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The New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) was published in June 2004. This modification of the regulatory framework for banking institutions raises the question to what extent real estate financing will be impacted and how market participants can be adequately prepared. Aims to examine the impact of Basel II on the future pricing and availability of debt capital and on the cost of capital in real estate financing and to present possible reactions for real estate developers.

This research paper follows a deductive approach. First, the New Basel Capital Accord and the main features of commercial real estate financing are presented. On a normative level, the implications for developers are explained. Since no information regarding the behaviour of market participants in commercial real estate financing was available, the authors have ascertained the relevant questions within the framework of an empirical analysis. A total of 205 banking institutions were asked to fill out a survey pertaining to commercial real estate financing. The results of this survey are partly presented and interpreted.

The availability and the pricing of debt capital will be risk‐adjusted and will depend on the amount of regulatory equity banks will have to hold in reserve for a credit engagement. The cost of debt capital in real estate financing will rise due to systemic reasons of the New Basel Capital Accord. Banks are/will be very restrictive with regard to credit allowances. The use of the positive leverage effect will become more difficult. Structured financing, particularly the use of private equity, is the best way to fill a potential financing gap.

The paper is a timely investigation of a significant regulatory framework that is of world‐wide significance. The New Basel Capital Accord is introduced in its fundamental structure and the two relevant rating approaches are described and put into context. The paper reduces the complexity of the comprehensive and sophisticated Basel Capital Accord. Based on the facts that have been analysed, recommendations of how real estate developers can react to the changes in financing that lie ahead are given.

This study aims to render a fundamental assessment of the Basel II internal ratings-based (IRB) approach by taking readings of the Australian banking sector since the implementation of Basel II and comparing them with signals from macroeconomic indicators, financial statistics and external credit ratings. The IRB approach to capital adequacy for credit risk, which implements an asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) model, plays an important role in protecting the Australian banking sector against insolvency.

Realisations of the single systematic risk factor, interpreted as describing the prevailing state of the Australian economy, are recovered from the ASRF model and compared with macroeconomic indicators. Similarly, estimates of distance-to-default, reflecting the capacity of the Australian banking sector to absorb credit losses, are recovered from the ASRF model and compared with financial statistics and external credit ratings. With the implementation of Basel II preceding the time when the effect of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was most acutely felt, the authors measure the impact of the crisis on the Australian banking sector.

Measurements from the ASRF model find general agreement with signals from macroeconomic indicators, financial statistics and external credit ratings. This leads to a favourable assessment of the ASRF model for the purposes of capital allocation, performance attribution and risk monitoring. The empirical analysis used in this paper reveals that the recent crisis imparted a mild stress on the Australian banking sector.

Given the range of economic conditions, from mild contraction to moderate expansion, experienced in Australia since the implementation of Basel II, the authors cannot attest to the validity of the model specification of the IRB approach for its intended purpose of solvency assessment.

Access to internal bank data collected by the prudential regulator distinguishes this paper from other empirical studies on the IRB approach and financial crisis of 2007-2009. The authors are not the first to attempt to measure the effects of the recent crisis, but they believe that they are the first to do so using regulatory data.

The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach provides more effective risk discrimination than the standardized approach when calculating regulatory capital for retail credit risk exposures.

The author uses four retail credit data sets to compare regulatory capital appropriation using the IRB approach and the standardized approach. The author follows the regulatory capital calculation method recommended under Basel III. For the IRB approach, the author uses a logistic regression to determine the probability of default.

The results suggest that the IRB approach provides more effective risk discrimination across individual exposures, which allows more regulatory capital to be held against riskier exposures and less regulatory capital to be held against less risky exposures. The author further argues that the Basel III output floor, as presently constructed, may disincentivize the use of the IRB approach and further diminish the value of secured lending under the IRB approach. To address this issue, the author offers two simple adjustments to the current design of the output floor.

While studies have argued the idea of risk-sensitive regulatory capital, the author has not observed any research that empirically compares the risk-sensitivity of regulatory capital across retail credit exposures, which makes up a significant portion of many banks’ credit exposures. This study also highlights what appears to be a major point of concern for the output floor, which is set to be phased in starting January 2022. This is of particular value because this point has not appeared to receive any attention in the literature thus far.

This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the gradual evolution of the supervisory policy adopted by the Basel Committee for the regulatory treatment of asset securitisation. The pathology of the new “securitisation framework” is carefully highlighted to facilitate a general understanding of what constitutes the current state of computing adequate capital requirements for securitised credit exposures. Although a simplified sensitivity analysis of the varying levels of capital charges depending on the security design of asset securitisation transactions is incorporated, the author does not engage in a profound analysis of the benefits and drawbacks implicated in the new securitisation framework.

This paper forms part of a presentation on the same subject given by the author to the Basel II conference organised by the Securities Institute in London during March 2004. It is a case study based on the author’s experience in Barclays Bank on the preparations required for successful implementation of the new Basel II Accord. First it considers changes to regulatory capital, and then goes on to examine the main challenges that lie ahead and, finally, the advantages and disadvantages of adopting one of the internal ratings‐based approaches. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the Barclays Group.

This analysis asks whether regulatory capital requirements capture differences in systematic risk for large firms and micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs). The authors explore whether bank capital regulations intended to support SMEs’ access to borrowing are effective. The purpose of this paper is to find out whether the regulatory design (particularly the estimate of asset correlations) positively affects the lending process to small and medium enterprises, compared to large corporates.

The authors investigate the appropriateness of bank capital requirements considering default risk of loans to MSMEs and distortions in capital charges between MSMEs and large firms under the Basel III framework. The authors compiled firm-level data to capture the proportions of MSMEs and large firms in Italy during 2000–2014. The data set is drawn from financial reports of 708,041 firms over 15 years. Unlike most empirical studies that correlate assets and defaults, this study assesses a firm’s creditworthiness not by agency ratings or by sampling banks but by a specific model to estimate one-year probabilities of default.

The authors found that asset correlations increase with firms’ size and that large firms face considerably greater systematic risk than MSMEs. However, the empirical values are much lower than regulatory values. Moreover, when the authors focused on the MSME segment, systematic risk is rather stable and varies significantly with turnover. This analysis showed that the regulatory supporting factor represents a valuable attempt to treat MSME loans more fairly with respect to banks’ capital requirements. Basel III-internal ratings-based approach results show that when the supporting factor is applied, the Risk-Weighted-Assets (RWA) differences between MSMEs and large firms increase.

The implications of this research is that banking regulators to make MSMEs support more effective should review asset correlation estimation criteria, refining the fitting with empirical evidence.

The asset correlation parameter stipulated by the Basel framework is invariant with economic cycles, decreases with borrowers’ probability of default and increases with borrowers’ assets. The authors found that those relations do not hold. This way, asset correlations fall below parameters defined by regulatory formula, and SMEs’ credit risk could be overstated, resulting in a capital crunch.

The original contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that the gap between empirical and regulatory capital charge remains high. When the authors examined the Basel III-IRBA, results showed that when the supporting factor is applied, the RWA differences between MSMEs and large firms increase. This is particularly strong for loans to small- and medium-sized companies. Correctly calibrating asset correlations associated with the supporting factor eliminates regulatory distortions, reducing the gap in capital charges between loans to large corporate and MSMEs.

Estimation of default and asset correlation is crucial for banks to manage and measure portfolio credit risk. The purpose of this paper is to find empirical relationship between the default and asset correlation with default probability, to understand the effect of systematic risk.

The authors have estimated single default and implicit asset correlations for banks and corporates in India and compare it with global scenario. This paper deduces a simple methodology to estimate the default correlations from the variance of temporal default rates. Next, the asset correlations have been estimated analytically by decomposition of variance equation in Merton's one factor risk model following approaches of Gordy and of Bluhm and Overbeck.

The authors empirically find a negative relationship between asset correlation and the probability of default using Moody's global corporate data that support Basel II internal ratings‐based (IRB) correlation prescription. However, they do not find any smooth relationship between the probability of default (PD) and asset correlation for Indian corporate. The magnitude of correlation estimates based on a large bank's internal rating‐wise default rates are much lower than what is prescribed by the Basel committee. Thus, the standardized correlation figures as assumed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision need to be properly calibrated by the local regulators before prescribing their banks to calculate IRB risk weighted assets.

These correlation estimates will help the regulators, insurance firms and banks to understand the linkage between counterparty default risks with the systematic factors. The findings of this paper could be used further in estimating portfolio economic capital for large corporate exposures of banks and insurance companies.

The Basel Committee has proposed a new capital framework to respond to the deficiencies of the 1988 Capital Accord (Basel I). The 1988 Accord has been criticised for its crude assessment of risk and for creating opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. In principle, the new approach, often referred to as Basel II, is not intended to raise or lower the overall level of regulatory capital currently held by banks, but to make it more risk sensitive. The spirit of the new Accord is to encourage the use of internal systems for measuring risks and allocating capital (the Accord extends the use of internal models from market risk to credit risk). A number of issues have been raised, however, with regard to its complexity, its cost, its impact on procyclicality, the possibility that it can lead to competitive distortions if some countries do not apply it (some big emerging economies) or apply it differently to small and big institutions (the USA) and others. Banks in Europe will also be obliged to comply with the new Capital Directive, often referred to as CAD III, which is the means by which the EU will implement the new Basel Capital Accord. CAD III will apply to all credit institutions and investment firms and not only to internationally active banks, as Basel does. This paper presents a critical approach to these developments and examines their impact upon the banking industry.

This chapter reassesses the economics of interest rate risk management in light of the global financial crisis by developing a derivative-based integrated treatment of interest rate and credit risk interrelation. The decade-long historical data on credit default swap spreads and interest rate swap rates are used as proxy measures for credit risk and interest rate risk, respectively. An elasticity of interest rate risk and credit risk, considered a function of the business cycle phases, maturity of instruments, economic sector, creditworthiness, and other macroeconomic parameters, is investigated for optimizing economic capital. This chapter sheds light on how financial institutions may address hedge strategies against downside risks implementing the proposed derivative-based integrated treatment of interest rate and credit risk assessment allowing for optimization of interest rate swap contracts. The developed framework of integrated interest rate and credit risk management is of special importance for emerging markets heavily dependent on foreign capital as it potentially allows emerging market banks to improve risk management practices in terms of capital adequacy and Basel III rules. Analyzing diversification versus compounding effects, it allows enhancing financial stability through jointly optimizing Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 economic capital.