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Economists usually shy away from talking about power. They assume an economy comprised of many small and medium-sized firms, each competing for consumer dollars. This circumvents the problem of economic power. John Kenneth Galbraith, however, refused to ignore power. It stood at the center of his economics, and he saw it as a key reason the US economy thrived in the years following World War II (WWII). This chapter examines Galbraith’s changing views regarding economic power. American Capitalism explains how countervailing power, or power on the other side of the market, solves the problem of economic power. In The New Industrial State, scientists and educated managers within the firm (the technostructure) mitigate the negative consequences of economic power wielded by large firms. The Affluent Society and Economics and the Public Purpose look to the government as the main check on corporate power. It does this through labor legislation or programs such as the New Deal and Fair Deal. This chapter then evaluates the different solutions Galbraith proffered to the problem of economic power. It contends that Galbraith got three things right when analyzing economic power. First, we no longer live in a world of scarcity due to oligopolistic firms. Second, capitalism was different in the post-WWII era because the US economy thrived and gains were shared widely. Third, Galbraith understood that power was unequally distributed – both between the public and private sectors and within the private sector itself. On the other hand, Galbraith was overly optimistic in believing the market economy or the public sector could counter corporate power.

John Kenneth Galbraith’s social balance theory is an important theme in many of his books, particularly The Affluent Society, The New Industrial State, and Economics and the Public Purpose. Galbraith’s social balance theory states that forces driving private consumption in an industrial society will outpace the development and provision of public goods and services with consequences on the well-being of society (Stanfield, 1996, p. 49). The theory leads to several questions: (1) What is the specific relationship between private and public goods and consumption? (2) What is optimized with social balancing? (3) Does the relationship between private and public goods change over time? and (4) How do we evaluate the types of public goods we need? This chapter explores these questions and examines the type of public goods we need today to serve our communities better. For example, police presence and activities in many minority communities are now viewed negatively, as evidenced by the “defund the police” movement. Conversely, some have advocated for greater public spending on community mental health programs and new initiatives to deal with racism in communities.

Discusses and analyses Veblen′s views on corporate ownership and control and on the risk of a professional managerial class of engineers and experts. Veblen′s views are compared with those of Berle and Means and of J.K. Galbraith.

This paper analyzes and explains the dynamics of corporate evolution in the context of anthropologist conception of culture. The multinational corporate characterizing the Galbraithian world, as The New Industrial State, dominates the current economic landscape. The conception of corporate culture and its dynamics lays bare the locus of corporate power which resides in the control of corporate technology. Granting this dynamic, the question then arises concerning the agency which controls the application and use of this cumulated corporate power. Corporate power and policy in the USA are currently directed by a social institution in the form of profits without social responsibility. This policy is manifest in a “low road” of cost reduction. Such a policy direction exacerbates rather than ameliorates the current economic malaise now characterizing the US economy.

This article examines the locus of power in the large corporation (The East India Company) over a 125 year period and the career paths of two of its dominant players (Laurence Sulivan and James Mill). Sulivan embodies the character of such modern powerful leaders as Jack Welch and Lee Iacocca. Mill represents the modern power broker associated with the “technostructure”. What gave rise to the technostructure? What were the qualities of Sulivan and Mill which allowed them to dominate the organization? These are two of the questions investigated.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how a state-owned Colombian multi-utility conglomerate (CMC) has used management accounting practices (MAPs) to shape efficiency. The authors bring out the interplay between structures and agency in the process of shaping efficiency, which has enabled the company to operate as a private enterprise, taking advantage of NPM-led reforms and management accounting technologies.

This is an interpretative case study of a CMC. Data for the study are derived from interviews, non-participative observations and document analysis. Giddens' structuration theory (ST) provides the theoretical approach for the study.

Results show that MAPs have shaped efficiency in a CMC, promoting the profitability criteria prevailing in private enterprises. Theoretically, the paper shows how structure and agency are embedded in shaping efficiency in an emerging economy context through MAPs. It does this by analysing both the broader influence of the School of Mines and multilateral development banks and the micro-situated practices of employees at the CMC. The employees who have worked in the company for long periods of time have transformed the profitability criteria into a corporate value that influences their day-to-day practices.

The paper adds to the literature that draws on the ST by illustrating a paradigmatic case, in which agents have brought in knowledge and values to a state-owned company, and changed its ethos and practices whilst remaining under state control.

This study examines the social organizational structure of one early childhood education (ECE) center in Finland and the relationship between this structure and the roles and the responsibilities of the members of the organization.

The research is a qualitative case study with ethnographic features. Its variables for content analysis are based on Henry Mintzberg's theory of organizational design.

The study's results show that the organizational structure of the ECE center follows the organizational configuration of a Professional bureaucracy and that the multiprofessional teams follow the configuration of a Simple structure. The structures for centralization and decentralization are suitable for a professional bureaucracy, but the roles of the members of the organization and the processes for shared decision-making lack clarification. The shortage of qualified ECE teachers disrupts the function of the organization and the work of ECE leaders.

The educational background of subjects may have affected the findings.

The study uses Henry Mintzberg's organizational structure theory to evaluate how and why power is distributed and activities are coordinated at the ECE center. The results also show what parts of the organization pose challenges that most commonly disrupt the organization's operations. With these findings, it is possible to expand the understanding of roles and responsibilities in the currently reforming ECE environment and what ECE centers need to function effectively. The study is part of a larger research project and will be continued to examine the leadership culture of the ECE center.

This purpose of this study is to understand how the spread of audit culture and the related public sector reforms have affected Finnish universities’ organization principles, performance measurement (PM) criteria and ultimately their reason for being.

Applying extensive qualitative data by combining interview data with document materials, this study takes a longitudinal perspective toward the changing Finnish higher education field.

The analysis suggests the reforms have altered universities’ administrative structures, planning and control systems, coordination mechanisms and the role of staff units, as well as the allocation of power and thus challenged their reason for being. Power has become concentrated into the hands of formal managers, while operational core professionals have been distanced from decision making. Efficiency in terms of financial and performance indicators has become a coordinating principle of university organizations, and PM practices are used to steer the work of professionals. Because of the reforms, universities have moved away from the ideal type of professional bureaucracy and begun resembling the new, emerging ideal type of competitive bureaucracy.

This study builds on rich, real-life, longitudinal empirical material and details a chronological description of the changes in Finland’s university sector. Moreover, it illustrates how the spread of audit culture and the related legislative changes have transformed the ideal type of university organization and challenged universities’ reason for being. These changes entail significant consequences regarding universities as organizations and their role in society.

The Berle and Means thesis focuses on a managerial revolution in which corporate control came to be transferred from owners to managers. Currently, it is arguable that control of corporate policy has shifted back to owners in what has come to be called “investor capitalism.” Stock market manipulators, as owners, have currently come to assert increased levels of control over CEO autonomy. This empirical reality appears in a vicious circle culminating in excessive CEO profits. The result has been to give support to a basic Veblenian assertion that imbecile business institutions hold sway to direct and dominate the economic process. In this process, the making of money rather than the production of goods serviceable for basic human needs have increasingly come to prevail over the US economy and culture.

Baumol’s impact on the development of managerial theories of the firm is investigated here through the material found in Galbraith’s archives. In 1957, Galbraith published a paper claiming that the impact of macroeconomic policies varies with market structures (competitive versus oligopolistic). That publication prompted Baumol (1958b) to send Galbraith a manuscript dealing extensively with a crucial question of managerial theories of the firm, namely, the trade-off between sales and profits. I argue that Baumol’s critiques and Galbraith’s answers largely explain the way Baumol (1958a, 1959) framed his alternative model of the behavior of corporations. He reasoned in terms of maximization of sales with a profit constraint as their main objective. In return, Business Behavior, Value and Growth fostered the development of Marris’ (1964) and Galbraith’s (1967) theories of the corporation. While Tullock (1978) provides a narrative in which the sales maximization hypothesis has two main branches – Baumol for the one and Galbraith–Marris for the other – the paper demonstrates that these branches are intimately connected.