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Behavioral economics poses a challenge for the welfare evaluation of choices, particularly those that involve risk. It demands that we recognize that the descriptive account of behavior toward those choices might not be the ones we were all taught, and still teach, and that subjective risk perceptions might not accord with expert assessments of probabilities. In addition to these challenges, we are faced with the need to jettison naive notions of revealed preferences, according to which every choice by a subject expresses her objective function, as behavioral evidence forces us to confront pervasive inconsistencies and noise in a typical individual’s choice data. A principled account of errant choice must be built into models used for identification and estimation. These challenges demand close attention to the methodological claims often used to justify policy interventions. They also require, we argue, closer attention by economists to relevant contributions from cognitive science. We propose that a quantitative application of the “intentional stance” of Dennett provides a coherent, attractive and general approach to behavioral welfare economics.

Risk preferences play a critical role in almost every facet of economic activity. Experimental economists have sought to infer the risk preferences of subjects from choice behavior over lotteries. To help mitigate the influence of observable, and unobservable, heterogeneity in their samples, risk preferences have been estimated at the level of the individual subject. Recent work has detailed the lack of statistical power in descriptively classifying individual subjects as conforming to Expected Utility Theory (EUT) or Rank Dependent Utility (RDU). I discuss the normative consequences of this lack of power and provide some suggestions to improve the accuracy of normative inferences about individual-level choice behavior.

Purpose: Technological innovations and frameworks that provide a framework for unification have evolved to improve information exchange across organisational units and information security. These integration technologies share and communicate information using defined protocols and different data. Service-oriented architecture (SOA) is a significant emerging approach that enables modular design solution construction.

Methodology: These designs are beneficial when many apps operating on different architectures and networks need to connect. A well-defined strategy and company-specific guidelines are essential for ensuring the firm’s systematic adoption of such an architecture. The critical components of MASSOASCM ‘(Multi-Agent System Service Oriented Architecture Supply Chain Management’ are a multi-agent system (MAS), a service-oriented structure, and supplier management. The MASSOASCM model has been made, and a production unit has been made to show how it works.

Findings: It has been stated that it saves development costs, and inventory management, all of which are critical concerns in any company. Our goal is to create an inventory control approach that relies on MAS and SOA but also a simulation that demonstrates how it works and may enhance Supply Chain Management (SCM) productivity in a production plant.

Practical Implications: The SCM implementation comprises three different services: SCM, SOA, and MAS. These facilities are constructed, maintained, planned, and implemented individually before being brought together collectively using MAS and SOA techniques.

An emerging stream of research has identified critical events as spikes in societal interest that increase public attention to firm behavior and can function as exogenous triggers for change. With respect to misconduct, firms vary considerably in how they respond to critical events, and for a visible change in their undesirable behavior to transpire, there needs to be ongoing accumulation of work by social-control agents. While social-control agents are often boundedly rational in their decision-making, most studies have overlooked the ability of critical events to restrict or redirect collective attention among such agents. Drawing on the case of a regulatory agency’s enforcement actions against violations of anti-money laundering regulations by three European banks, we investigate the influence of critical events on social-control agents’ enforcement behavior. This study achieves two goals: first, we identify three types of fieldwide critical events that influence social-control agents’ behavior, and second, we demonstrate that these events may shape the regulatory environment in which firms operate, thus allowing for different organizational responses to enforcement actions. Our findings contribute to the literature on critical events and organizational misconduct.

Individuals develop and perform and process their identities in relationships with others as well as with the environment in which they find themselves, Many of these relationships with others are characterized by fundamental inequalities. In finding their identities, the subordinate in the relationship develops an identity that typically take steps – by vocal and non-vocal gestures – to perform this particularized identity. The identification of self is not only related to the others, with eachindividual in reflective communication, but also reflections characterized by inequality. In continuing to do so, he or she will experience a certain powerlessness, indeed what Marx called alienation.

When organizations engage in misconduct, social control agents play a crucial role in sanctioning them to show the enforcement of societal norms and reduce the risk of future deviance. We study the interaction between the government and the media, two key social control agents, in the evaluation organizational misconduct. While past work has focused on the influence of the media on the government, we theorize the influence of the government on the media. The government is a social control agent with supreme formal authority to punish misconduct, and thus its actions are of particular interest to the media as they form evaluations of misbehaving organizations. However, the government, tied by conflicting demands, sometimes turns a blind eye to misconduct and supports misbehaving organizations for the greater societal good, instead of punishing them. How is the media’s perception of misbehaving organizations affected by such government actions? We explore this question by looking at the case of the 2008 government bailout of investment banks in the United States, after those were caught red-handed for their involvement in the sub-prime financial crisis. Carrying out a content analysis of newspaper reporting (2007–2011), we show that the negative perception of investment banks and their misconduct is attenuated when they receive government support. Our work contributes to the emerging literature on the social construction of organizational misconduct and illuminates the interaction between government and media in the evaluation of behavior as organizational misconduct.

Cities evolved into quite complex urban systems. The rigid management process must reflect the complexity of the current political, social, and economic environment. With the vast city growth, citizens experience new difficulties – traffic congestion, pollution, immigration, overcrowding, and inadequate services.

In our research, we analyze problems and benefits that occur with the growing complexity and offer a new concept considering every city as a live and constantly developing complex adaptive system of many participants and actors that operate in an uncertain environment. These actors (residents, businesses, transport, energy, water supply providers, entertainment, and others) are the main elements of city life.

The new concept of “Smart City 5.0” is based on a previously developed model of Smart City 4.0 (compared with Industry 4.0) and implements the Urban Digital Ecosystem, where every element can be represented by a smart agent operating on its behalf. It is shown that smart services can interact vertically and horizontally in the proposed ecosystem, supporting competition and cooperation behavior based on specialized network protocols for balancing the conflicting interests of different city actors.

The chapter describes the design principles and the general architecture of the Urban Digital Ecosystem, including the basic agent of smart service, protocols of the agent’s negotiation, the architecture, and basic principles Smart City knowledge base.

The developed evolutionary methodology of implementation will ensure a minimum of disruptions to city services during its transformation into an urban ecosystem to harmoniously balance all spheres of life and the contradictory interests of different city actors.

In this paper, we investigate the process by which social control agents define wrongdoing over time and the principles they employ in drawing the boundary between right and wrong. We empirically examine how Italian state actors sought over four decades to categorize behaviors in the so-called “gray area,” i.e., the conduct of individuals supportive of the mafia organization Cosa Nostra and its criminal aims, but not members of the organization. Based on an archival analysis of texts produced since the 1960s, we reconstruct how state actors started from a preliminary definition of wrongdoing, moved to stigmatize the behaviors in question on moral grounds, and ultimately criminalized them with legal sanctions. We conceptualize the main principles behind this evolving categorization as intentionality of conduct, freedom of choice, and scope of harm. The paper contributes to the debate on the factors and conditions shaping the definition of wrongdoing over time and the contribution that social control agents provide to this aim.