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Since the end of the cold war, the arms industry has been experiencing a deep structural transformation. The logical consequence of such short-term and structural evolutions is that companies in the arms industry are looking to access markets beyond national borders. Such transformation becomes a policy concern, since the core regulatory framework has been built on a national basis and there are very limited structural and regulatory means for dealing with an international, or even a transnational, industry in such a sensitive activity as weapons development and production. This chapter wonders whether it is possible to qualify such transformation of the arms industry as an internationalisation process and whether it can be compared to the globalisation of commercial activities. It compares what has happened and continues to happen in the arms industry with the globalisation experienced by commercial industries.

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s creation of the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) in 1999 inspired great hopes. As we explain, however, the noble initiatives of the UNGC are undermined by the arms industry. Arms are expensive. The expenditure on arms diverts a nation’s “resources from ‘productive’ to ‘unproductive’ ends.” The arms industry is a major employer in most arms manufacturing nations. It generates much needed revenue for those countries. Therefore, attempts at thwarting the supply of arms are doomed to failure. Instead of halting the supply of arms, we argue as to the advantages of restraining the demand for arms. Michael Walzer is the only moral philosopher who has considered the ethics of appeasement. We explore Walzer’s arguments for appeasement and consider how a United Nations Secretary-General could appease those nations demanding arms. In doing so, the UN Secretary-General would make it possible for the UNGC to achieve what was initially envisaged for the UNGC.

This paper explores whether data back the claim that imports of armaments are inherently bad for economic growth. Regardless of one's point of view, the production and trade of weaponry is a significant industry with serious economic implications that warrant investigation. The financial repercussions of military spending have been extensively studied, but the economic effects of arms importation remain unknown.

This study adopts a pooled mean group approach to investigate the nexus between arms imports, military expenditure and per capita GDP for a balanced panel of twenty-five of the top arms importers in the world from 2000 to 2021.

The authors find that arms imports and military spending negatively impact GDP per capita in the short run, but military spending is beneficial over the long run. The authors also used the Dumitrescu Hurlin Granger causality test, which revealed a unidirectional causation between per capita GDP and military expenditure, and a unidirectional causal relationship from military spending to arms imports.

This paper is deficient in a few aspects: first, it looks at only those countries comprising the top 70% of arms imports. Second, it omits many political, technological and legal factors that impact arms imports and military expenditures.

This paper looks into the impact of defense spending and arms imports on economic growth for twenty-five nations with the highest share of arms imports in recent times. It is a significant addition to the literature as it resolves the debate of whether or not the military expenditure is wasteful and whether arms imports significantly harm the nation's economic growth.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the dynamic changes of the arms trade network not only from the network structure but also the influence mechanism from the aspects of the economy, politics, security, strategy and transaction costs.

The study employs the Temporal Exponential Random Graph Model and the Separable Temporal Exponential Random Graph Model to analyze the endogenous network structure effect, the attribute effect and the exogenous network effect of 47 major arms trading countries from 2015 to 2020.

The results show that the international arms trade market is unevenly distributed, and there are great differences in military technology. There is a fixed hierarchical structure in the arms trade, but the rise of emerging countries is expected to break this situation. In international arms trade relations, economic forces dominate, followed by political, security and strategic factors.

Economic and political factors play an important role in the arms trade. Therefore, countries should strive to improve their economic strength and military technology. Also, countries should increase political mutual trust and gain a foothold in the industrial chain of arms production to enhance their military power.

The contribution of this paper is to analyze the special trade area of arms trade from a dynamic network perspective by incorporating economic, political, security, strategic and transaction cost factors together into the TERGM and STERGM models.

Reports on research into the relationship between European defence manufacturing firms and their experience of cross‐border strategic alliances. The research takes in 135 cross‐border strategic alliances involving UK and European defence manufacturing firms, ranging from firms heavily dependent on defence contracts to firms whose defence interests make up less than 10 per cent of overall business. These firms manufacture telecommunications, transport, information, lethal platforms and components for the operation of these platforms for military organisations. A main aim is to ascertain the extent of participation in strategic alliances, the types of alliances being used and the major problems experienced by the partners.