Search results

Those charged and authorized with the acquisition and usage of all types of public resources are responsible for obtaining, using, accounting for, reporting resources in an effective, economical, efficient and legal way, and taking the necessary precautions to prevent their misusage. They have to report to the offices that are authorized regarding these issues. In this context, overpayment and undue payments made by public administrations become significant in terms of using public resources in an effective, economical, efficient, and legal way. One of the confusing issues for public institutions regarding salaries and similar payments to civil servants is on which legislation provisions should collection of salaries, additional course, severance, additional payment and similar payments should be collected in terms of overpayment and undue payments made for civil servants. In practice, most institutions interpret overpayments and undue payments to civil servants as public loss, and they carry out collection operations within the framework of the provisions of the Directive on Collection of Public Loss.

Overpayment and undue payment refer to all forms of payments that are determined to be excessively or improperly made by an institution to employers, insurance holders, voluntary insurance holders, those who receive income or monthly payment, beneficiaries of these, holders of general health insurance and their dependents. An institution might provide more payment to a civil servant than they deserve due to reasons originating from the civil servant themselves or the administration. The purpose of this study is to explain in detail what overpayment and undue payment are and describe operations regarding collection of overpayments and undue payments, calculation of interest to be applied on these and accounting for it by providing examples.

This paper aims to examine how firms react to the loss of a major government contract. Reactions to contract loss are yet to be properly studied in public procurement.

The hypothesis is that contract loss triggers a five-stage grieving process, as predicted by the Kubler-Ross model. The hypothesis is tested using the recent UK passport contract in which the British supplier, De La Rue, lost to the Franco-Dutch supplier, Gemalto. Secondary data from corporate publications, news reporting, parliamentary debates and trade union press releases is used to compile the case.

The findings show that De La Rue and its supporters passed through the five stages of grief in response to their loss. De La Rue initially exhibited denial by vowing to appeal the decision. Next came anger directed at the UK Government. An attempt to bargain was made during the standstill period. Depression set in after De La Rue admitted it would not appeal. Finally, acceptance was indicated by De La Rue pursuing new opportunities in the product authentication market.

The study is based on a single case. Further case research is warranted to test the external validity of the results.

By debriefing unsuccessful bidders and listening to their viewpoint, public buyers can help to assuage the anger that accompanies contract loss.

Elected representatives, the media and civic society groups have vested interests in the outcome of contract competitions. Moreover, they use their agency in pursuit of their own interests, whether through political bargaining, lobbying or editorials.

The paper demonstrates that the Kubler-Ross model of grieving has utility for understanding reactions to loss in a public procurement context.

The paper aims to elucidate effective strategies for promoting the adoption of green technology innovation within the private sector, thereby enhancing the value of public–private partnership (PPP) projects during the operational phase.

Utilizing prospect theory, the paper considers the government and the public as external driving forces. It establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of government regulators, the private sector and the public. The paper uses numerical simulations to explore the evolutionary stable equilibrium strategies and the determinants influencing each stakeholder.

The paper demonstrates that government intervention and public participation substantially promote green technology innovation within the private sector. Major influencing factors encompass the intensity of pollution taxation, governmental information disclosure and public attention. However, an optimal threshold exists for environmental publicity and innovation subsidies, as excessive levels might inhibit technological innovation. Furthermore, within government intervention strategies, compensating the public for their participation costs is essential to circumvent the public's “free-rider” tendencies and encourage active public collaboration in PPP project innovation.

By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model, the paper comprehensively examines the roles of government intervention and public participation in promoting green technology innovation within the private sector, offering fresh perspectives and strategies for the operational phase of PPP projects.

The time period from the mid-1980s through 2002 is described in this series of research as a “pre-SOX” era of rapid deprofessionalization in U.S. pubic accountancy resulting in the loss of professional status. This was a period, however, when all professions were suffering some deprofessionalization. During the pre-SOX period it appears that leadership in public accountancy responded to a nearly perfect storm of changes confronting the profession with a corporate mentality of management by objectives, commercialization, and profit maximization resulting in constant and substantial net deprofessionalization greater than that of other professions. Starting in the late-1970s and continuing through 2001, some critics of public accountancy have asserted that leaders in the profession either lost or forgot what was required for public accountancy to be recognized as a profession. The conclusion stated in this paper is that public accountancy has lost its professional status in or before 2002. The reasons and events leading to this conclusion are presented and discussed. In the United States it appears as though once professional status is lost, regaining the elite status is more difficult. The question is if public accountancy can learn from history going into the substantial changes to be confronted in the post-SOX era of public accountancy and regain or at least make progress toward regaining professional status.

In his review of 30 years of research in Prospect Theory, Barberis (2013) notes that support for Prospect Theory had come mainly from the laboratory. In this paper, I write about a recurring phenomenon in real life that is consistent with Prospect Theory predictions in decision-making loss domain. The 60 cases noted in this paper are associated with specific risk seekers that had cost more than $140 billion (an average of $2.33 billion per case). Given space consider– ations, I provide synopses for 14 cases. A few of these cases have been discussed in the extant literature in connection with internal control, but were not considered from the perspective of Prospect Theory. It is striking that these cases are costly, all participants are young men, and almost all had followed the gambler’s martingale strategy – i.e., double down. While these cases are informative about risk-seeking behavior, they are not sufficiently systematic to be subjected to stylized archival research methods.

The recent financial crisis provides an opportunity to examine the management of local government investment pools (LGIPs). This study examines asset concentration of current LGIPs to find if investment practices of LGIPs are consistent with the objective of prudent management of public funds. Using cross-sectional data of 72 LGIP portfolios, exploratory factor analysis was conducted. Findings suggest that there are five underlying factors that describe the investment practices of current LGIP portfolios. The findings also suggest that LGIP investment managers considered return on investment when they chose investment instruments. However, LGIP managers put more focus on the safety of investment when they allocated assets in their portfolio.

The operation of water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP) is crucial to the project effectiveness. However, there are often problems in projects that attach importance to construction and neglect operation management, which seriously affect the project operation effect. To ensure the good operation effect of the WETP-PPP, an evolutionary game model of the regulation strategy during the operation period of WETP-PPP is constructed.

An evolutionary game model of regulation is established which considers the government, the project company and the public in water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP). Five scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. Finally, through the simulation, the influence of different factors on the choice of the three-party strategy is analyzed.

First, the key factors that affect the evolution game are the regulation costs and performance rewards of the government, the project company's operation costs and penalties for opportunism and the public supervision costs and rewards. Second, in order to ensure the operation effect, the government needs the performance incentive from the superior government. Third, the public's supervision enthusiasm needs to be mobilized by the government. Last, the penalty strength of speculative operation should be strong enough to play a deterrent role.

The theoretical research in this paper has some limitations. Initially, due to the large number of participants in WETP-PPP, in addition to the government department, the project company and the public studied in this paper, it also involves the consulting industry and financial institutions. In the future, more participants can be added to form four-party interest relationships and conduct four-party evolutionary game research. Second, the operation environment of WETP-PPP is complex and changeable, and various influencing factors are intertwined, the number of parameters involved in this paper is limited, and further detailed research is needed in the future.

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this article discusses the evolution law of the tripartite game behavior of the government department, the project company and the public, which is helpful to clarify the strategy evolution path of the tripartite in the WETP-PPP, and the generation condition and evolution mechanism of the equilibrium strategy of the tripartite game. The key parameters affecting the tripartite strategy selection are analyzed through simulation, which can provide reference for the government department to formulate relevant measures. At the same time, it broadens the application field of evolutionary games and supplements the research on the management mechanism of WETP-PPP during the operation period.

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper introduces the supervision behavior of the public, which can provide a new perspective for researchers to conduct relevant research. Secondly, for the regulation during the operation of WETP-PPP, this paper can provide reference for the government department to establish a scientific public supervision system, improve the government supervision mechanism and other relevant measures, which can help promote the public supervision willingness, improve the regulation efficiency of the government and guide the project company to reduce speculation, so as to ensure the effect of water environment management.

This paper focuses on the regulation of WETP-PPP during the operation period to research interactions among the government, the project company and the public. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, some suggestions are put forward, such as perfecting the government regulation mechanism, optimizing the reward and punishment system for the project company and broadening the channels of public supervision. The research results of this paper can provide support for the government's regulation of WETP-PPP and ensure the project operation effect.

This study aims to explore how the implementation of the recapitalisation by the Bank of Ghana disrupted the indigenous banks’ sources of accessing capital to raise the required amount within the mandatory stipulated time/deadline.

This study used purposive sampling techniques to interview key role players and senior members involved in the bank’s recapitalisation process and/or have in-depth information on the 2017–2018 recapitalisation period.

This study revealed that government directives significantly shape banks regulations and strategy; accordingly, any state-directed policies must be communicated cautiously, well explained and implemented to reduce any negative consequences.

This study makes a significant contribution to knowledge by exploring how directives (arbitrary) of regulatory bodies can influence the business as well as its other stakeholders (such as the depositors, public, among others). Secondly, the study highlights how the delays in government support may not derive the benefits expected by the regulator.

As public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become more widespread, doubts and criticisms about this type of infrastructural projects have emerged. The authors describe the PPP framework, discuss the financial structure and risk-sharing processes, and dissect the structure and organisation. The authors address the following questions: what are the main organisational characteristics of PPPs? How does the private sector structure and finance PPPs? And why and how are PPP contracts renegotiated? The paper aims to discuss these issues.

This paper draws on extensive theoretical and empirical research, which is presented in a literature overview on PPPs and their renegotiations. A comprehensive review is carried out and two case studies are developed to investigate the reasons behind success and failure of PPPs and the renegotiation of contracts.

Incomplete contracts and the long duration of concessions can bring uncertainty and change to PPPs. Joint decision making can be difficult due to different parties involved. Renegotiation outcomes tend to rely on the position of the government. In Fertagus, the private sector asked for financial help led to a very balanced agreement. Conversely, Lusoponte renegotiations were initiated by the government, which significantly changed the project. Instead of relying solely on commercial revenues, Lusoponte was substantial financed by public funds.

Incomplete contracts and the long duration of concessions bring about much uncertainty to PPPs. Ex post decision making in PPPs in the wake of changing risks is difficult as it necessarily involves negotiations between the public sector and the private firm. The paper shows that marked differences in renegotiation outcomes emerge. In one case study, the private sector asked for financial help and the negotiation outcome was a very balanced agreement. Conversely, renegotiations in a second case were initiated by the government mainly for political reasons, resulted in a significant change in the PPP’s structure, risk, financing, and returns, and yielded a large public losses.

Contrasting successful and unsuccessful PPPs enables the reader to examine the opportunities and pitfalls in case of PPP renegotiations, which frequently occur. He can gain insight in the determinants of negotiation outcomes and the importance of a governmental PPP entity as well as of an independent monitor such as a court of audits.

This paper should be useful for both academics and practitioners and should help increase the understanding of the several stages, structures, and renegotiation processes associated with PPPs.