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This study aims to examine the hypothesis that the effect of insurer risks on profitability is conditional on regulation, using two main regulatory directives in the Ghanaian insurance market as a case study.

This study used the robust ordinary least square and random effect techniques in a panel data of 30 insurers from 2009 to 2015 to test the research hypothesis.

The results suggest that regulations on no credit premium and required capital have insignificant effects on profitability of insurers. On the contrary, this study documents evidence that both policies mitigate the effect of underwriting risk on profitability and suggests that regulations significantly mitigate the negative effect of underwriting risk to improve profitability.

The finding suggests that policymakers and regulators must continue to initiate, design and model regulations such that they help tame risk to improve the performance of insurers in Ghana.

This study provides first-time evidence on the role of regulations in controlling risks in a developing insurance market.

The purpose of this paper is not only seek to trace developments that have contributed to the importance of risk in regulation, but also to justify why risk has become so significant within regulatory and governmental circles.

This task will be facilitated through a consideration of theories associated with risk, and by reference to two forms of risk regulation, namely risk‐based regulation and meta regulation. As well as a consideration of the application of both in jurisdictions such as the UK, the paper adopts a comparative approach through references to the their application in jurisdictions such as Germany, Italy, and the USA, and also through a comparison between meta‐regulatory strategies and risk‐based regulation.

This paper concludes that all regulatory strategies should take into consideration the importance of management responsibilities – both on individual and corporate levels. Meta‐risk regulation has not only assumed such a prominent position in regulation through its application in Basel II, but also is preferred to risk‐based regulation – not only because of the element of ambiguity which risk‐based regulation introduces into its assessment (through a consideration of the external environment of the firm), but also because of its impact of the use of external auditors in regulation and supervision.

The practical implications of a move towards risk‐based regulatory strategies, and meta‐regulatory strategies in particular, is that courts are simply not adequately equipped to deal with the pace with which some financial instruments, such as derivatives, operate.

This paper not only introduces originality through its comparative approach and the choice of jurisdictions involved, but also through the attention it draws to the need for more innovative techniques such as meta regulation. Meta regulation can be considered to be the most evolved and collaborative form of regulation, which is best suited for such an ever‐evolving and changing regulatory environment that currently exists.

Debate is growing around the expansion of risk-based regulation. The regulation scholarship provides evidence of regulatory failure of the risk-based approach in different domains, including financial regulation. Therefore, this paper aims to provide cautionary evidence about the risk of regulatory failure of risk-based strategy in the financial regulation while using enterprise risk management (ERM) as a meta-regulatory toolkit.

Based on interview data gathered from 30 risk managers of banks and five regulatory personnel, combined with secondary data, this study mainly explores the challenges for meaningful use of ERM based self-regulation in regulated banks. The evidence helps to assess the risk of regulatory failure of the risk-based regulation while using ERM.

The evidence reflects that regulated banks face diverse challenges arising from both peripheral and internal environments that limit the true internalization of ERM-based self-regulation. Despite this, the regulator uses this self-regulation as a meta-regulatory toolkit under the risk-based regulation to achieve the regulatory aims. However, the lack of true internalization of ERM based self-regulation is likely to raise the risk of regulatory failure of risk-based regulation to achieve the regulatory goals. Risk-based regulation is an evolving strategy in the regulatory regime. Therefore, care should be taken while using ERM as a regulatory toolkit before relying on it substantially.

The paper provides empirical insights about the challenges for effective use of ERM as a meta regulatory toolkit that might be useful practically both to the regulators and regulated firms.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether board characteristics moderate the relationship between capital adequacy regulation and bank risk-taking of universal banks in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

The paper uses 700 bank-year observations of universal banks in SSA between 2009 and 2019. The paper further uses the two-step generalized method of moments as the baseline estimator.

The paper finds that capital adequacy regulation is positively related to overall bank and liquidity risks. Nonetheless, capital adequacy regulation increases credit risk in the sampled banks. The paper further reports that board characteristics individually and significantly moderate the relationship between capital adequacy regulation and risk-taking.

The findings have implications for regulators of universal banks that board characteristics matter for capital adequacy regulation to impact risk-taking behavior.

The paper extends the existing literature on the effect of board characteristics on the capital adequacy regulations and risk-taking behavior nexus of universal banks.

This paper aims to examine different types of sharing platforms based on risk perceptions of product/service providers and users, and to illustrate appropriate platform regulation preferences.

A survey was used (N = 540) to collect data on platform participants’ risk perceptions and regulation preferences in the Chinese (N = 263) and the US markets (N = 277). Cluster analysis and multiple correspondence analysis were used to categorise platforms and match their regulation preferences with the risk characteristics.

The results show that i) four types of sharing platforms are categorised in terms of the risk perceived by the supply and demand side, and ii) four types of regulation preferences are clustered, drawing on the power and trust elements proposed from the slippery slope framework. Furthermore, coercive power regulation is favoured by participants of platforms with high supply risk and low demand risk, legitimate power regulation is preferred by actors of platforms with low supply risk and high demand risk, reason-based trust regulation is preferred by actors of platforms with high supply and demand risk, and implicit trust regulation is favoured by participants of platforms with low supply and demand risk.

This paper develops an empirical typology of platforms based on risk perceptions of providers and users, and advances our understanding about lateral exchange markets from a consumer perspective.

This paper provides implications for platforms to regulate transactions through two mechanisms – the power of platforms and trust in platform participants.

Regulating by power ensures transaction security while regulating by trust enhances transaction efficiency, so it is important to configure the power and trust elements in platform regulation in an appropriate manner. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is one of the first attempts at addressing platform regulation and shows how consumers’ risk perception of platforms can lead to important implications for theory and practice in marketing and better regulation of platform transactions.

According to previous international studies, the impact of external regulation on bank risk is ambiguous. The purpose of this paper is to ask the question, “When do regulations matter for bank risk-taking?” by reporting the first empirical investigation of how the relation between bank regulations (capital requirements, official supervisory power and market discipline) and bank risk-taking is moderated by board monitoring characteristics.

Using SYS-GMM, the analysis of the interaction between bank-level boards of directors’ attributes (board size, board independence and board gender diversity) and external regulation is based on a sample of 493 banks operating in 54 countries over 2001-2015, accounting for three measures of bank risk-taking.

Regulations matter for bank risk-taking conditional on board characteristics: board size, board independence and board diversity. With the exception of capital requirements, the market discipline exerted by external private monitoring and greater supervisory power are unable to mitigate the propensity to greater risk-taking by banks resulting from larger board size, higher board independence and greater gender diversity of the board.

The bank risk empirical literature is still silent as to the interaction between board governance and regulation for the purpose of examining banks’ risk-taking. This paper fills this gap, thus making a significant contribution by extending our knowledge of whether and how board governance moderates the relationship between external regulation and bank risk-taking.

In a bid to enhance the stability of banks, supervisory authorities in sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) have also adopted international bank regulatory standards based on the Basel core principles. This paper aims to investigate the effectiveness of these regulations in mitigating Bank risk (instability) in SSA. The focus of empirical analysis is on examining the implications of four regulations (capital, activity restrictions, supervisory power and market discipline) on risk-taking behaviour of banks.

This paper uses two dimensions of financial stability in relation to two different sources of bank risk: solvency risk and liquidity risk. This paper uses information from the World Bank Regulatory Survey database to construct regulation indices on activity restrictions and the three regulations pertaining to the three pillars of Basel II, i.e. capital, supervisory power and market discipline. The paper then uses a two-step system generalised method of moments estimator to estimate the impact of each regulation on solvency and liquidity risk.

The overall results show that: regulations pertaining to capital (Pillar 1) and market discipline (Pillar 3) are effective in reducing solvency risk; and regulations pertaining to supervisory power (Pillar 2) and activity restrictions increase liquidity risk (i.e. reduce bank stability).

Given some evidence from other studies which show that market power (competition) tends to condition the effect of regulations on bank stability, it would have been more informative to examine whether this is really the case in SSA, given the low levels of competition in some countries. This study is limited in this regard.

The key policy implications from the study findings are three-fold: bank supervisory agencies in SSA should prioritise the adoption of Pillars 1 and 3 of the Basel II framework as an effective policy response to enhance the stability of the banking system; a universal banking model is more stability enhancing; and there is a trade-off between stronger supervisory power and liquidity stability that needs to be properly managed every time regulatory agencies increase their supervisory mandate.

This paper provides new evidence on which Pillars of the Basel II regulatory framework are more effective in reducing bank risk in SSA. This paper also shows that the way regulations affect solvency risk is different from that of liquidity risk – an approach that allows for case specific policy interventions based on the type of bank risk under consideration. Ignoring this dual dimension of bank stability can thus lead to erroneous policy inferences.

This paper aims to examine the interaction effect of regulations (monetary and macro-prudential) in explaining the possible non-linear effect of bank risk exposures (credit risk and insolvency risk) on banking stability in Africa.

The study uses a two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator for a data set of banks across 54 African countries over the period 2006–2020.

The authors find that the relationships between bank credit risk–bank stability and bank insolvency risk–bank stability are non-linear and characterized by the presence of optimal thresholds, which are 5.3456 for credit risk and 2.3643 for insolvency. Contrary to their positive effects below these optimal thresholds, credit risk and insolvency risk become negatively linked to bank stability in Africa. The authors find that macro-prudential action and monetary policy both have a positive and significant relationship with bank stability. The authors provide evidence to support that the marginal effect of excessive credit risk and insolvency risk on bank stability is reduced when interacted with monetary and macro-prudential regulations, and the impact is significant in strong institutional environment.

Future research should extend data to include developing and emerging economies in the world. Also, policymakers, researchers and practitioners should consider different regulatory and institutional frameworks in explaining the relationship between the thresholds of bank risk exposures and bank stability in the world.

Regulatory authorities should have to deeply reform their financial systems, develop risk-based regulatory framework and effective supervision mechanism relating to appropriate techniques that maintain an optimal and desired level of bank risks and risk-taking behaviours required to ensure a stable banking system.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to examine how different regulatory frameworks shape the non-linear impact of bank risk exposures on bank stability in Africa.

In Australia, national harmonisation of occupational health and safety (OHS) regulation was pursued through the development of model Work Health and Safety legislation. The model Work Health and Safety Regulations specify that construction works above a threshold cost of AU$250,000 are deemed to be construction projects requiring the appointment of a principal contractor with duties relating to OHS planning and coordination. The purpose of this paper is to explore the effectiveness of the monetary threshold as a suitable trigger for specific OHS planning and coordination duties.

Interviews were conducted with 46 Australian construction industry stakeholders, including union representatives, employer groups, construction firm representatives and regulators, as well as four international construction OHS experts, to explore perceptions about the effectiveness of the monetary threshold. Two construction scenarios were also modelled to test for variability in operation of the threshold by geographical location of works and design conditions.

The monetary threshold was perceived to be subject to two forms of capture problem, reflecting inadvertent capture of low risk works or failure to capture high risk works. Organisations were also reported to deliberately split contracts to avoid capture by the threshold. The cost-estimate modelling revealed inequalities and variation in the operation of the monetary threshold by geographic location and design specification.

The analysis suggests that limitations inherent in the use of a monetary threshold to trigger duties relating to OHS planning and coordination in construction works. Opportunities to use more sophisticated risk-based mechanisms are considered.

The study explores a fundamental challenge of risk-based OHS regulation, i.e., how to ensure that workers’ health and safety are adequately protected without creating an unnecessarily high regulatory burden. The research provides evidence that using a monetary value as a proxy measure for OHS risk in construction projects may be problematic.

This paper aims to study the design of bank capital regulation and points out a conceptual downside of risk-sensitive regulation. The author argues that when a bank is better informed about its risk than the regulator, designing regulation is subject to the Lucas critique. The second-best regulation could be risk-insensitive, which provides an explanation for the leverage ratio as a backstop to risk-based capital requirements. This paper offers empirical predictions and implications for policy.

The argument in the paper is based on analytical results from mechanism design.

Optimal bank regulation could be risk-insensitive, as is observed in practice in the form of the leverage ratio rule.

Counter to conventional wisdom, the paper argues and provides a new explanation for why bank regulation should not be sensitive to the risk of the bank. The paper then offers empirical predictions and implications for policy.