Search results

The American agricultural economist Marion Clawson advised the Israeli government during 1953–1955. Clawson, a protégé of John D. Black and Mordecai Ezekiel, criticized the government for ignoring economic considerations, and stated that Israel’s national goals – defense, Negev Desert irrigation, immigrant absorption via new agricultural settlements, and economic independence – were mutually contradictory. His major recommendations were to improve the realism of Israel’s agricultural plan; end expensive Negev irrigation; enlarge irrigated farms eightfold; freeze new settlements until the number of semi-developed settlements falls from 300 to 100; and limit new Negev settlements to 10 over 5–7 years. Thus, Clawson ignored political feasibility and made value judgments. Minister of Finance Levi Eshkol and Minister of Agriculture Peretz Naphtali rejected Clawson’s recommendations because they ignored Israel’s national goals. By September 1954, Clawson shifted towards greater pragmatism: He acknowledged that foreign advisors should not question the national goals or make value judgments, and sought common ground with the Ministry of Agriculture. At his initiative, he wrote Israel Agriculture 1953/54 in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture. Israel Agriculture was a consensus document: Clawson eschewed recommendations and accepted that the government might prioritize non-economic goals. In proposing Israel Agriculture, Clawson made a pragmatic decision to relinquish some independence for (potentially) greater influence. Ultimately, Clawson was largely unsuccessful as an advisor. Clawson’s failure was part of a general pattern: Over 1950–1985, the Israeli government always rejected foreign advisors’ recommendations unless it was facing a severe crisis.

The political crisis related to two main factors internal to the public revenue system, namely financial markets and the commercialisation of the state, and three related external factors, pertaining to the pandemic, popular discontent and inequality. The emphasis on financial markets since the mid-1990s expanded the commercialisation of the state while neglecting public accountability and government oversight. The efforts to shore up public finances through the tax system is increasingly undermined by the global tax architecture, enabling financial secrecy and illicit financial flows.

The pandemic revealed the significance of women’s work, paid as well as unpaid care work. The pandemic also exposed the limitations of a domestic economy, based on export-oriented development, over-reliant on tourism and remittances from migrant workers. Combining with the on-going dengue epidemic, the pandemic highlighted the urgency of climate adaptation. Meanwhile, the popular discontent conveyed an accumulation of grievances linked with cultural discrimination, political misrepresentation as well as economic maldistribution. The participation of new middle-class segments in the protests foregrounded new tendencies significant for strengthening the labour movement as well as working-class parties in their demands for redistribution, reframing democracy as well as citizenship.

Democratic renewal in Sri Lanka as well as a cross the Global South depends on strengthening democratic social movements within varieties of patrimonial capitalism. Patrimonial capitalism, emphasising patron–client relations, coincide with weakening democratic institutional cultures and practices. The dominant corruption/anti-corruption narrative is bracketed with elite class strategies aimed at negotiating a ‘managed corruption’. The realm of representative politics creating consent for patrimonial capitalism is shaped by: ethnic and class relations; the weakening of working-class parties; patriarchal cultures within parties; links with criminal networks; opaque finances and the integration of mainstream media with party patronage.

Democratising the realm of representative politics points towards democratic social movements. The internal dynamics of social movements, their relationships with political parties and collective learning are significant factors that shapes the strategic orientation of social movements. State repression of social movements highlights the need for demilitarisation and the abolition of prisons. The global sense of this local struggle relates to transforming financial markets and platform economies towards notions of financial and digital commons. The integration of different realms of politics, such as representative, movement, life and emancipatory politics, is vital for reinforcing solidarity as the basis for counter-hegemonic struggles.

COVID-19 not only has impacted adversely the health infrastructure, taking away lives of millions of people but it has also crippled the economy. The worst effected were food supply chain due to restrictions imposed on operations of shops and retail outlets. The consumers were suffering due to lack of supply. Similarly, agriculture produce were getting wasted due to lack of cold storage.

In this case we have proposed how a mobile-based application solution during COVID lockdown can successfully transform the livelihood of rural farmers in the state of Maharashtra (India), a state worst affected by the pandemic.

The technology-integrated supply chain model jointly developed by financial institutions, self-help groups (SHGs) and NGOs has enabled direct selling of fresh produces by rural women farmers to urban large residential societies at their doorsteps. It has provided a solution of municipality waste management by converting the waste to compost, getting them collected and used in the farmlands.

It will help the urban consumers to have the continuous supply of fresh vegetables and fruits available at their doorsteps, and keep a track of transport of foods from farm to fork. The farmers will be able to get better price for their produce. The model will also contribute towards circular economy (CE) through citizen partnership.

The world’s so-called developed countries of the West have long economic and political history compared to those of the East. The developed countries are far away from today’s developing countries in terms of aggregate income, aggregate capital formation, total number of human capital, etc. Though some countries from the East have outpaced some of the Western countries in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), aggregate bank credit and capital formation, in the twenty-first century, such as China and India, they are far behind in terms of per capita income, per capita financial facilities and per capita capital stock. On the other hand, the countries from the East, except a few one, are also well lagging behind their Western counterparts in the level of human development. With the theme of the book on the growth and developmental aspects of credit allocations, the present chapter makes an introduction to the subject area by means of credit histories in the selected 10 countries and their phase-wise levels of GDP, credit and Human Development Index (HDI). The figures for GDP, credit and HDI reflect the rising trends in GDP and credit for all in the entire phase but there are some downfalls in the GDP and credit during the phase of the global financial crisis. Besides, it observes rising trends of HDI in all the countries but the rates of rise are more in the case of the developing countries. There are thus the possibilities of getting correlations among the different pairs of the variables across the countries.

In Chapter 1, we critically reviewed the foundations of the free enterprise capital system (FECS), which has been successful primarily because of its wealth and asset accumulation potentiality and actuality. In this chapter, we critically argue that this capacity has been grounded upon the profit maximization (PM) theories, models, and paradigms of FECS. The intent of this chapter is not anti-PM. The PM models of FECS have worked and performed well for more than 200 years of the economic history of the United States and other developed countries, and this phenomenon is celebrated and featured as “market performativity.” However, market performativity has not truly benefitted the poor and the marginalized; on the contrary, market performativity has wittingly or unwittingly created gaping inequalities of wealth, income, opportunity, and prosperity. Critical thinking does not combat PM but challenges it with alternative models of profit sharing that promote social wealth, social welfare, social progress, and opportunity for all, which we explore here. Economic development without social progress breeds economic inequality and social injustice. Economic development alone is not enough; we should create a new paradigm in which economic development is the servant of social progress, not vice versa. Such a paradigm shift involves integrating the creativity and innovativity of market performativity and the goals and drives of social performativity together with PM, that is, from market performativity to social performativity.

This chapter discusses how an urban regeneration process, with culture as an economic asset, can contribute to creating a city brand and identity for the city of Mestre, a new habitat, and economic opportunities for the local community, as well as helping neighboring Venice tackle overtourism. This chapter highlights that places suffering from undertourism often are located closely to those suffering from overtourism. Urban regeneration policies driven by culture can be a key solution for both places, by creating a new future, identity, and economic opportunities for one community and for the other, in helping to regulate their touristic flows.