Search results1 – 10 of 260
The purpose of this paper is to introduce an interpretive approach to examining the relation between information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the good life, based on Michael Walzer's view of (connected) social criticism.
Through a discussion of Michael Walzer's view of social criticism, an interpretive approach to normative analysis of ICTs and the good life is introduced. The paper also offers an additional argument for the indispensability of prudential appraisals of ICTs in normative analysis of ICTs and the good life, which in turn strengthens the basis for the Walzerian approach proposed in the paper.
It is argued that an interpretive approach to normative analysis of ICTs and the good life, i.e. the Walzerian approach, is as viable as – if not superior to – a theory‐driven approach. It is also argued that actual appraisals of ICTs and the good life must be taken into account in the normative analysis.
It is only recently that “the good life” has become more visible in normative analysis of ICTs. This paper continues this relatively new line of research and proposes an alternative approach – as opposed to a theory‐driven approach – to this research programme.
War is undoubtedly a dirty business, usually entailing massive destruction and loss of life on both sides. In an attempt to limit this inevitable death and destruction…
War is undoubtedly a dirty business, usually entailing massive destruction and loss of life on both sides. In an attempt to limit this inevitable death and destruction, philosophers have argued that belligerents must following certain principles in the conduct of warfare; namely, the principles of discrimination (that only legitimate military targets may be attacked) and of proportionality (that the damage done in attacking such targets must not be out of proportion to the military value of the target). These principles have come to be enshrined in International Law through a range of treaties, which are collectively known in military circles as the International Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).
The essential idea at the heart of Michael Walzer’s supreme emergency argument, or as Brian Orend calls it, the supreme emergency exemption, is that desperate times call for desperate measures. If the situation is dire enough, and the consequences faced are serious enough, then it will be justifiable to act in ways which would normally be prohibited. In concrete terms, what this means is that during a time of war, a state can in some circumstances ignore the usual rules of warfare (i.e. the principles of discrimination and proportionality). Walzer claims this is justified if and only if the following conditions are met: the state is the victim of aggression, the state is about to be militarily defeated, and that the consequences of defeat will be catastrophic (i.e. would include extreme and widespread violations of fundamental human rights). In other words, when faced with a supreme emergency one is justified in engaging in widespread violations of the rights of some people (people to whom one only has a general duty) in order to prevent widespread violations of the rights of others (people to whom one has a specific duty).
In this paper I argue that the ‘rules’ which must be applied in order for widespread rights-violations to be considered justified are actually well understood, and that supreme emergency is not an unusual situation for which new rules must be considered, but simply an important specific example of such a situation. Essentially I argue that one must dirty one’s hands in war, but that there is no need for one’s hands to get any dirtier in a situation of supreme emergency.
This paper provides a novel framework for considering a much-debated question within military ethical fields, using insights from two of the major proponents of contemporary military ethics.
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s creation of the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) in 1999 inspired great hopes. As we explain, however, the noble…
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s creation of the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) in 1999 inspired great hopes. As we explain, however, the noble initiatives of the UNGC are undermined by the arms industry. Arms are expensive. The expenditure on arms diverts a nation’s “resources from ‘productive’ to ‘unproductive’ ends.” The arms industry is a major employer in most arms manufacturing nations. It generates much needed revenue for those countries. Therefore, attempts at thwarting the supply of arms are doomed to failure. Instead of halting the supply of arms, we argue as to the advantages of restraining the demand for arms. Michael Walzer is the only moral philosopher who has considered the ethics of appeasement. We explore Walzer’s arguments for appeasement and consider how a United Nations Secretary-General could appease those nations demanding arms. In doing so, the UN Secretary-General would make it possible for the UNGC to achieve what was initially envisaged for the UNGC.
This Chapter is written in an era in which the United Nations (UN) routinely deploys Missions to environments that satisfy the armed conflict threshold. Such Missions…
This Chapter is written in an era in which the United Nations (UN) routinely deploys Missions to environments that satisfy the armed conflict threshold. Such Missions often require personnel to employ significant levels of force, whether to safeguard mission and humanitarian personnel, to protect civilians, to neutralise violent armed groups or, in pure self-defence. But use as well as non-use of force can readily frustrate the very objectives these troops are deployed to uphold, in turn creating gaps between the Promises they make and the Outcomes they actually secure. On the other hand, current Missions such as MINUSMA in Mali have proven to be amongst the deadliest for UN troops in the entire history of UN Peacekeeping. The thin line between use and non-use of force must therefore be trodden with utmost care. This Chapter tries to find answers to this dilemma from a moral perspective and considers how the peculiar nature of the morality of resort to force by the UN influences that of its use of force. It assesses why the latter should be calibrated or adjusted to comply with the former, and how this can consequently channel UN troop conduct towards the objectives pursued through deployment. It is only where these realities are understood and addressed, the Chapter submits, that the aforementioned Gaps between Promises and Outcomes can be redressed and closed.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how the conceptual lens of corporate social responsibility (CSR), business and civil society can be used to explore “less…
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how the conceptual lens of corporate social responsibility (CSR), business and civil society can be used to explore “less popular causes” (in this case, a community‐based public sector empirical study of initiatives with offenders) and, in particular, respond to the question used by Walzer “In which society can lives be best led?”
This is a formative and summative evaluation study of a National Offender Management “community payback” offender scheme based in the UK using a mixed method, predominantly qualitative approach that integrates theory and practice.
The paper finds that citizenship actions of front‐line public sector employees, working in partnership with other agencies in the community, embody the essence of Walzer's notion of CSR and civil society by going beyond the call of duty to provide additional training and moral support for the community offenders.
The paper contributes towards an understanding of how CSR and civil society debates can inform wider aspects of public policy and business through its application to areas of society that are perceived to be “challenging” and “undeserving”.
This paper compares two approaches to the moral justifications for killing in war: the forfeiture approach, which sees killing as justified when the victim has forfeited…
This paper compares two approaches to the moral justifications for killing in war: the forfeiture approach, which sees killing as justified when the victim has forfeited his or her right not to be killed, and the double-effect approach, which argues that even if intentional killing is absolutely prohibited, that killing can still be morally acceptable under certain conditions, most notably if it is not the intended, desired outcome of a person’s chosen action. The double-effect approach is considered out of fashion in contemporary military ethical literate. I argue that it warrants equal attention as an internally viable and coherent account of the morality of killing, and is preferable in at least one way: that it protects combatants from being necessarily culpable of killing merely by serving in active combat positions.
By defending an alternate framework to the forfeiture approach to killing which is most popular in today’s military ethical literature, I provide an opportunity for new and increased philosophical reflection and discourse on the ethics of killing, as well as new opportunity for defenders of double-effect to make a substantive contribution to the field. This paper demonstrates the internal consistency of arguments that seek to utilise DDE, including its relevance to individual self-defence and individual killing in war.
The images of soldiers which are evoked on memorial days commonly include a number of different virtues: courage, loyalty, fraternity, etc. One ideal perhaps extolled…
The images of soldiers which are evoked on memorial days commonly include a number of different virtues: courage, loyalty, fraternity, etc. One ideal perhaps extolled above all others is that of sacrifice. Soldiers, according to popular moral platitudes, are lauded for the sacrifices they make for the common good. Implied in this is the expectation that soldiers ought to be the type of people who are prepared to sacrifice themselves in defence of an ideal. Within the most popular framework for morally evaluating war, Just War Theory, sacrifice tends to be understood from within the deontological, rights-based framework that modern just war theorists favour. In this chapter I will aim to show how the conclusions drawn by considering sacrifice through a deontological lens can be enriched through the addition of virtue theoretical considerations, leading to a fuller account of sacrifice.
This chapter takes a philosophical approach to the idea of sacrifice in the military. It explores whether the predominant framework used for evaluating war, Just War Theory, is a suitable framework for understanding the sacrifices soldiers, commanders, and political leaders can be asked to make in times of war. Focussing on various conceptions of sacrifice, including physical and moral sacrifices, the chapter argues that the predominantly deontological formulation of modern just war theories could be enriched by considering notions surrounding the ancient Greek concept of arete (virtue). Thus, as well as being a detailed exposition of sacrifice in war, the chapter also seeks to show how consideration of aretaic notions such as virtue, character and moral psychology can enrich just war theories responses to various issues.
The value of this research is in suggesting that soldiers are morally obligated to accept more risk than modern warfare typically places, or at least historically has placed, on them. It also has implications for military ethics education in that it suggests that soldiers’ characters should be shaped in such a way as to dispose them to sacrifice. Further, it has implications for the use of Just War Theory in international relations by introducing a moral framework through which political leaders can determine when they might be morally obligated to forgive the indiscretions of another nation, and what it means to forgive in this context. As such, it makes a contribution to a growing discussion within Just War Theory: jus post bellum – the moral norms surrounding the resolution of conflict.
We utilise the problem of dirty hands to consider the ethical dimensions of commissions of inquiry, particularly commissions of inquiry conducted for the purposes of…
We utilise the problem of dirty hands to consider the ethical dimensions of commissions of inquiry, particularly commissions of inquiry conducted for the purposes of public policy. The Independent Local Government Review Panel (ILGRP) in NSW is used as an example for the purposes of discussion. Four questions endemic to considerations of dirty hands are derived from Coady (2014). The framework affords various insights into the ethical terrain of this particular inquiry and those undertaken for the purposes of public policy more generally. We argue that commissions of this type and the ILGRP in particular cannot be labelled examples of dirty hands and that the concept of determinatio from the work of St Thomas Aquinas sheds light as to the nature of moral claims around commissions. We also argue that a fruitful analysis is afforded by Wallis’ (2013) analytic framework of the ‘logic of fateful choices faced by the leaders of commissions of inquiry’. Nevertheless, confusion surrounding the nature and types of inquiries is partially responsible for accusations of their ethical incoherence.
In the lead article of this volume, Daryl Koehn relates the story of “The Fisherman and His Wife.” There was once a fisherman who lived with his wife in a ditch by the sea. One day the fisherman caught a magical, talking fish. Realizing that he couldn’t kill a fish that talked, the fisherman throws the fish back into the water. After hearing about his adventure, the fisherman’s wife insists that the fisherman return to the water and ask the fish to grant them a wish – perhaps a small cottage. When the fisherman returns home from his second encounter with the fish, his wife is sitting in front of their new cottage. “Inside there was a pretty little parlor, bedroom, kitchen, and a well-stocked pantry. The cottage contained the best furniture and fittings of shiny brass. A small yard was full of hens and ducks, and there was even a little garden with beautiful flowers and fruit.”
Approaching anti-essentialism from the perspective of multiculturalism this article reexamines the value of tolerance in dealing with inter-cultural conflicts and in…
Approaching anti-essentialism from the perspective of multiculturalism this article reexamines the value of tolerance in dealing with inter-cultural conflicts and in facilitation of multicultural discourses. It asserts that tolerance can be a potentially useful practice in specific local contexts, but it is not an ideal in itself. The article questions the role of public administration in building tolerance for cultural diversity and argues that providing visible forms of public recognition of cultural practices could be one possible role for government agencies.