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Healthcare regulation is one means to address quality challenges in healthcare systems and is carried out using compliance, deterrence and/or improvement approaches. The four countries of the UK provide an opportunity to explore and compare different regulatory architecture and models. The purpose of this paper is to understand emerging regulatory models and associated tensions.

This paper uses qualitative methods to compare the regulatory architecture and models. Data were collected from documents, including board papers, inspection guidelines and from 48 interviewees representing a cross-section of roles from six organisational regulatory agencies. The data were analysed thematically using an a priori coding framework developed from the literature.

The findings show that regulatory agencies in the four countries of the UK have different approaches and methods of delivering their missions. This study finds that new hybrid regulatory models are developing which use improvement support interventions in parallel with deterrence and compliance approaches. The analysis highlights that effective regulatory oversight of quality is contingent on the ability of regulatory agencies to balance their requirements to assure and improve care. Nevertheless, they face common tensions in sustaining the balance in their requirements connected to their roles, relationships and resources.

The paper shows through its comparison of UK regulatory agencies that the development and implementation of hybrid models is complex. The paper contributes to research by identifying three tensions related to hybrid regulatory models; roles, resources and relationships which need to be managed to sustain hybrid regulatory models.

INTRODUCTION During the past dozen years a relatively large theoretical literature has grown out of the models proposed by Averch‐Johnson (2) and, to a lesser extent, Wellisz (90). Averch‐Johnson (here‐after A‐J) pointed out the now famous overcapitalization effect‐that a monopoly subject to rate of return regulation has an incentive to use more than the cost minimizing value of capital. The A‐J model was at first regarded as simply a theoretical explanation of what was long thought to be a significant cost of regulation. After languishing in this state for several years, the model achieved some popularity as a vehicle for theoretical explorations of various aspects of rate regulation. To date, the A‐J model has given rise to nearly forty papers on what has come to be called “the theory of regulatory constraint.”

Regulatory and institutional changes, restructuring and/or privatization of the erstwhile vertically integrated electricity networks have been adopted by all Sub‐Saharan African (SSA) countries in their pursuit of rural and urban electrification, poverty reduction and economic growth. But advances with the reforms remain limited and the results are at best debatable. The purpose of this paper is to examine the reasons for the unsuccessful implementation of deregulation in Sub‐Sahara electricity markets.

The paper examines the experiences with deregulation of the electricity industries in developed and developing economies and surmises on the factors that have contributed to the success of reforms in some industrialized countries and identifies the factors that have contributed to the failure of reforms in SSA. The “evidence‐based economics” (EBE) methodology is used to analyze the existing models of regulation and their differences particularly as they are practiced in SSA and developed economies. A gap analysis is realized by highlighting the differences between best practices and the existing level of knowledge. Two case studies are analyzed and the collection of information is assessed in a way that is useful for the development and implementation of the most appropriate models of regulation for SSA.

The paper finds that the current trend to the regionalization of the electricity markets in SSA and the creation of regional power pools make possible the creation of a genuine regional electricity market which would provide new opportunities for the adoption and adaptation of more advanced models of regulation (2‐G and/or 3‐G) similar to the ones currently employed by some developed economies in Europe and North America. To do so, regulators in SSA need to adopt a more dynamic approach to regulation.

Given the comparative approach of this paper, it is not possible to prove that SSA countries will succeed in their electricity reforms by adopting the 2‐G and 3‐G regulatory models. Nonetheless, if they do follow the dynamic approach to regulation, as suggested in the paper, their chances to succeed are much better.

The analysis of this paper has major implications for governments, regulators, shareholders, customers and employees of the electricity industry. A better understanding of the reasons for the failure of previous reforms and the identification of major advantages and disadvantages of the electricity markets in SSA provide new opportunities and challenges. The success of the application of the 3‐G model may increase the competitiveness of the electricity industry and productive capacity of Sub‐Saharan countries.

Electricity is an essential input in any industrial and commercial process. Its availability reduces costs, enhances productivity and creates jobs in other sectors. The social well‐being of Sub‐Saharan countries would increase by adopting the 3‐G model suggested in this paper.

To the best of the author's knowledge, there are no recent studies dealing with the same issues particularly for Sub‐Sahara Africa. This paper fulfils the gap that exists in the literature.

Between 1988 and 1994 ten European countries introduced or modified their regulations on insider trading. We evaluate in this article the impact of such regulatory changes on the risk, return, and some other characteristics of these ten markets. After extensive testing, we find that the evidence suggests that these regulations have had little (if any) impact on the market characteristics we examine, and briefly speculate about the reasons that justify our findings.

In response to the 2008 financial crisis, the European Union (EU) comprehensively restructured its derivative regulation. A key component of this new framework is a reporting obligation for every derivative trade. As the reporting requirement does not involve public disclosure of the information, existing academic analysis on reporting regulations to-date, which focusses on public disclosure, is limited in predicting the effectiveness of the reform. This paper aims to assess whether the reform has been designed effectively based on the regulatory setup in the UK.

Framing the reporting regulation as a moral hazard problem with asymmetric information, this paper uses a game-theoretical approach to evaluate whether the new derivative reporting obligation effectively induces firm compliance. I also discuss potential extensions of the derivative reporting model, with particular emphasis on how the framework could account for heterogeneous firms and different regulatory tools.

Based on the theoretical analysis, this paper finds that while firms are unlikely to comply fully with derivative reporting requirements, it is possible to induce relatively high firm compliance. Although this does not mean we are immune from another financial crisis, the derivative reporting requirements should equip EU regulators to monitor a more transparent and secure derivatives market.

This paper provides a theoretical foundation for further study of post-crisis derivatives reforms. In particular, the implications of the model point to an empirical strategy to test the accuracy of the model.

The growth of new trading opportunities, advances in technology, and investor interest in fast, cheap execution have all challenged the dominance of traditional exchanges and encouraged the development of alternative trading systems. This article explores the vigorous debate among market participants that has ensued, and outlines their various positions on how these developments should impact the existing regulatory structure.

Most governments would profess either to having a model regulatory system for their markets or at least to having a proposal for a model regulatory system. The leading international grouping of securities market regulators, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which comprises the regulatory bodies of almost 100 countries with day‐to‐day responsibility for securities regulation and the administration of securities laws, has devised a benchmark standard of regulatory best practice against which regulators around the world can reliably measure their operations' effectiveness.

This study aims to render a fundamental assessment of the Basel II internal ratings-based (IRB) approach by taking readings of the Australian banking sector since the implementation of Basel II and comparing them with signals from macroeconomic indicators, financial statistics and external credit ratings. The IRB approach to capital adequacy for credit risk, which implements an asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) model, plays an important role in protecting the Australian banking sector against insolvency.

Realisations of the single systematic risk factor, interpreted as describing the prevailing state of the Australian economy, are recovered from the ASRF model and compared with macroeconomic indicators. Similarly, estimates of distance-to-default, reflecting the capacity of the Australian banking sector to absorb credit losses, are recovered from the ASRF model and compared with financial statistics and external credit ratings. With the implementation of Basel II preceding the time when the effect of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was most acutely felt, the authors measure the impact of the crisis on the Australian banking sector.

Measurements from the ASRF model find general agreement with signals from macroeconomic indicators, financial statistics and external credit ratings. This leads to a favourable assessment of the ASRF model for the purposes of capital allocation, performance attribution and risk monitoring. The empirical analysis used in this paper reveals that the recent crisis imparted a mild stress on the Australian banking sector.

Given the range of economic conditions, from mild contraction to moderate expansion, experienced in Australia since the implementation of Basel II, the authors cannot attest to the validity of the model specification of the IRB approach for its intended purpose of solvency assessment.

Access to internal bank data collected by the prudential regulator distinguishes this paper from other empirical studies on the IRB approach and financial crisis of 2007-2009. The authors are not the first to attempt to measure the effects of the recent crisis, but they believe that they are the first to do so using regulatory data.

This paper aims to examine the characteristics of banks that were the target of intervention in the form of bailout or failure during the financial crisis and, of those subjected to intervention, what characteristics distinguish those that received bailout funds from those that were deemed failures.

The study estimates a series of logit regressions in an effort to identify the causes of regulatory intervention while controlling for bank-level characteristics and the economic and regulatory environment.

The empirical results indicate that many of the same characteristics associated with banks receiving bailout funds are similar to the characteristics associated with failed banks. However, non-performing loans increased the likelihood of failure, but reduced the likelihood of a bank receiving Capital Purchase Program (CPP) funds, suggesting that regulatory authorities discriminated in their use of CPP funds based on the quality of a bank’s asset portfolio. Further, those banks located in states with limits on de novo branching and those banks that are part of a multi-bank holding company structure were less likely to fail but were more likely to receive CPP funds.

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of regulatory intervention in the banking industry during the late 2000s financial crisis and the impact of different banking organizational structures, economic circumstances, and financial fragility on the likelihood of a bank failing or receiving bailout funds.

This paper aims to trace the evolution of Indian financial market structure and regulation, in the broad dialectic sense and to suggest a consolidated, holistic regulatory model.

The paper sketches the evolution of Indian financial market structure and its regulation in terms of dialectic cycles. The first cycle extending practically over four decades, from the 1950s to the 1980s, was a period of foundation, expansion, and policy introspection. The decade of the 1990s marked the commencement of the second cycle – a period of liberalization and emergence of financial conglomerates. The Indian financial system has since completed one full circle in the dialectic process and is now passing through the last phase (synthesis) of the second cycle. Based on this dialectic approach, a consolidated and holistic regulatory model has been developed and suggested.

The paper concludes that, from a regulatory perspective, the recent developments in the financial sector have led to an appreciation of the limitations of the present segmental approach to financial regulation and favors adopting a consolidated supervisory approach to financial regulation and supervision, irrespective of its structural design.

This paper will be of value to financial regulators, financial intermediaries and investors across all the countries, developed as well as developing. It will facilitate and guide in the process of regulatory restructuring and strengthening the overall health of the financial markets.