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The upper-echelons model of Hambrick and Mason ((1984). Academy of Management Review, 9, 193–206) launched a new area of research and provided the first overall theoretical framework for use in understanding how the experiences, backgrounds, and values of senior executives in organizations can influence the decisions that they make. The model is typically assumed to be what Rousseau ((1985). In: B. M. Staw, & L. L. Cumming (Eds), Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 7, pp. 1–37). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press) calls “multi-level,” as it describes how both individuals and top management teams (TMTs) make decisions in line with their preferences, biases, and values; the same model is applicable to both individuals and groups. However, the levels issues in the model have never been subjected to rigorous analysis. This chapter juxtaposes levels concepts and theories on the upper-echelons model, in an effort to highlight its strengths as well as its weaknesses. While the majority of researchers use the model to describe team-level decision making, the analysis presented here reveals that the model is inherently individual-level in focus, and several important limitations must be overcome before the model will provide a full explanation of team-level decision making.

We develop theoretical arguments from the efficiency wage model (Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984) to provide better understanding of Fama’s (1980) seminal notion that executive labor markets contribute to the alignment of executive and shareholder interests. We show how the efficiency wage model can be integrated with several other theories of executive turnover. Furthermore, the model allows for predictions that have received very little analysis to date, such as the effect of firm risk and executive salaries on turnover. We test predictions from the model on a sample of executives from 280 manufacturing firms observed annually from 1986 to 1992. Our sample includes data on over 12,000 observations and nearly 1,700 employment terminations. The results are consistent with the main predictions of the efficiency wage model. Holding performance constant, boards of directors are less patient with (more likely to dismiss) executives who have lower salaries and those in higher risk firms.

We thank Carpenter and Dalton and Dalton for their insights on our earlier chapter, and on the promise (and perils) of upper-echelons research in general. We set out to closely examine the levels issues in Hambrick and Mason's ((1984). Academy of Management Review, 9, 193–206.) original upper-echelons model, and the research initiatives that have applied this theoretical framework. We are encouraged by the initial reception that we have received from these authors. We continue to believe that top management teams (TMTs) are an important level of analysis for strategic leadership research, though the original upper-echelons model proposed by Hambrick and Mason cannot be directly applied at the team level. Our reply highlights several joint and individual concerns raised by the articles. We close by reiterating our call for continued analysis of the upper-echelons model.

A vast amount of research has been carried out to help us understand the main factors influencing mergers and acquisitions (M&A) performance. Although the existing body of knowledge focuses mainly on macro-level factors, there is an increasing interest from scholars and practitioners in understanding the micro-foundational factors occurring at individual and team levels. This chapter focuses on the importance of emotions – a central facet in individual reactions to workplace events – in M&A processes. To this end, the authors carried out a multi-phased search for articles on micro-foundations in M&A settings published by Business and Management (B/M) and Organizational Behavior and Psychology (O/P) journals. The authors reviewed 41 papers and used the circumplex model to identify and categorize 19 themes related to individual emotions involved in M&A processes in terms of positive/negative valence and high/low activation. The findings show that scholars mainly assume a risk mitigation perspective and focus on themes related to change resistance (negative emotions with high activation) by providing prescriptions on how negative emotions could be mitigated to avoid eroding acquisition performance. Hence, the authors suggest that (a) there should be more efforts to integrate different streams of literature, namely between the strategic and operational/behavioral areas of knowledge and (b) future research should focus on understanding how positive emotions like change proactivity (positive emotions with high activation) might be essential to enhance acquisition performance.

As the reality dawns on more and more organizations that their cutting‐edge competitiveness is inextricably linked to the talents, knowledge, energy and enterprise of the people they employ, how many of them are doing enough to make sure they do not run short of that vital raw material? Too few seems to be the simple and honest answer. Strange, is it not, that both huge companies and small ones are pretty adept at making sure they have enough “stuff” to do what they do. So why is it that so many companies put so much effort into making sure they have a never‐ending supply of every essential item they need, bar these – key leaders and managers?

1. INNOVATION IN ORGANIZATIONS: A MULTI-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE ON CREATIVITY

The purpose of the study is to set a research agenda so that future conceptual and empirical research can improve the understanding of why CEO pay and CEO performance are decoupled.

The paper compiles and adds to many of the explanations provided by this special issue’s nine commentaries regarding why CEO pay and CEO performance are decoupled. These explanations were grouped into two categories: economic (e.g. marginal productivity theory, agency theory and behavioral agency model) and social-institutional-psychological (e.g. CEO individual differences and characteristics and CEO-organization interactions). Moreover, new analyses based on additional data were conducted to examine measurement-related explanations for the observed pay-performance decoupling.

Results based on alternative measures of pay and performance confirmed, once again, the existence of pay-performance decoupling.

This paper will stimulate research pitting theoretical explanations against each other to understand their relative validity in different contexts.

The paper informs ongoing efforts to link CEO pay to performance.

The paper also revisits the decoupling of CEO pay and firm performance from a normative and value-based perspective (i.e. regarding whether pay and performance should be related).

The paper clarifies that the articles in this special issue largely concluded that CEO pay is decoupled from CEO performance.

Objetivo – El objetivo es proponer una ageda de investigación de forma que la futura investigación conceptual y empírica pueda mejorar la comprensión sobre por qué la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO no están conectados.

Diseño/metodología/aproximación – El artículo compila y añade a la mayoría de las explicaciones proporcionados por los nueve comentarios publicados en este número especial acerca de porqué la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO están desconectados. Estas explicaciones se agrupan en dos categorías: económicas (e.g. teoría de la productividad marginal, teoría de agencia, modelo de agencia comportamental) y socio-institucional-psicológicas (e.g. diferencias y características individuales del CEO, interacción CEO-organización). Además, se llevan a cabo nuevos análisis sobre datos adicionales para examinar algunas explicaciones relativas a la medición para la falta de conexión entre retribución del CEO y su rendimiento.

Resultados – Los resultados basados en medidas alternativas de retribución y rendimiento confirman, una vez más, la existencia de una desconexión entre ambas magnitudes.

Limitaciones/implicaciones – Este artículo estimulará a investigación contraponiendo diferentes explicaciones teóricas para entender su validez relativa en diferentes contextos.

Implicaciones prácticas – El artículo informa sobre los esfuerzos actuals para relacionar la retribución del CEO y su rendimiento.

Implicaciones sociales – El artículo revisa la desconexión entre la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO desde una perspectiva normativa y de valor (i.e. sobre si la retribución y el rendimiento deben estar conectados).

Originalidad/valor – El artículo clarifica que los artículos en este número especial concluyen que la retribución del CEO está desconectada de su rendimiento.

O objetivo é estabelecer uma agenda de investigação para que futuros estudos conceptuais ou empíricos possam melhorar a compreensão do porquê de a compensação do CEO e o desempenho do CEO estarem dissociados.

Metodologia – O artigo compila e acrescenta às muitas explicações fornecidas pelos oito comentários deste número especial sobre as razões da dissociação da compensação e do desempenho do CEO. Estas explicações agrupam-se em duas categorias: económicas (eg., teoria da produtividade marginal, teoria da agência, modelo da agência comportamental) e Socio-institucional-psicológicas (eg., características e diferenças individuais do CEO, interações CEO-Organização). Além disso, conduziram-se novas análises baseadas em dados para examinar explicações baseadas em medições para a dissociação pagamento-desempenho.

Resultados – Resultados baseados em medidas alternativas de pagamento e desempenho confirmaram, uma vez mais, a existência da dissociação entre pagamento e performance.

Limitações/implicações – Este artigo estimula investigação que contraponha diferentes explicações teóricas, para perceber a sua validade relativa em diferentes contextos.

Implicações práticas – O artigo dá informação sobre esforços em curso para ligar a compensação do CEO ao desempenho.

Implicações sociais – O artigo revisita a dissociação do pagamento e desempenho da empresa Numa perspectiva normative e baseada em valores (ie, sobre se a compensação e a performance devem estar relacionadas).

Originalidade/valor – O paper clarifica que os artigos neste número especial basicamente concluiram que a compensação do CEO está dissociala do desempenho do CEO.

Jay Barney is a Professor of Management and holds the Bank One Chair for Excellence in Corporate Strategy at the Max M. Fisher College of Business, The Ohio State University. He received his undergraduate degree from Brigham Young University, and his master's and doctorate from Yale University. He taught at the Anderson Graduate School of Management at UCLA and Texas A&M University before joining the faculty at Ohio State in 1994, where Professor Barney teaches organizational strategy and policy to MBA and Ph.D. students.