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This study aims to discuss the European Commission’s proposal for a pilot regime for market infrastructures to experiment with the distributed ledger technology (DLT). In this respect, the study comments on the purpose, scope, requirements and attention points for market operators, investment firms and central securities depositories (CSDs) that are considering using this technology.

This paper focuses on the proposed rules surrounding the DLT pilot regime. The study is based on an analysis of the proposal, compares it with existing literature and presents the purpose and scope of the regime, followed by a detailed analysis of the proposed requirements.

The proposed requirements aim to provide legal certainty, ensure investor protection, support innovation and protect financial stability. The European Commission attempts to reach these goals by establishing uniform requirements for the DLT market infrastructures by means of a European sandbox approach. This study stresses that a level playing field between the various market participants using the technology should be warranted and provides arguments for why the proposal is incomplete in this respect.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, there are no other articles that provide a holistic overview of the proposed regulation and describe the choices that legislators have made so far. This paper will be of interest to all market operators, investment firms and CSDs that have interest in DLT. The study is also of value to their stakeholders, such as their regulators, market participants and their clients, as well as to other linked financial market infrastructures.

This chapter aims the research whether the application of European Directive, Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), had any significant effects on the European Capital Markets and the progress of the European Integration. This new regulation specifies the tasks and responsibilities of the supervisory authorities of the Member State of origin and the host Member State, in order to enhance the certainty of effectiveness of cross-border transactions supervision and to reduce the risk of imposing unnecessary legal reforms from the host Member State on investment firms which perform cross-border transactions. It has been concluded, among others, that the aligning of the national regulatory approaches to a common European regulatory system is quite necessary. It is finally concluded that MiFID will contribute to reduce problems at country level as the previous experience of the Investment Services Directive, where the European investments and economies of Member States were based mainly on the level of ‘country’ and not of the ‘sector’. An effective capital entrepreneurship market is a strategically important element in the development of new and innovative businesses, encouraging entrepreneurship, increasing the productivity and maintaining high economic growth rates in Europe. Currently, European venture capital market is much less effective than that of the US market, for example. Therefore, in this area, should be specified the priorities that will lead to new initiatives.

The purpose of this paper is to answer a specific research question: How have EU and US regulators translated the idea of central clearing into law?

A meticulous legal research is carried out. First, the pre‐crisis regulatory regime for credit default swap (CDS) is reviewed, from a securities law angle as well as from a comparative Euro‐American perspective. Next, the regulatory processes leading to the adoption of the central clearing regulations are discussed. Thereafter, a material comparative analysis is made of the provisions related to central clearing in the EU and US regulatory initiatives. Finally, the paper is concluded with an evaluation of both legislations in the light of all previous analyses.

The research first shows that central clearing regulations rely on a series of presumptions, both concerning the gravity of counterparty risk threats and the necessity of central clearing. Additionally, the EU and US clearing regulations are similar with regard to the broad innovations they introduce, i.e. the mandatory central clearing of a variety of over‐the‐counter derivatives and counterparty risk management requirements for central clearing institutions and for non‐cleared swaps. However, the specific content of the provisions often differs. Furthermore, both legislations are limited to enouncing broad principles. This is also the case for the crucial provisions related to counterparty risk management. Therefore, these provisions in se do not guarantee the proper regulation of counterparty risk management practices. Consequently, much is to be expected from the implementing measures adopted by regulatory institutions.

The paper provides an overview of those provisions in the European and US regulations that specifically concern central clearing for CDS. It is one of the first papers which does this in a very well‐structured and clearly written manner. Also it is one of the first to provide a clear comparison between the provisions in the EU and the US regulations.

This paper aims to discuss the European Commission’s proposal for a central counterparty (CCP) recovery and resolution regulation. In this respect, the paper comments the consequences, risks and attention points for CCPs and their authorities.

This paper focuses on the proposed rules surrounding CCP recovery and resolution. The paper first familiarizes the reader with the risk management procedures currently obliged before discussing the resolution and recovery provisions foreseen in the proposal.

The proposed regulation commands significant requirements for CCPs and for their regulators. Not only will CCPs have to draft a recovery plan but also a resolution authority will need to be assigned. The latter will have the task, in consultation with a resolution college, to draft a resolution plan. When a resolution is inevitable, authorities will need to assure the continuation of the CCP’s critical functions, thereby warranting financial stability and investor protection.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, there are no other papers that provide a holistic overview of the newly proposed regulation and describe the choices to be made during a CCP’s resolution. This paper will be of interest to all CCPs and their stakeholders, such as their regulators, clearing members and their clients and other linked financial market infrastructures.

This paper investigates the impact of moving Central Counterparty Clearing Houses (CCPs) that clear euro-denominated transactions to the Eurozone after the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union. Prior to Brexit, the City of London had a dominant position in euro-clearing, but in the aftermath of Brexit, clearing houses might decide to move to the EU27. This paper aims to investigate the impact of moving euro-clearing to the EU27.

This paper provides an economic, political and legal investigation based on desk research. It studies the relevant materials, as they relate to the functioning of Central Counterparty Clearing in the aftermath of Brexit, with specific attention to the potential shift of locations and oversight.

The development of a EU27 financial hub and the possibility to increase oversight over euro-denominated financial transactions, which were partly at the roots of the financial and Eurozone crisis, could strengthen the market shaping of European financial markets. However, localizing euro-denominated transactions in Europe could potentially give rise to efficiency losses and a higher risk for companies and investors. Furthermore, the European regulatory framework currently faces certain weaknesses, obstructing the regulatory potential of the EU.

As the Brexit negotiations are not yet finished, this paper does not intend to set out a definite outcome of the processes currently taking place.

Shifting locations and oversight of CCPs as a result of Brexit could lead to the establishment of a large financial centre within the EU-27. At the same time, it is to be expected that such a development will have a significant impact on the financial infrastructure of the City of London.

There exists an important trade-off with regard to shifting locations that need to be at the forefront of the discussions and the negotiations when dealing with Brexit. This seems to be neglected in a lot of the current policy debates. This paper takes stock of the ongoing debate and how it relates to the functioning of CCPs.

This paper aims to conceptualize and empirically illustrate the challenges that financial market regulation presents to politicians and the organization tasked with specifying regulations and supervising their implementation in the interest of users and consumers of financial instruments. It analyses the problem from the viewpoint of the governor's dilemma and the control/competence conflict, the linked problem of the rent-seeking of agents/intermediators and consumers of financial instruments. Political accountability problems are enhanced by the materiality of the technologies used, i.e. algo trading.

The paper theoretically conceptualizes and empirically illustrates the argument.

The paper finds that regulators of digitalized financial markets are faced with considerable problems and depend on private agents when regulating financial transactions. However, the new technological instruments also offer new possibilities for securing compliance.

Further research should focus more in-depth on the cooperation between public and private actors in the specification and implementation of regulatory details. It should further investigate the conditions which allow regulators to use RegTech in the surveillance of financial firms.

Since financial market transactions are opaque for most users, the creation of more transparency is crucial to hold regulators accountable in their activity of surveillance of financial firms. New algorithm-based technologies may lend important support in doing so.

By linking the different analytical perspectives, i.e. the governor's dilemma vis-à-vis the intermediator or agent and the possible rent-seeking of intermediators, under the condition of a highly developed technology of financial transactions as well as the market structure, the paper offers new insights into the limits as well as new opportunities of regulating financial markets allowing for political accountability of regulators and financial firms.

The Belgium Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) market was created primarily to facilitate a transparent, professionally managed and fiscally efficient market, providing access to the European property markets. Being the 2nd oldest REIT market in Europe, it has undergone many evolutionary changes over the years that add to its considerable stature as a sophisticated investment opportunity. This includes an increased recent focus on the social infrastructure property sectors such as healthcare, care facilities and nursing homes, consistent with the evolving investment mandates requiring stronger integration of environmental, social and governance (ESG) aspects in the investment strategy formulation. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the strategic transformation of Belgium REITs and empirically assess their performance attributes over 1995–2018. Sub-period performance dynamics of Belgium REITs in the pre-global financial crises (GFC) (1995–2007) and post-GFC (2009–2018) contexts are provided.

In total, 23-year monthly total returns over 1995–2018 were used to analyse the risk-adjusted performance and portfolio diversification potential of Belgium REITs. The traditional mean-variance portfolio optimisation model using the ex-post returns, risk and correlation coefficient of Belgium REITs and other financial assets was developed to determine the added-value benefits of Belgium REITs in a diversified investment framework. The analysis was further extended to cover the sub-periods of pre-GFC (1995–2007) and post-GFC (2009–2018).

The results of the analysis provide a strong investment case for Belgium REITs, as they are able to deliver a discernible premium in the total return performance, superior risk-adjusted returns and strong diversification benefits with the stock market in a long-term investment horizon. Broadly consistent results are similarly observed in the sub-period analysis over varying market conditions. Importantly, the role of Belgium REITs in a diversified investment framework was also empirically validated, as they enhanced the mixed-asset portfolio performance comprised of the traditional asset classes of stocks and bonds across a broad portfolio risk-return spectrum. Dividend yield was also found to be a key component of the financial performance of Belgium REITs.

The Belgium REIT market has evolved to become the 5th largest market in Europe by the capitalisation volume. This is mainly due to the robust regulatory support and innovations since its debut which have resulted in a polished framework that is both supportive and attractive to financial players and investors. The broad direct consequence of this paper is to highlight the performance attributes of Belgium REITs, adding clarity to the ongoing discussion regarding the viability of European REITs as a liquid and tax transparent route for institutional investors to obtain their property exposure. The strong dividend yield and ESG/social infrastructure focus of Belgium REITs sees Belgium REITs well-placed going forward to meet the evolving investment mandates from major investors.

This paper is the first empirical investigation that elucidates the risk-adjusted performance and role of Belgium REITs as an important property investment opportunity. It equips investors and practitioners with an independent and comprehensive empirical validation of the strategic role of Belgium REITs in a portfolio. Well-informed and practical property investment decision making regarding the use of Belgium REITs for access to the property asset class is the main outcome of this paper.

This paper aims to provide an overview of the market for corporate and sovereign credit default swaps (CDS), with particular focus on Europe. It studies whether the subprime crisis of 2007/2008 and, particularly, the European debt crisis 2009/2010 led to a differential development on corporate and sovereign CDS markets and investigates the primary use (speculative risk-trading or risk-hedging) of the two markets in recent years.

The authors use aggregate market data on the size of the respective markets and on the structure of market participants and their changes over time to assess the main research question. They enhance existing data from public sources such as the Bank for International Settlements and Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation with their own statistics on European sovereign CDS and combine their conclusions with observations regarding standardisation efforts and regulatory changes in the CDS market.

The authors show that after the subprime crisis 2007/2008 and the European debt crisis 2009/2010, the corporate and sovereign CDS markets developed quite differently. They provide evidence that since mid-2010, market participants started to use the sovereign CDS market more strongly for speculative purposes than for risk-hedging. This shows both in the shift of risk-quality of sovereign CDS contracts and in the changing structure of market participants. The ongoing standardisation and regulation in the CDS market – leading to further increases in transparency and reductions in transaction costs – may be expected to trigger a similar change also for corporate CDS.

Based on a broad variety of market infrastructure data, the authors show a diverging development of corporate and sovereign CDS markets in Europe in recent years. Particularly the sovereign CDS market appears to have shifted from a risk-hedging instrument to being used more strongly for speculative risk-trading. The authors combine their findings with recent regulatory action and market standardisation schemes and draw conclusions for the future development of CDS markets.

This paper aims to discuss the impact of nascent Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) initiatives and, thus, to deliver practical insights into MiFID II implementation, compliance and cost reduction MiFID II constitutes the backbone for the upcoming financial market reforms. With the first proposal of MiFID drafted in October 2011, this regulatory framework has undergone over 2,000 amendments. As MiFID II currently stands, this Directive attempts to address issues exposed by the global financial crisis.

This study, based on secondary research and an in-depth analysis of the MiFID II framework, investigates structural and technological challenges entailed by this Directive. The analysis is broken down into the following sections: technological and structural challenges; costs of implementation; MiFID II teams; facilitating near real-time regulatory reporting; increased transparency requirements; and information technology (IT) initiatives for MiFID II compliance.

MiFID II commands significant changes in business and operating models. With this in mind, the study indicates current technological and structural challenges faced by financial institutions and advises on ways of mitigating MiFID II risks. Although it is too early to assess the costs of implementing MiFID II, this paper suggests ways of reducing MiFID II-related costs. The study also advises on organising dedicated teams to deal with MiFID II. Furthermore, this paper argues that early investments in IT systems and processes would allow financial services firms to gain a competitive advantage and, hence, scoop up market share or launch new, lucrative services – especially in the area of collateralisation and market data processing.

This paper shows that the current version of MiFID II still requires a great deal of attention from the regulators that need to readdress contentious issues revolving around the links between MiFID II and other regulatory frameworks such as European Market Infrastructure Regulation and Dodd–Frank. This study addresses the MiFID II compliance issues by adopting European Union and non-European Union banks’ and asset managers’ perspectives and, hence, delivers practical implications for risk managers and compliance officers of various financial institutions.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework for the legal classification of trading venues in financial markets. Currently, there is no clear definition of when a trading platform should be classified as multilateral or bilateral. This paper builds a theoretical framework that will allow regulators to define the border (with its regulatory implications) between multilateral and bilateral trading venues.

The approach used for this paper focuses on looking at the different trading models available in financial markets and analyzing their key features in order to bring up recurrent aspects that have helped to build the theoretical framework.

Multilateral trading facilities would not only be systems bringing together multiple interests from third parties, but those systems bringing together multiple interests with “no discretion” (ex ante rules) vis‐à‐vis membership, admission of products to trading, and matching of interests. All trading venues that do not meet these three key requirements will be falling under the bilateral trading classification, which implies the application of fiduciary duties, such as conflicts of interest rules and best execution. The paper then advances a proposal to solve the legal classification issue in the revision of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive in Europe (MiFID). In effect, despite the claim that the Organised Trading Facility (EU) and the Swap Execution Facility (USA) would be equivalent categories, EU and US regulators, respectively, have taken divergent paths on how these venues will ultimately look.

The value of the paper is in its ability to provide a theoretical framework to something that has not been assessed in these terms previously. Today, only the SEC is trying, for the first time, to have a definition of when a RFQ model can be defined “multilateral”. This topic has been rarely discussed before in financial regulation, while it is extensively discussed in market microstructure (but on the market structure implications, rather than its regulatory and policy implications).