Search results

For more than nine decades, the Jewish–Palestinian conflict has dominated all aspects of life in the Arab world. The Arabs have disregarded and neglected their political, economic, and social development since 1916 because of their obsession with defeating the Jews or driving them into the sea. When the Arab armies collectively failed to destroy the newly established Jewish state in 1948, the dynamics of the conflict changed. On the one hand, Arab rationalists such as King Abdullah ibn al-Husyan (King Abdullah-I) (d 1951) of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (HKJ) suggested accepting the United Nations Partition Plan as proposed by the UN General Assembly on November 29, 1947. On the other hand, most Arab countries followed the lead of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nassir, who advocated the destruction of Israel. The latter view was also adopted by the PLO during Ahmad Shukeiri's reign (1964–1967) and later by Yasir Arafat (1969–2004) and most Palestinian armed factions.

The coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) generated a crisis; however, it also gave us an opportunity to imagine the future and build a better world. Moreover, as we are convinced of the importance of understanding the lessons of history when facing both current and future challenges, this chapter seeks to present a concise overview of global crises since the end of the nineteenth century and to show crises for which we ignored the warning signs and wakeup calls, the consequences of said crises and how we managed to recover and thrive in several cases. Ultimately, we seek to justify the capacity of humanity to build a sustainable future – ideally, a regenerative future.

State leaders’ decision-making calculus is often attributed to external factors. The political arena, international community pressure and a country’s military stance all take centre stage in the analysis of national security decisions. Little weight is given to personal aspects of a leader’s psyche in explaining these decisions; this is true to the bulk of the research regarding this topic. This study theorizes and tests a positive link between Israeli leaders’ combat military experience and their propensity to enter into ‘peacemaking’ decisions namely, peace talks, cease fires and unilateral withdrawals. This research uses a new database comprising all peacemaking decision points in Israel’s history, looking at the pressure put on a leader from outside factors and his military experience to explain the decision taken. It finds a strong significant link between combat experience and the tendency to enter in a peacemaking decision with little regard to ideological affiliation, shedding a new light on Israeli politicians from both sides of the aisle.

Two trends mark the contemporary international scholarship on conflict and resolution. The scholarship on conflict has begun to look systematically at intra-state conflicts and track the role of non-state actors, along with the more established trend of analysing inter-state conflict. Conflict resolution has also moved beyond looking at states and national and global-level NGOs to the role of local, non-state actors in preventing and/or minimising conflict. While the “mainstream” scholarly work emphasises a linear process of reaching resolutions in the aftermath of a conflict (e.g. Burton, 1990; Galtung, 1965), a range of “related” scholarship has begun to focus on factors that prevent conflict and their rapid diffusion over wider areas, as well as factors that contribute to longer term, peaceful, resolution (e.g. Das, Kleinman, Lock, Ramphele, & Reynolds, 2001; Sabet, 1998; Varshney, 2001). These related literature look beyond political solutions such as conflict management, boundary adjustments, and treaties, and the role of international and national formal bodies to resolve and manage conflict; their emphasis is on conflict prevention, the healing of conflict victims, and building and sustaining peace. With the recognition, in the 21st century, of the escalating production and spread of weaponry, the power of non-state actors to generate significant conflict, as well as the rapidly growing proportion of people who suffer from and cope with the aftermath of such conflict, the expanded frames for understanding conflict and resolution, requires further attention.

This article calls for closer attention to the Middle East in the wider debate on the purported rise of new modes of armed conflict following the end of the Cold War, particularly in relation to the notion of ‘regional conflict formations’ (RCFs). In so doing, it presents and analyses three main paradoxes. First, though the contemporary Middle East had its own share of intrastate conflicts that generally grew into regional constellations, a look at the region's post-colonial history suggests that such trends are not as novel as has often been claimed. Second, the striking longevity of regionally entwined conflict in the Middle East calls into question the common and generalizing argument that it was the end of the Cold War, together with the alleged disengagement of the superpowers, that constituted the radical shifts – including the rise of RCFs – that signalled the demise of old forms of politics and conflict involving weak states. Third, Middle Eastern states, mostly authoritarian in outlook, have over recent decades become stronger despite prevailing conditions of regionalized conflict; indeed, as tentatively suggested in this article, to some extent because of those factors.

The extent to which opposition movements engaged in contention are able to broaden the scope of their struggle has garnered the attention of scholars of ethnic conflict, social movements, and contentious politics alike. The ability to broaden the scope of contention is known as scale shift. It is of paramount importance in cases of ethnonationalist movements, given the nature of their claims and the oppressive and repressive sociopolitical setting in which they are often situated. Our study advances social movement theory by developing a more nuanced understanding of the process by analyzing rich historical evidence from a failed attempt of scale shift: the case of Israeli-Arab 1976 Land Day. Utilizing Tarrow and McAdam's (2003) model, we analyze scale shift and its constituent mechanisms of brokerage and diffusion as they operate across different political opportunity structures and encounter different levels and types of repression. Based on our findings, we modify the model by highlighting a set of intermediary mechanisms, namely individualization, segmentation, resource restriction, exclusion, co-optation, defection, and internalization/externalization. We argue that these intermediary mechanisms largely account for the failure of scale shift in the specific repressive settings of the Arab minority in Israel.

The current study is an extension of the PF model research program that began after the Great Depression in the early 1930s. The purpose of the study is to introduce political dimensions to the PF defense-growth model and to assess the impact of political and conflict variables on EG. The study theorizes that excluding political factors from the PF defense-growth model hampers any realistic explanation of the problems of EG; that the influences of economic and military variables and their externalities effects vary across different political contexts; that political factors are at least as important as economic factors in determining the outcome of EG; that intrastate and interstate conflicts have differential effects on EG (both types of conflicts have negative effects on EG; however, intrastate conflicts have more damaging effects on growth than do interstate conflicts); and that the impact of conflicts on EG differs across regions.

Social media platforms are increasingly receiving attention as legitimate locations for civil society discourse and social movement mobilization. Initial work by Lovejoy and Saxton suggests NGOs use digital platforms such as Twitter to engage their constituencies through information dissemination, community building, and mobilization to action. Here, we explore the applicability of Lovejoy and Saxton’s communicative functions framework to resistance movement behavior by exploring two examples of digital engagement in political conflict. Through content analysis of tweets using hashtag indicators #BDS and #ICC4Israel collected during the spring of 2015, we affirm Lovejoy and Saxton’s findings that information dissemination is the most prevalent communication function for grassroots and institutionally grounded movements. Further, we find that informational tweets in our sample often provide information about grievances, and therefore propose an expansion of the framework to accommodate tweets that may be more common in resistance movements than in NGO communication. In addition to general findings about the communicative functions framework, the content analysis yielded several findings specific to the resistance movements studied. Notably, we find that #BDS and #ICC4Israel tweets are overwhelmingly nonviolent, and that sentiment is generally favorable across both hashtags, with the exception of tweets focusing on academic boycott, which were more ambiguous.