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Family businesses are essential to the global economy but often grapple with family-related issues, especially during succession. This study explores how governance tools like the family protocol (FP) mitigate conflicts by setting standards for family firm management and continuity. Pioneering the use of game theory and adverse selection setups in family business governance, this research uncovers FP determinants.

This research employs game theory and adverse selection setups to delve into the strategic decision-making processes of stakeholders in family firms. The authors break new ground by applying principal–agent theory (PAT) to family business governance structures. This innovative approach uncovers the determinants of the FP, enhancing the authors’ understanding of family firm dynamics.

The authors emphasize the importance of custom governance structures, such as the FP, in managing complex family-business interactions. These structures mitigate conflicts and promote smoother transitions during succession, ensuring family firm continuity. This study identifies key determinants, and these results will aid founders, families and practitioners in achieving smoother transitions, ensuring family firm continuity.

This research pioneers game theory and PAT applications in family business governance, shedding light on the effectiveness of customized governance mechanisms. By identifying FP determinants, the authors contribute to a deeper understanding of family firm dynamics. The findings have practical implications for founders, families, practitioners and consultants, promoting the long-term success and harmony of family firms in the global economy.

Based on dual information asymmetry, the two-stage segmented compensation mechanism for technological innovation of civilian enterprises’ participation in military (CEPIM) has been discussed.

On the basis of the traditional principal-agent problems, the incentive compatibility condition is introduced as well as the hybrid incentive compensation model is established, to solve optimal solution of the compensation parameters under the dynamic contract condition and the validity is verified by numerical simulation.

The results show that: (1) The two-stage segmented compensation mechanism has the functions of “self-selection” and “stimulus to the strong”, (2) It promotes the civilian enterprises to obtain more innovation benefit compensation through the second stage, (3) There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between government compensation effectiveness and the innovation ability of compensation objects and (4) The “compensable threshold” and “optimal compensation threshold” should be set, respectively, to assess the applicability and priority of compensation.

In this paper, through numerical simulation, the optimal solution for two-stage segmented compensation, segmented compensation coefficient, expected returns for all parties and excess expected returns have been verified under various information asymmetry. The results show that the mechanism of two-stage segmented compensation can improve the expected returns for both civilian enterprises and the government. However, under dual information asymmetry, for innovation ability of the intended compensation candidates, a “compensation threshold” should be set to determine whether the compensation should be carried out, furthermore an “optimal compensation threshold” should be set to determine the compensation priority.

This paper aims to empirically examine the presence of a balance sheet channel (BSC) of monetary transmission mechanism (MTM) using firm-level panel data of Pakistan. It also explores the role of financial sector development (FSD) and firm age (FAge) in formulating the effect of monetary policy (MP) on the investment decisions of firms.

The authors applied the two-step system generalized method of moments (SYS-GMM) estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) to carry out the empirical analysis. The final sample of the study includes 450 nonfinancial firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PXS) during the period 1988–2021. The empirical framework of the study is based on the new classical model of investment. Different measures of MP are used to obtain the robust empirical evidence. To take into account the different dimensions of FSD, the index developed by Svirydzenka (2016) is utilized. To examine the moderating role of FSD and FAge, the interacted model is estimated, which enables the authors to estimate the MP effects at different percentiles of the moderating variables.

The study’s findings confirm the existence of BSC by revealing that MP instruments have negative, significant effects on firms’ investment decisions. These findings suggest that during periods of tight MP, firms significantly cut their investment expenditures. The results of the interacted model show that both FSD and FAge play an important role in lessening the adverse effects of MP on firms’ investment policy. Specifically, the calculated total effects suggest that the negative effect of MP on investment is considerably weaker at the higher percentiles of FSD and FAge.

The findings of the study have several important policy implications for different stakeholders. Specifically, the evidence suggests that the monetary authorities should keep in mind the adverse effects of MP while designing tight MP. The tight MP will have a negative effect on firm investment, which, in turn, will adversely affect firm growth and subsequently the growth rate and level of employment in the economy. Thus, during episodes of tight MP, the authorities should provide other facilities such as a friendly tax environment, better legal and regulatory framework, special credit arrangements, and provisions of loan guarantees. The findings of the moderating role suggest that the government may improve FSD to minify the adverse impacts of tight MP. Finally, the findings suggest that the government should design external financing-friendly policies to provide more opportunities to newly established firms to avoid tight MP’s effects.

The findings of the moderating role suggest that the government may improve FSD to minify the adverse impacts of tight MP. Finally, the findings suggest that the government should design external financing-friendly policies to provide more opportunities to newly established firms to avoid tight MP’s effects.

There are three significant contributions of the paper. Firstly, it provides empirical evidence on the existing of BSC of MTM using firm-level panel data spanning over 43 years for an emerging and small economy, namely Pakistan. Secondly, it examines the moderating role of FSD and FAge in formulating the effects of MP. Finally, it presents the total impact of MP at different percentiles of FSD and FAge, which definitely broadens the understanding of MTM through indirect channels.

This study aims to inspect the impact of earnings quality on corporate cash holdings of Jordanian companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange.

This study examines a large sample of (98) Jordanian companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange during the period that ranges from 2009 to 2019. Earnings quality was computed using two different methods; firstly, through the absolute abnormal discretionary accruals (as an inverse measure of earnings quality), which were estimated using the Dechow et al.’s (1995) cross-sectional version of the Modified Jones model and the Kothari et al. (2005) model; and secondly, through earnings persistence as a direct measure of earnings quality.

The empirical results of this study reveal that poor accounting quality (high levels of abnormal discretionary accruals) is associated with higher levels of cash holdings, implying that as the quality of earnings decreases, the harmful effects of information asymmetry and adverse selection costs will increase, leading, therefore, Jordanian companies to increase their corporate cash holdings levels to act as a buffer against any cash shortages. Further, the authors document that higher accounting quality (more persistent earnings) is associated with lower levels of cash holdings. In addition, this study found that earnings quality negatively and significantly affects the cash holdings of profitable companies in Jordan. Thus, earnings quality appeared to be a significant determinant of cash holdings for profit-making companies but not for companies enduring losses.

This study contributes to the limited evidence that investigates the relationship between earnings quality and corporate cash holdings. Where the majority of previous studies have focused on developed economies, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first in Jordan to comprehensively explore the relationship between earnings quality, computed by the absolute abnormal discretionary accruals and earnings persistence, and corporate cash holdings. Also, it is the first to explore the nature of the earnings quality-cash holding nexus in loss-making companies compared with their profit-making counterparts to the best of the authors’ knowledge. The results of this study have important policy implications for managers, creditors, investors and academics in Jordan and other emerging economies that share similar characteristics.

The construction industry has long been criticized for unethical conduct. The owner usually manages the contractor's opportunistic behaviors by employing a professional supervisor, but there is a risk of covert collusion between the supervisor and contractor. Based on the principal–agent theory and collusion theory, this paper aims to investigate optimal collusion-proof incentive contracts.

This paper presents a game-theoretic framework comprising an owner, supervisor and contractor, who interact and pursue maximized self-profits. Built upon the fixed-price incentive contract, cost-reimbursement contract, and revenue-sharing contract, different collusion-proof incentive contracts are investigated. A real project case is used to validate the developed model and derived results.

This paper shows that the presence of unethical collusion undermines the owner's interests. Especially, the possibility of agent collusion may induce the owner to abandon extracting quality information from the supervisor. Furthermore, information asymmetry significantly affects the construction contract selection, and the application conditions for different incentive contracts are provided.

This study still has some limitations that deserve further exploration. First, this study explores contractor–supervisor collusion but ignores the possibility of the supervisor abusing authority to extort the contractor. Second, to focus on collusion, this paper ignores the supervision costs. What's the optimal supervision effort that the owner should induce the supervisor to exert? Finally, this paper assumes that the colluders involved always keep their promises. However, what if the colluders may break their promises?

Several collusion-proof incentive contracts are explored in a project management setting. The proposed incentive contracts can provide the project owner with effective and practical tools to inhibit covert collusion in construction management and thus safeguard construction project quality.

This study expands the organization collusion theory to the field of construction management and investigates the optimal collusion-proof incentive contracts. In addition, this study is the first to investigate the effects of information asymmetry on contract selection.

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) has caused financial stress and limited their lending agility, resulting in more non-performing loans (NPLs) and lower performance during the II wave of the coronavirus crisis. Therefore, it is essential to identify the risky factors influencing the financial performance of Indian banks spanning 2018–2022.

Our sample consists of a balanced panel dataset of 75 scheduled commercial banks from three different ownership groups, including public, private and foreign banks, that were actively engaged in their operations during 2018–2022. Factor identification is performed via a fixed-effects model (FEM) that solves the issue of heterogeneity across different with banks over time. Additionally, to ensure the robustness of our findings, we also identify the risky drivers of the financial performance of Indian banks using an alternative measure, the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model.

Empirical evidence indicates that default risk, solvency risk and COVAR reduce financial performance in India. However, high liquidity, Z-score and the COVID-19 crisis enhance the financial performance of Indian banks. Unsystematic risk and systemic risk factors play an important role in determining the prognosis of COVID-19. The study supports the “bad-management,” “moral hazard” and “tail risk spillover of a single bank to the system” hypotheses. Public sector banks (PSBs) have considerable potential to achieve financial performance while controlling unsystematic risk and exogenous shocks relative to their peer group. Finally, robustness check estimates confirm the coefficients of the main model.

This study contributes to the knowledge in the banking literature by identifying risk factors that may affect financial performance during a crisis nexus and providing information about preventive measures. These insights are valuable to bankers, academics, managers and regulators for policy formulation. The findings of this paper provide important insights by considering all the risk factors that may be responsible for reducing the probability of financial performance in the banking system of an emerging market economy.

The empirical analysis has been done with a fresh perspective to consider unsystematic risk, systemic risk and exogenous risk (COVID-19) with the financial performance of Indian banks. Furthermore, none of the existing banking literature explicitly explores the drivers of the I and II waves of COVID-19 while considering COVID-19 as a dependent variable. Therefore, the aim of the present study is to make efforts in this direction.

This study considers a contracting problem between a fairness concerned entrepreneur (EN) and a fair-neutral venture capitalist (VC) to explore the effects of asymmetry, agency conflicts and fairness concerns.

The authors construct the model by assuming the EN's risk aversion degree is private information, which is more realistic but ignored in most studies. Under the principal–agent framework, the authors solve the VC's optimal contracting models by identifying the ranges of feasible solution, where the optimal solutions of these models are explicit and nicely reconcile the “private equity” puzzle. Moreover, validity of the optimal solutions is verified by numerical simulations.

In accordance with empirical evidence, information asymmetry lowers the optimal equity share that the VC provides to EN but raises EN's profit due to lower effort disutility and information rent. Moreover, the authors find that the fairness concerns is beneficial for the EN, where it not only increases the EN's optimal equity share, but also enhances the certainty equivalence of the EN's utility regarding its profit. Relative to the benchmark model where the EN's risk aversion degree is common knowledge, the EN's efforts recommended by the optimal contract is less sensitive to the EN's fairness concerns degree when the EN does not actually announce its risk aversion degree.

First, the authors incorporate asymmetry to study a two-period contracting problem and explore how it affects the equity shares allocated to the contractual parties. Second, the authors incorporate fairness concerns and analyze its effect regarding the decision-makings and profits.

This study aims to provide empirical evidence on the impact of foreign share ownership on the liquidity of the Tunisian Stock Exchange (TSE).

The authors hypothesize in the first strand that stock liquidity could be positively affected by foreign ownership based on the real friction channel. The authors then hypothesize in the second strand, based on the information friction channel, that foreign ownership's impact on stock liquidity could be insignificant or negative and that foreign investors raise the level of information asymmetry. A sample of 318 firm-year observations from Tunisia over the 2012–2017 period and a random-effects estimation were used. Moreover, using the 2SLS estimator, a robustness check framework was applied in order to address any potential reverse causality concerns.

The authors find strong evidence that higher foreign ownership improves stock liquidity. More specifically, firms with higher foreign ownership engender a lower bid-ask spread, a better stock ability to absorb a large amount of trading volume, and a larger depth. These findings are still valid when reverse causality concerns are addressed through the use of the 2SLS estimator.

The paper contributes to the existing literature by focusing on the ownership–liquidity relationship on a frontier market. It provides further empirical support that higher corporate governance quality reduces the information asymmetry problem and enhances stock market liquidity.

This study aims to comprehensively examine the relationship between financial reporting quality (FRQ) and investment efficiency (IE). The central thrust of this research endeavor is to empirically analyze the impact of FRQ on diverse facets of investment, including overinvestment, underinvestment and overall IE.

Using a sample of 13,902 firm-year observations from publicly listed US companies, this study uses the generalized method of moment (GMM) in conjunction with three distinct measures for FRQ under three different investment settings, considering firm liquidity and industry performance.

This study offers interesting insights into the intricate relationship between FRQ and IE. The results indicate a strong positive relation between the two constructs. In particular, the research reveals a negative link between FRQ and underinvestment, and an inverse relationship between FRQ and overinvestment. These findings suggest that FRQ is one of the key drivers of IE and that by enhancing FRQ, businesses can better optimize their investments.

This study highlights the significant implication of the effect of FRQ on IE, as it enables businesses to optimize their investments by improving their decision-making processes and better risk assessment of associated projects, resulting in more efficient capital allocation. A higher degree of FRQ increases investors’ confidence in a company’s financial statements, resulting in higher liquidity. It can benefit regulators to set higher standards and promote transparency.

The study examines the relationship between FRQ and IE. The study finds a strong positive relation between FRQ and IE, with FRQ being a key driver of IE. The paper’s original contribution lies in its comprehensive examination of the complex relationship between FRQ and IE, using robust analytical techniques by applying GMM and taking into consideration firms liquidity and industry performance.

Management of power distribution companies (discoms) in India has been historically criticized on the ground of inefficient management. Inefficiency in operations triggered management by private franchisees for promotion of managerial and technical expertise. However, franchise contracts have achieved mixed outcomes despite the business model being a decade old in the Indian power distribution sector. Therefore, this study sheds light on the drivers of discoms (principal) with the franchisees (agent) for the achievement of the common performance goals, highlighting the agency issues at multiple levels across the organizational hierarchies. The study seeks to acknowledge the commonalities and differences between and across varying levels.

A qualitative embedded single case study was conducted in an Indian state, namely Odisha. The study was built on archival analysis, personal observations and semi-structured interviews with the franchisors and franchisee officials across the organization's hierarchical levels. A conceptual model based on the review of prior literature formed the set of coding and presentation for the study.

The study provides insights on factors that play a role in effective power distribution management, operational efficiency and improved financial performance through the partnership of the principal and the agent.

The study is predominantly dependent upon interviews. This paved the way for the limitation of human biases. Additionally, deep insights were drawn from a single case study of a discom's decision to hire franchisees. However, this was at the cost of the number of organizations interviewed. The findings of the study could be built across other areas or nations.

There is adequate literature on franchising as a business model. However, literature is lacking in highlighting the commonalities and differences between different contracting parties and their impact on the performance of the contract. Additionally, there is a dearth of literature on franchising in the power distribution sector. Therefore, studying the model from multiple perspectives would contribute to the literature on the power sector and franchising.