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Through a case study on the governance structures of the UN, the purpose of this paper is to develop a critique of Public and Private Bureaucracies Transaction Cost Economics (PPBTCE) (Williamson, 1999) as a theoretical lens to analyze internal oversight structures.

The authors explore “probity” and “independence” transactions’ attributes through historical narrative case-based research to answer the question – Why did numerous attempts to strengthen the governance of UN internal oversight structures not relieve “probity” hazards?

The analysis shows that at the UN increasing and strengthening the governance of oversight structures, i.e., incentives, did not relieve probity/ethics hazards as predicted in PPBTCE. Secretaries-General and UN General Assembly, entities charged with oversight powers, systematically trumpeted the UN Charter, breaching probity/ethics and disregarding the supervisory independence prerogative of internal oversight structures, hence failing to contribute to the “common good” and to protect the UN mission.

This paper is the first application of PPBTCE to internal oversight transactions within an International organization context testing probity and independence attributes. The authors find that “independence” outweighs the “asset specificity” attribute whenever decisions on the governance of internal oversight arise. As far as sourcing decisions are concerned, the authority of the sovereign and the independence of the judiciary as well as quasi-judiciary transactions are not transferable attributes and, thus, cannot be contracted along with the actors’ ethics. PPBTCE should be modified to include, e.g. “virtues ethics” behavioral assumption as a transaction costs’ reduction device and explanatory framework for “probity” hazards, abandoning the opportunism behavioral assumption.

This paper aims to explore whether an internal auditor’s evaluation of internal control deficiencies are influenced by the party with primary influence over the internal audit function and by the type of internal control deficiency.

A behavioral experiment is conducted with internal auditors as participants in a 2 × 2 between-subjects factorial design.

Results indicate that internal auditors are less likely to evaluate a pervasive control deficiency related to “tone at the top” as a material weakness than a process-specific control deficiency. Furthermore, internal auditors are somewhat less likely to evaluate a process-specific internal control deficiency as a material weakness when management has primary influence over the internal audit function than when the audit committee has primary influence. It is also found that the best practice of internal audit oversight (i.e., primary oversight of internal auditors by the audit committee) may lead to potential internal under-reporting of instances where the audit committee represents a material weakness in internal control.

Limitations of this research include lack of economic consequences (e.g. future pay and job loss) associated with the internal control decisions made by the participants; less concise information provided to the participants than would generally be available to them; and lack of generalizability of the findings beyond the specific company setting and internal control scenario portrayed in the case materials.

Not evaluating a pervasive control deficiency related to “tone at the top” as a material weakness seems to not fully align with relevant professional guidance and can possibly result in inaccurate internal information about the quality of internal controls. Furthermore, having an internal auditor’s evaluation of a process-specific internal control deficiency influenced by the party with primary influence over the internal audit function would not appear to align with relevant professional guidance. Finally, primary oversight by the audit committee of the internal auditors may lead to potential internal under-reporting of instances where the audit committee represents a material weakness in internal controls and, thus, possible communication of inaccurate internal control information.

This study is the first to address whether the party with primary influence over the internal audit function influences an internal auditor’s evaluation of internal control deficiencies.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether corporate governance structures influence the audit process in terms of audit fee pricing for regulated companies.

The paper first reviews prior literature and identifies factors within the categories of client size, audit risk, audit complexity, auditor‐related issues and corporate governance characteristics that are likely to influence audit fees of banking clients. It then regresses these variables on audit fees using an ordinary least square regression model for a sample of US listed bank holding companies (BHC).

The paper finds no significant association between most corporate governance variables and audit fees, suggesting that governance agents do not require additional assurance from the auditor, given close oversight by regulators. It also observes a negative association between audit committee independence and audit fees, implying that auditors reduce their effort and thus audit fees in the presence of an independent audit committee because they perceive that such committees reduce control and financial reporting risks.

In contrast with prior findings based on non‐regulated companies, governance agents in regulated companies such as BHC do not demand a more extensive audit. This reflects a substitution effect of regulatory oversight for internal governance monitoring. The paper also shows that BigN auditors modify their audit strategies in response to corporate governance mechanisms. Modifying audit strategies in accordance with the strength of governance mechanisms is consistent with recommendations in professional standards and would enable auditors to address risks more appropriately, thereby increasing audit quality and efficiency.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the perception held by attendees about the role and the effectiveness of their audit committees.

The investigation was conducted via a qualitative methodology through the content analysis of interviews conducted with 33 attendees of audit committee meetings of Tunisian listed companies.

The findings reveal that audit committees do not have the means to achieve the objectives that they have been given by the legal texts, which are likely to characterize their work as “ceremonial” or “symbolic.” This paper also found that the most significant effects of the audit committee chair’s role come through informal meetings and conversations.

The paper’s findings have policy implications for regulators. Findings from this research may allow regulators to assess whether the audit committee activities in Tunisian companies meet their expectations.

This paper tries to fill a gap in the extant literature and provides meaningful information on activities performed by audit committees and the extent to which they are perceived effective in the eyes of attendees of audit-committee meetings. This study is one of the few field investigations that have analyzed audit committees’ effectiveness in emerging markets through interviews with attendees involved in audit-committee processes.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate and discuss potential reasons why the internal auditing (IA) profession has been marginalized in the governance debate on solutions after the financial crisis that started in 2007, also noting recent studies questioning the value of IA's work. The key aim of this paper is to make readers aware of ambiguities concerning the ultimate customer of IA and its core business, and to stimulate critical reflection thereon.

The conceptual discussion of this paper is based on an objective review of relevant literature, both practitioner and academic.

Positioning IA as agent to the board/audit committee and, at the same time, as partner to management is challenging in practice. The IA function should clarify the customer dimension in its organizational context. Furthermore, this paper argues for a consolidation of internal audit around its core function of providing assurance when seeking to establish IA as a profession.

Practitioners will benefit as this paper demands fundamental questions to be addressed in the organizational context, about the ultimate customer and the core business of the IA service rendered. The Institute of Internal Auditors will benefit from this paper and subsequent discussions in academia and practice, supporting its pursuit to gain universal recognition for IA as a profession.

This paper may open a new research area in IA that addresses a more critical way of evaluating IA practices.

Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) are required to establish a Shariīʿah Governance Framework (SGF) to strengthen their Sharīʿah-compliance mechanism and ensure that all relevant IFI regulations are in line with Sharīʿah rules and principles. Effective implementation of the Shariīʿah-compliance function will further promote stakeholder confidence, as well as the integrity of IFIs, by reducing Shariīʿah non-compliance risks. This study aims to examine the internal control framework developed by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) and explore the extent to which it can be incorporated in the Sharīʿah-compliance function of IFIs.

This study adopts a qualitative method of inquiry, utilizing the inductive method and content analysis to build comprehensive knowledge that will assist in exploring the framework of COSO methodology and the extent to which it can be adopted by IFIs.

The findings indicate that the existing frameworks of Sharīʿah governance, whether that of the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) or Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), need to be further developed. Therefore, the adoption of COSO methodology in the internal Sharīʿah audit of IFIs, as suggested by AAOIFI, is not only possible but desirable. The study also finds that the COSO framework places the highest priority on risk management in that it makes it an integral part of the decision-making process in all the institution's activities. As a result, incorporating the comprehensive COSO risk management structure within the Sharīʿah-compliance function will enhance risk management in IFIs.

This study highlights the importance of the COSO internal control framework and examines its components, principles and the possibility of its adoption by IFIs. The findings of this study are expected to contribute to enhancing the Sharīʿah-compliance function of IFIs.

This study aims to understand independence in internal auditing by investigating how internal auditor independence is constructed when analysed in its corporate governance context.

A critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the corporate governance reports of Swedish large stock market listed non-financial companies, for three consecutive years, is undertaken, using a theoretical lens of organisational embeddedness and operational coupling to understand independence as a situated practice.

The study develops four archetypes of internal auditor independence – autarchic, instrumental, symbiotic and subservient – and discusses each archetype's implications for independence, related to tripartite relations with management and the audit committee, regarding who has the mandate to direct work and how the work is done. It finds that internal auditors always have a capacity to be independent. Although they are not independent in relation to agents in the subservient archetype, they are independent of those down the organisational chain of command, suggesting independence is both situational and relational.

The analysis contributes a novel approach to the literature and develops a conception of independence using the dimensions of embeddedness and coupling. The archetypes offer an analytical framework for future studies on independence.

Internal auditors may understand their practice differently through the archetypes that result from this study.

Internal auditors' power relations within corporate governance further an understanding of the pressures on internal auditors and their role.

This study contributes new knowledge on the situatedness of independence by showing how internal auditors are embedded and coupled helps build their independence.

This paper aims to investigate the association between internal audit function (IAF) characteristics and internal control quality.

Using data gathered from 59 chief audit executives from Tunisian listed companies, this paper uses a regression model to examine research hypothesis related to the association between IAF characteristics and internal control quality.

The findings of the current study reveal that internal control quality is significantly and positively associated with IAF competence, internal audit quality control assurance level, follow-up process and audit committee’s involvement in reviewing the internal audit program and results.

The findings have significant implications for IAF wishing to enhance their effectiveness, by recognizing the impact of the IAF’s characteristics on internal control quality. The findings of this study also have significant implications for regulatory bodies who are concerned with the internal control quality, managers and audit committees who determine IAF investment, oversight IAF activities and assess internal auditors’ performance.

This study helps fill a gap in the extant literature where existing empirical evidence of how the IAF characteristics influences the quality of the financial reporting process in emerging markets is scant.

This paper aims to recognise the importance of informal processes within corporate governance and complement existing research in this area by investigating factors associated with the existence of informal interactions between audit committees and internal audit functions and in providing directions for future research.

To examine the existence and drivers of informal interactions between audit committees and internal audit functions, this paper relies on a questionnaire survey of chief audit executives (CAEs) in the UK from listed and non‐listed, as well as financial and non‐financial, companies. While prior qualitative research suggests that informal interactions do take place, most of the evidence is based on particular organisational setting or on a very small range of interviews. The use of a questionnaire enabled the examination of the existence of internal interactions across a relatively larger number of entities.

The paper finds evidence of audit committees and internal audit functions engaging in informal interactions in addition to formal pre‐scheduled regular meetings. Informal interactions complement formal meetings with the audit committee and as such represent additional opportunities for the audit committees to monitor internal audit functions. Audit committees' informal interactions are significantly and positively associated with audit committee independence, audit chair's knowledge and experience, and internal audit quality.

The results demonstrate the importance of the background of the audit committee chair for the effectiveness of the governance process. This is possibly the first paper to examine the relationship between audit committee quality and internal audit, on the existence and driver of informal interactions. Policy makers should recognize that in addition to formal mechanisms, informal processes, such as communication outside of formal pre‐scheduled meetings, play a significant role in corporate governance.

This paper aims to provide empirical evidence of the association between audit committee characteristics and internal audit quality through internal audit professionalization.

The investigation of the research question was based on 45 usable responses that were received from a survey of chief audit executives from firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange and combined with publicly available information from annual reports.

The results indicate that audit committee characteristics (independence, diligence through frequent meetings and interaction with internal audit through valuation) influence internal audit professionalization. In addition, they demonstrate that internal audit professionalization is also influenced by CEO duality and firm’s external auditor.

The findings of this study have implications for audit committees wishing to improve their overall effectiveness, by identifying areas with substantial impact on internal audit quality. Moreover, regulators of corporate governance bodies can also benefit from the results to strengthen audit committee’s efficiency regarding internal audit function oversight.

The results add to the literature on the discussion of internal audit professionalization and complement the work of other researchers in the field of audit committee’s impact on internal audit quality/effectiveness. This study attempts to fill a gap in the literature on the effect of audit committee characteristics on internal audit professionalization, an element introduced from an institutional theory perspective.