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The paper aims to develop a theoretical model to explain the exact process through which the scale effect works to create a possible wedge between a perception-based ranking like the “Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ” and the axiomatic “absolute costs of corruption”-based ranking of economies with low enforcement against corruption.

The paper takes into account corruption both at the “high” and “low” levels of bureaucracies, where the bribes are paid sequentially at the two levels. The bribes are endogenously determined at the equilibrium using a sequential game approach.

The paper finds that in the absence of coalition between the two levels of bureaucrats, both the absolute level of corruption and the welfare level of the economies are expected to vary inversely with the perceived corruption frequency. The paper also explores the possibility of a stable coalition between the “high” and “low” level bureaucrats and shows that with the perception of a stable coalition being formed, the negative monotonic relation between the corruption frequency and the absolute size of corruption breaks down.

First, the paper argues that the ranking of the economies with low enforcement against corruption on the basis of perceived corruption frequency may not reflect the ranking of the economies according to their absolute size of corruption; it points out that the perceived higher corruption frequency in an economy as reflected in CPI can be an indicator of both the lower size of “high” level corruption and absolute size of corruption in the economy. Particularly, this happens in economies where coalition between the “high” and “low” level officials does not form. Second, it identifies the exact way in which the scale effect works to create a difference in the CPI ranking and the axiomatic “absolute costs of corruption”-based ranking and explains why similar difference would exist if “absolute costs of corruption”-based ranking is derived from all the sources of hard data on corruption. Third, it explains why a stable coalition between the “high” and “low” level bureaucrats in economies with low enforcement does not usually form.

Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013a, 2013b) find that in response to an increase in the public wage rate in National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), underpayment of wage and embezzlement rates increase monotonically. This paper aims to investigate theoretically whether the empirical finding of Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013b) is valid in the long run. The author also verify whether their observation extends to the situation where multiple types of corruption coexist.

The author builds a theoretical model comprising of three individuals – a government official, a landlord and a representative worker. First, the author defines a no-corruption equilibrium where the official honestly reports the employment period to the government. In a two-stage game, the landlord announces the private wage rate in stage one, followed by the worker deciding on the allocation of time between private and public works and leisure. Then the author considers a single type of corruption where the official embezzles a part of public money by over-reporting the employment period. The landlord-worker game remains the same as before. Finally, the author considers multiple types of corruption where alongside embezzlement, the official takes a bribe from the worker for employing her. Here also, the author considers a two-stage game where in stage one, the official and landlord simultaneously determine embezzlement and bribe rates and the private wage rate, respectively. In stage two, the worker decides on the allocation of time. In both types of corruption, the probability of detection increases with the corruption rate.

In the case of a single type of corruption, the embezzlement rate behaves nonmonotonically in response to an increase in the public wage rate. A similar kind of result is obtained with multiple types of corruption as well.

First, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no paper prior to this has theoretically modeled corruption in NREGA. Also, the observations of Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013a, 2013b) is neither valid in the long run nor extend to multiple corruptions.

Corruption is widely considered as one of the primary bounds on economic growth. As a result, eradicating corruption takes top priority in development policy. Sadly, most anti-corruption efforts fail. In this policy brief, we explain why an overt focus on eradicating corruption is misguided. We address two problems. Firstly, there is insufficient proof that eradicating corruption is a necessity to kickstart or promote rapid economic growth, in contrast to a dominant view in development circles. An overt focus on combating corruption risks wasting funds in development policy. Secondly, most anti-corruption efforts in development fail because they treat the symptom instead of the root causes. Anti-corruption efforts can be improved by working much more holistically in development policy.

Our goal with this policy brief is to encourage those working in economic development to rethink their approach to anti-corruption. By highlighting relevant insights from the academic literature which have largely remained unrecognised in development policy, and adding concrete policy recommendations, we hope to spur change in the primacy which is often granted to anti-corruption efforts.

This study aims to assess the risks of systematisation of corruption in the UK following the Brexit referendum.

The study applies theoretical and empirical findings of criminological, social, psychological, economic and legal research on the causes of systemic corruption to the socio-institutional developments following the Leave vote.

The events surrounding the referendum confirm that the resort to corrupt practices is normalised in certain sectors of the British institutions, business and media and that socio-political processes activated by the Leave vote and inadequate UK policymaking and lawmaking can aggravate the situational and socio-psychological enablers of systemic corruption. Effective solutions must go beyond mere anti-corruption laws and address deeper social issues.

The study focuses only on some of the major situational and socio-psychological causes of systemic corruption, including the unintended criminogenic effects of the law. More interdisciplinary research is required to address other causes, such as historical and cultural factors.

The findings of this study can inspire practical solutions by policymakers and future research.

The study contributes to raising social awareness and stimulating public discussion on systemic corruption in the UK and on the consequences of the referendum on public and private integrity.

The study offers the first systematic analysis of the effects of Brexit and the referendum on corruption through an integrated interdisciplinary approach to systemic corruption in the UK.

This paper attempts to develop a simple, static model of tax administration that is capable of explaining the widespread collusive petty tax administration corruption observed in developing countries.

This paper utilizes a positivist research framework and adopts a theoretical method of analysis, although secondary data will also be mentioned to support theoretical arguments whenever it is appropriate to do so.

A high rate of collusive tax corruption is inevitable in developing countries.

The model is static and needs to be extended into a dynamic model.

Traditional enforcement tools such as higher audits or a higher penalty regime against tax evasion do not work. Tax simplification can lessen the incidence of tax corruption.

Fighting tax corruption requires significant changes in the attitudes of taxpayers and tax auditors.

This paper combines the literature on Kantian economics and tax compliance in an innovative fashion.

In recognition of corruption as a major obstacle to the development processes of poor countries, the search for effective strategies in combating the phenomenon in developing countries has become a major preoccupation of the international donor community, particularly since the early 1990s. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of “political will” in combating corruption in Hong Kong, Singapore and Ghana with the view to drawing significant lessons for all developing and transition countries in their anticorruption crusades.

The findings in this paper are based on an extensive review of relevant literature and personal experiences in Ghana.

This paper concludes that controlling corruption in a sustained manner requires a consistent demonstration of genuine commitment on the part of the top political elite towards the eradication of the menace. Where the commitment of the top political leadership to the goal of eradicating corruption in a country is weak, as has been the case in Ghana, governments are only likely to engage in “zero tolerance for corruption” talk but continue to play a “tolerant corruption” game. Anticorruption reforms, in this regard, are bound to fail.

The paper highlights a number of lessons from the successful anticorruption crusades of Singapore and Hong Kong that are significant for Ghana and other developing countries in their fight against corruption. These include the need for anticorruption reform initiatives to be participatory and inclusive of all stakeholders including public and private sectors as well as civil society; the need to provide adequate budgets and staff for specialized anticorruption agencies and grant them independence in the execution of their mandates; and the need to establish effective mechanisms for: providing positive incentives for those who comply with anticorruption laws; and exposing and sanctioning compromised individuals and institutions.

Whilst studies on the role of political will in combating corruption in developing countries abound, most of these have either not provided in‐depth country experiences or relied on single country cases. One major departure of this paper from extant literature is its cross‐country comparative nature.

With the analysis of the causes of corruption, this study aims to investigate specific anti-corruption measures that can be implemented to reform the political system and the social climate of China.

This study examines 97 severe corruption cases of high-ranking officials in China, which occurred between 2012 and 2015. As this insinuates that both institutional and social corruption are major problems in China, the analysis delves into multiple facts of corruption, including different types, four primary underlying causes, and suggestions regarding the implementation of three significant governmental shifts that focus on investigation, prevention tactics and legal regulations.

China’s corruption is not only individual-based but also it has developed into institutional corruption and social corruption. Besides human nature and instinct, the causes of corruption can be organised into four categories, namely, social customs, social transitions, institutional designs and institutional operations. For the removed high-ranking officials, the formation of interest chains was an important underlying cause behind their corruption.

This study makes a significant contribution to the literature because this study provides a well-rounded approach to a complex issue by highlighting the significance of democracy and the rule of law as ways to regulate human behaviour to combat future corruption.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between commercial corruption and money laundering. The challenge of corruption in the private sector and its relationship with money laundering are neglected subjects. Corruption and money laundering often occur together with the presence of one reinforcing the other. Corruption generates billions of dollars of funds that will need to be concealed through the money laundering process. At the same time, corruption contributes to money laundering activity through payment of bribes to persons who are responsible for the operation of anti‐money laundering (AML) systems.

Primary legal documentation, such as the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, the Financial Action Task Force's Recommendations on Money Laundering, and National Legislation, as well as Unpublished Government Commissioned Reports, are analysed in order to assess the links between corruption and money laundering.

Commercial corruption poses a threat to the integrity of the AML system, especially at the placement stage of the money laundering cycle. Private sector reporting entities may be bribed to actively collude in money laundering, refrain from lodging suspicious transaction reports, or tip off clients that they may be subject to a government investigation. The recursive links between corruption and money laundering suggest that policies which are addressed to fighting both corruption and money laundering may have a mutually reinforcing effect.

There is a lack of empirical data concerning private corruption that suggests significant underreporting of this type of crime.

This paper is addressed to policy makers who are concerned with corporate governance and the impact of corruption on AML systems. Future research would deal with the enforcement aspects of anti‐corruption laws.

The paper analyses commercial corruption for the purpose of understanding the corruption/money laundering nexus.

Singapore and Hong Kong are the least corrupt Asian countries according to their rankings and scores on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in 2018 and other indicators. This chapter explains why these two city-states have succeeded in minimizing corruption and identifies the four best practices which might serve as lessons for policy-makers in other countries.

International business is under increasing legal pressure to ensure compliance with legal and other standards on corruption, and thus needs to undertake due diligence on corruption. This paper aims to emphasise that existing sources of information on corruption in specific countries are often limited for interpretative purposes.

Using a number of country studies that look at the causes and legal and institutional responses, as well as other data sources from international agencies, the paper suggests that no one indicator can substantively alert business to the levels and types of corruption in a specific country.

As a preliminary conclusion, the paper proposes that business must undertake more substantive work to understand corruption in a particular country. It also indicates that qualitative sources may be more productive than quantitative sources in providing information that is of use to business in undertaking such work.

The paper highlights the need to stress the need to study corruption in a country context.