOB like regulation boards that may be created as an alternative framework to the current self‐regulation of auditors. Much consideration should be given to the implications of the new regulatory framework before its imposition on jurisdictions where the environment does not call for such “drastic” change.

Much has been written on the PCAOB, but without consideration necessarily of the international implications. In particular, the tensions facing small countries such as New Zealand have not been discussed, which seek to be part of the international community of capital markets. This paper seeks to fill some of these gaps.

This study's aim was to systematically review available literature related to the establishment, purpose, operation, and effectiveness of civilian police oversight entities in the United States and to gain a deeper understanding of support, opposition, academic, public, and police expectations concerning their utility.

A Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses extension for Scoping Reviews (PRISMA-ScR) was used to analyze police civilian oversight literature published between 1992 and 2022.

The authors find racially biased policing, political investment, police resistance, oversight structure, scope, and authority are key components that determine how oversight is perceived.

Based on the methodology, the results may not be generalizable. Future researchers should consider expanding public oversight research beyond the parameters, which constrained this paper.

This article contains implications that should be considered by jurisdictions seeking to develop, restructure, or eliminate public oversight entities and for recognizing the concerns of advocates and opponents of public oversight.

Civilian oversight has long been considered a potential method for public inclusion if not a means for greater public control of police. Over the past few decades, a resurgence of interest in civilian oversight has emerged.

This article synthesizes literature that spans 30 years of research on public oversight.

This paper analyses the establishment and evolution of a public oversight body (POB) – the Egyptian Audit Oversight Unit (AOU) – and its implications for local auditing firms and practices.

Primary data were gathered from 34 semi-structured interviews (including follow-up ones) between 2014 and 2020. Secondary data was obtained through publicly available documents and internal memos. Drawing on Debord's (1967) Society of the Spectacle, the insights focus on the POB's conception, materialisation and evolution in a context characterised by weak regulatory structures.

Through a series of acts, the findings reveal how the AOU first accepted the image of “international best practice” oversight (the “metaphorical”), followed by the construction of the local structure and décor replicating a United States (US) style POB archetype (the “transformational”) by primarily relying on visible processes/procedures. Yet, these mechanisms emphasised the spectacular nature of oversight, with little improvement for practice and limiting itself to “cracking down” on smaller local firms. A final stage (the “performative”) reveals how the AOU seeks to expand its activities beyond its original mandate without challenging the image-driven nature of its oversight.

The paper offers two key contributions. First, it reveals how actors, through a combination of symbolic and tangible measures, create a new performative reality of public oversight. Second, it advocates Debord's “spectacle” to complement other theoretical lenses, with a view to illuminating the materialisation stages that bridge the gap between proclaimed oversight policies and actual practices (including conscious and unconscious omissions) within a given political economy context.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether Washington State school district financial reporting and budget reporting meet the information needs of school board directors charged with governance.

Washington State school board directors were surveyed and asked to rank information items’ usefulness in carrying out their governance role. School district annual reports, budgets and websites were examined to determine whether the identified information was reported and easily transparent to those charged with governance and the public.

Directors rank information on strategic oversight, budget planning and student outcomes as more useful, consistent with the strategic role of new public management. Follow-on analysis of district annual financial reports, budgets and websites reveal that the availability of the information ranked useful by directors is limited. The findings suggest an information gap exists between directors’ information needs and school district reporting. Annual reports and budgets, when provided, often provide typical financial statements and variance data, respectively, rather than reporting on mission-aligned performance measures. The main consequence of the information gap may be compromised decision-making effectiveness.

By directly asking those charged with governance what information they identify as useful and then examining whether the information is reported in the annual report, budget or website, the study links user information needs to information transparency.

Highlights the role played by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the Treadway Commission, and other professional organizations in furthering the establishment of audit committees in the USA. In the international arena, the UK Cadbury Committee, the Australian Borsch Committee, and the Canadian Macdonald Commission have influenced the widespread use of corporate audit committees in their respective countries. The guidelines on audit committees set by the IIA, AICPA, SEC, and the Treadway Commission have had a tremendous impact worldwide. Cultural differences may, however, limit the formation and effectiveness of audit committees globally even though auditing is a relatively homogeneous profession. The Institute of Internal Auditors, as an international professional association, may wish to consider the cultural dimensions of corporate governance in formulating professional internal auditing standards dealing with the structure and functions of audit committees internationally.

IFAC, a Swiss‐registered non‐governmental organization, is emerging as an important international (auditing) standard setter amongst a powerful group of regulators, including the World Bank, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the European Commission (EC). The purpose of this paper is to focus on the changing governance and accountability structures within IFAC, the way such changes are shaping, or re‐shaping, its “public interest” commitments and the resulting strategic implications for processes of auditor regulation and public oversight in the global financial arena.

The material and analysis presented in the paper derives from an extensive review of official reports, consultation documents and related responses, a range of other information available on IFAC's web site (www.ifac.org) or those of other key regulatory players in the global financial arena.

The paper analyzes how IFAC is succeeding as an international standard setter with an established place in the global financial infrastructure. From analysis of the recent establishment of a Public Interest Oversight Board (PIOB) and the changing nature of representation on IFAC's Public Interest Activity Committees (PIACs), the paper reveals a growing reliance on governance by experts together with a growth in influence of the large, multinational accounting firms. Governance of auditors has become a matter of global importance and governance structures are being reconfigured.

By highlighting the changes that have taken place within IFAC's governance system, the paper establishes the importance for public policy of further study and debate concerning the nature and practical operation of such a system, particularly given IFAC's position within a complex but developing global governance arena.

IFAC is becoming an integral player in global financial governance processes and yet has not been subject to any substantial academic accounting research. This paper seeks to rectify this by focusing on the structures and processes underpinning both the development of IFAC's International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) and its own global strategy for advancement.

This article is the third in a trilogy of articles that discuss the professionalism (or deprofessionalism) of the accounting profession. The first examines the slow uphill climb of accounting and auditing practice to the level of being recognized as a highly trusted profession. The second examines the stagnation in professionalism leading to deprofessionalization of the accounting profession. This third article looks at the resulting directionless efforts of accounting and auditing firms in the wake of major deprofessionalization events. The interest in this study is the time period immediately following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 which is described in this paper as the “Post-SOX” history of public accountancy in the United States. During this time period, nearly equally mixed activities of professionalism and deprofessionalism have resulted in a status quo with directionless efforts doing little if anything to reverse decline in professionalism. Public accountants continued to experience conflict with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over independence rules. The large Certified Public Accountant firms generated controversies and squabbles concerning “auditing and consulting,” while at the same time they faced questions regarding the marketing and selling of aggressive tax shelters. In addition, most of the self-regulating aspects of the profession declined dramatically following passage of SOX. While initially both tax fees and audit fees of CPA firms increased during this time period, concerns are again arising as the large CPA firms more recently have renewed the emphasis on advisory services. While revenues have both increased and changed in composition during the post-SOX era, public opinion has maintained a status quo. The post-SOX era has also seen a weakening in the Code of Conduct, providing more liberties for CPAs to maximize self-interest. Meanwhile, the PCAOB faced constitutional challenges, while at the same time the AICPA experienced strong divisions in its membership. To provide some sense to these directionless efforts, this study, similar to the prior two articles in this trilogy, concludes with a summary analysis based on the nine SOCRECELIST criteria, and the question whether public accountants have learned their history lesson.

An increasing number of earnings restatements along with many allegations of financial statement fraud committed by high profile companies (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia) has eroded the public confidence in corporate governance, the financial reporting process, and audit functions. The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 was an attempt to regain confidence and trust in corporate America and the accounting profession. The Act addresses corporate scandals and the perceived crisis in the auditing profession. Some of its provisions relate to the audit committee oversight function over corporate governance, financial reporting, internal control structure, internal audit functions, and external audit services. This study examines three types of audit committee disclosures: the annual report of the audit committee; reporting of the audit committee charter in the proxy statement at least once every three years; and disclosure in the proxy statement of whether the audit committee had fulfilled its responsibilities as specified in the charter. This study conducts a content analysis on audit committee disclosures of Fortune 100 companies.

Although the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) has introduced rules to avoid auditor independence impairment, there are still issues that are not sufficiently solved. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the problems of auditor independence that arise by auditors being hired and paid by the auditee, and by SOX requiring rotation of only the lead audit partner.

The paper takes the form of a discussion paper, exploring alternatives to overcome the mentioned issues of independence.

The paper presents an alternative where auditors are hired and paid by an external third party. Besides this change, it also proposes a quality control system including the extension of the CPE program. A private entity in representation of the investors (e.g. Stock exchange) and an oversight board (e.g. PCAOB) as alternatives to hire, pay and control audit quality are discussed.

This paper has implications for regulators, since it presents a new alternative for hiring and paying auditors that requires an active involvement of an independent third party. It also has implications for professional bodies by increasing their participation in monitoring and training its members.

The paper presents an original alternative for avoiding independence issues derived by auditors being hired and paid by the auditee, and opens a discussion in a new solution to an old problem.

Examines the role of professional associations, governmental agencies, and international accounting and auditing bodies in promulgating standards to foster auditor independence domestically and abroad. Focuses specifically on the role played by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the Securities and Exchange Commission and the US Government Accounting Office. Also looks at other professional associations in banking, industry, and manufacturing sectors dealing with sensitive issues of auditors′ involvement in such matters as management advisory services, operating responsibilities, outsourcing, opinion shopping, auditor rotation, and other conflicts of interest which may impair auditor independence.