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This paper aims to provide a case study of complex conflict management within the arms race on the Korean Peninsula. Exploring the complex nexus of nuclear weapons, asymmetry and a qualitative arms race, the study explains how the arms race between Seoul and Pyongyang has promoted stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Presenting the limits of arguments that the US security guarantee is the factor that saved the two Koreas from going to war again, this paper explores the utility of the inter-Korean arms race as a stabilizer that promotes indirect negotiations. While presenting Korean anomalies, this paper analyzes the three stages of the inter-Korean arms race – especially its nuclear weapons, its asymmetry and the nature of arms races – and provides extant explanations on the causes and consequences of the qualitative arms race. These key elements drive the states’ strategic motives.

Using the case of the inter-Korean qualitative arms race and US extended nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, the study shows the complexities of conflict management today. This paper identifies three contributing factors – US nuclear weapons, asymmetry and the qualitative characteristic of the arms race – to explain the enduring stability on the peninsula despite the arms race’s intensification. The paper finds that although US nuclear-extended deterrence plays a critical role, it does not capture the full context of the ongoing, dynamic inter-Korean arms race; a prolonged arms race between the two Koreas has become a new regularity; the qualitative characteristic of the inter-Korean arms race, which is driven by technological advancement, contributes to stability in the arms race; and as the constant mismatch in priority technologies becomes more severe, the changes to the existing asymmetry could increase instability.

This paper offers a diverse perspective to the literature on conflict management and captures the complexities of 21^st-century conflict management. Through a thorough examination of the inter-Korean arms race, it brings readers’ attention to the nested dynamics within the arms race and shows how an intensifying arms race can promote stability. Furthermore, the paper explains the implications for potential instability – fueled by the comprehensive mix of a dynamic qualitative arms race and the US extended nuclear deterrence – in the Indo-Pacific region.

In this work, the author explores the specific structural conditions that render multilateral arms control agreements problematic by situating their dynamic in a three-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The addition of even a third state to an arms race compounds many times over the structural difficulties that face two racing states. Nevertheless, even in multilateral arms races, conditions exist that make it rational for all participating states to pause. The most salient of these conditions is the existence of a coalition that is collectively rational for a subset of the racing states. It was suggested that if such a coalition exists naturally, or if one forms as a result of a exogenous shock to the system, then it is possible for it to offer incentives to all states not in the coalition to join it and, at the same time, increase the payoffs to the original members of the coalition. Thus, if such a coalition exists, then the possibility also exists that all the participating states could be induced to stop arming. Nonetheless, the major lesson that should be drawn from this chapter is the realisation that the conditions under which multilateral arms races might rationally be terminated are generally quite restrictive.

The purpose of this paper is to explain the tendency of escalation of a regular bilateral arms race, or the arms race spiral.

Inspired by the Richardson‐type models, a system of two differential equations is used for describing a bilateral arms race. But the variation of one adversary's armaments and/or military expenditures is not associated with the amount of the other's armaments and/or military expenditures as it is usually done in this type of model. It is linked instead with their variation, as it practically happens in governments' decision‐making processes.

The association of the two variations suggests that when one adversary tends to match the increase of the other's armaments and/or military expenditures, these tend to increase to infinity for a given fixed point in time.

The mathematical result indicates that the tendency of completely matching the increase of adversary's armaments or military expenditures acts as an accelerator that causes the continuous escalation of the arms race. Therefore, as long as a substantial change in the relationship between the two adversaries – implying a complete change of the model's coefficients – does not happen, the arms race escalates, and the so‐called spiral is observed.

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s creation of the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) in 1999 inspired great hopes. As we explain, however, the noble initiatives of the UNGC are undermined by the arms industry. Arms are expensive. The expenditure on arms diverts a nation’s “resources from ‘productive’ to ‘unproductive’ ends.” The arms industry is a major employer in most arms manufacturing nations. It generates much needed revenue for those countries. Therefore, attempts at thwarting the supply of arms are doomed to failure. Instead of halting the supply of arms, we argue as to the advantages of restraining the demand for arms. Michael Walzer is the only moral philosopher who has considered the ethics of appeasement. We explore Walzer’s arguments for appeasement and consider how a United Nations Secretary-General could appease those nations demanding arms. In doing so, the UN Secretary-General would make it possible for the UNGC to achieve what was initially envisaged for the UNGC.

The purpose of this paper is to describe how China’s rapid growth and increasing resource dependence have changed its relationship with India and their respective defense strategies. In particular, we consider China's Belt and Road Initiative, India's “Act East” policy and the strategic and economic value of the Indian Ocean and South China Sea regions.

The authors find no econometric evidence of interactions between China and India’s military spending using a Richardson-Baumol arms race model. Likewise, in a cross-county panel data study of military spending, they find that China’s military spending has no independent effect on military spending in other countries. The authors also show that once wage costs and other sources of military inflation are accounted for, the pattern of real defense spending growth is much less intense than is suggested by nominal data. Nevertheless, they show that China has been undertaking intense military modernization with rapidly rising capital-labor ratios in its defense spending.

The authors find little evidence of a traditional arms race, but also show that China, and to a lesser extent India, have been realigning their military capabilities to these new security risks while maintaining overall military burden on the economy.

Econometric analysis is limited by data availability and is necessarily historical, whereas the security situation is very fluid and may change in the short term.

The paper identifies factors that are likely to influence China and India's attitudes to defense spending in the coming years.

The paper finds that there is not an arms race in the traditional sense but may be an arms race in terms of new technologies and military modernization.

This is a very much underexplored topic in economics. The authors take an interdisciplinary approach showing how economics tools can be used to help understand this important issue in international relations.

It is generally believed that Middle Eastern countries are homogenous. Although this belief holds some truth, Middle Eastern countries have more differences than similarities. They differ in language, race, psychology, perception of threats, historical and colonial backgrounds, and political and economic developments. Realizing these differences, I expect that these countries have varying perceptions and interpretations of external threats and different methods of dealing with those threats. It is theoretically implausible to contemplate a general trend in defense spending across Middle Eastern countries; however, it is theoretically sound to view several broad trends within the region.

The objective of this chapter is to discuss how different techniques in Regional Science and Peace Science and the emerging techniques in Management Science can be used in analysing Disaster Management and Global pandemic with special reference to developing countries. It is necessary for me to first discuss the subjects of Disaster Management, Regional Science, Peace Science and Management Science. The objective of this chapter is to emphasise that the studies of Disaster Management should be more integrated with socioeconomic and geographical factors. The greatest disaster facing the world is the possibility of war, particularly nuclear war, and the preparation of the means of destruction through military spending.

This paper aims to elaborate in a greater detail about how to manage and eventually help resolve outstanding issues, including the core issue of Kashmir between nuclear India and Pakistan. In doing so, this paper elaborates various innovative measures that could be applicable to South Asian nuclear environment that in turn could assist the South Asian nuclear leadership in understanding and managing the fragility of South Asian nuclear deterrence.

Innovatively, this research paper looks at the South Asian nuclear issues at three levels of analysis – understanding the prevailing dynamics of nuclear revolution and improved means of communications and promoting deterrence stability in South Asia. All three levels may be more needed than ever before in the wake of the arrival of nuclear weapons for a broader Southern Asian region.

This paper finds out that although nuclear weapons have become a reality in South Asia and these deadly weapons have prevented major wars between India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons have not prevented the crises between India and Pakistan. Therefore, both India and Pakistan have confronted a number of crises. The paper finds out that any serious crisis between India and Pakistan could further undermine the credibility of existing confidence-building measures and the same could escalate from military to nuclear level. Absent from immediate measures undertaken by the South Asian security leadership, nuclear weapons may not help prevent the war between India and Pakistan at the sub-conventional level, this paper finds out.

By explaining innovative measures at the three level of analysis, this papers adds to the existing literature in understanding the behavior of South Asian security leadership and how these measures could best bring positive results in preventing a major crisis that potentially bears the risk of escalation to nuclear level.

According to Thucydides, writing in 416 BC, when the Melians suggested that the Athenians accept Melian neutrality in the war against Sparta, the Athenians replied, “No, for your enmity doth not so much hurt us as your friendship will be an argument of our weakness and your hatred of our power amongst those we have ruled over” (Vasquez, 1996, p. 16). Realists consider the Melian Dialogue to be an immutable lesson that morality in itself is not sufficient against power (Vasquez, 1996, p. 1). Edward H. Carr (1939) articulates the main tenets of classical realism in The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939. According to Carr, “Internationally, it is no longer possible to deduce virtue from right reasoning, because it is no longer seriously possible to believe that every state, by pursuing the greatest good of the whole world, is pursuing the greatest good of its own citizens, and vice versa” (p. 12). Thus, the eternal dispute, as Albert Sorel put it, is “between those who imagine the world to suit their policy, and those who arrange their policy to suit the realities of the world,” and the realists resolved it by making policies that suit the world (as cited by Carr, 2001, p. 12).