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This chapter provides a legal and theoretical overview of environmental PPMs articulated in private standards. It seeks to expand the debate about environmental PPMs, elucidating important dimensions to the issue from the perspective of global governance and international trade law. One of the arguments advanced in this chapter is that a comprehensive analysis of environmental PPMs should consider not only their role in what is regarded as trade barriers (governmental and market driven) but also their significance in global objectives such as the transition towards a green economy and sustainable patterns of consumption and production.

This chapter is based on an extensive literature review and doctrinal legal research.

This research shows that environmental PPMs represent a key issue in the context of the trade and environment relationship. For decades such measures have been thought of as being trade distortive and thus incompatible with WTO law. Although it seems clear now that they are not unlawful per se, their legal status remains unsettled. PPMs can be regarded as regulatory choices associated with a wide range of environmental concerns. However, in trade disputes, challenged measures involving policy objectives addressing production issues in the conservation of natural resources tend to focus on fishing/harvesting techniques. On the other hand, an important goal of Global Environmental Governance (GEG) is to incentivise sustainable consumption and production in order to achieve the transition to a green economy. In this sense, it can be argued that what are generally denominated as ‘PPMs’ in the WTO terminology can alternatively be regarded ‘SCPs’ in the language of environmental governance. Environmental PPMs are not only limited to state-based measures, such as import bans, tariff preferences, and governmental labelling schemes. Environmental PPMs may also amount to good corporate practices towards environmental protection and provide the rationale for numerous private environmental standards.

Most academic attention afforded to environmental-PPMs has focused on their impacts on trade or their legality under WTO law. Although legal scholars have already referred to the significance of such measures in the context of environmental governance, this issue has remained almost entirely unexplored. This chapter seeks to fill the gap in the literature in this regard. In particular, it addresses the relevance of environmental PPMs in the context of decentralised governance initiatives such as the UN Global Compact and private environmental standards.

Overall, this chapter assists in the understanding of the significance of environmental PPMs in the context of private environmental standards and other governance initiatives involving goals related to sustainable consumption and production. This chapter adds to the existing body of literature on the subject of PPMs in international trade and environmental governance.

The paper attempts to empirically examine the difference in the foreign direct investment (FDI) – private investment relationship between developed and developing countries over the period 2000–2013.

The paper uses the two-step GMM Arellano-Bond estimators (both system and difference) for a group of 25 developed countries and a group of 72 developing ones. Then, the PMG estimator is employed to check the robustness of estimates.

First, there is a clear difference in the FDI – private investment relationship between developed countries and developing ones. Second, governance environment, economic growth and trade openness stimulate private investment. Third, the effect of tax revenue on private investment in developed countries is completely opposite to that in developing ones.

The paper is the first to provide empirical evidence to confirm the dependence of FDI – private investment relationship on governance environment. In fact, contrary to the view (arguments) in Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol (2012), the paper indicates that FDI crowds out private investment in developed countries (good governance environment), but crowds in developing countries (poor governance environment).

Explores the central role that private information on corporate intangibles plays in the private corporate governance role of financial institutions (FIs). The institutional fund managers’ (FMs) private understanding of many qualitative or intellectual capital factors driving corporate performance was the basis for wide‐ranging corporate governance influence concerning financial performance and conventional Cadbury‐style corporate governance issues. This was primarily a private, implicit corporate governance process by FIs and their FMs during good corporate performance. Also reveals how the nature of FM corporate governance influence became more interventionist with adverse changes in corporate performance factors, in FI‐side influence factors and in environmental circumstances. The qualitative intangible factors, especially board and top management qualities, were central to this more proactive form of intervention. Finally, discusses the case results within the research literature on the corporate governance role of FIs, identifies new directions for research and discusses policy implications briefly.

Due to scarcity of research in governance and accountability in private higher education in developing countries, the purpose of this paper is to explore the tensions surrounding good governance in legitimizing accountability in private universities in developing countries with reference to Bangladesh.

Mixed methods are employed: a quantitative survey of 1,576 students from all 79 private universities; qualitative interviews with 23 stakeholders; and policy documents including the Private University Acts, the World Bank Report and newspapers (1992-2015) were evaluated. The objectives of these mixed methods in this study are juxtaposed and generate complementary insights that together create a bigger picture surrounding governance and accountability issues.

Using Clark's (1983) triangle model (i.e. state control, academic oligarchy, and market forces together with the external influence of donors and boards of trustees as internal governance) and new institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), the major contributions of this study are explaining the root causes of the poor governance of private universities through three related factors: the substantial political power and autonomy held by boards of trustees; a lack of enforcement of Private University Act; and a lack of coordination among stakeholders. The coercive power of the state becomes powerless since the board of trustees ultimately enjoys political power and “does whatever it can.” The lack of coordination of the academic oligarchy (e.g. professors and academics) and market forces (represented by students) by the board of trustees creates a paradox of governance and hence a decoupling of formal policies and actual practice.

The findings have major policy implications for local and international policymakers for improving good governance in private universities in developing countries.

The novelty of the study's findings represents an initial effort to understand the complex and persistent phenomenon of prolonged poor governance of private universities in developing countries, which is largely neglected in the literature. This will undoubtedly contribute to literature and policy implications.

Developing economies that are subject to global influences, such as through exposure to global product, labor and capital markets, may be expected to practice higher standards of corporate governance (CG) than less globalized developing economies. This paper seeks to understand the relationship between CG and firm ownership by private equity investors in India, and to understand whether CG practices in particular national institutional contexts change when the firm is exposed to investors with a background in other countries' institutional contexts. Taking India as a test case, the paper aims to explore how CG standards are affected by private equity investment that originates from developed countries.

A primary survey on Indian firms' CG practices for firms that receive private equity and for comparable firms that do not was used to determine differences in CG. Private equity investors were surveyed to determine their national institutional contexts. The CG practices were then related to the national institutional context that the private equity investors came from.

Private‐equity funded firms display higher standards of corporate governance than firms that do not receive such funding. The difference arises from the application of developed country standards of CG arising from the investors that own the private equity funds. These funds are primarily owned by developed country investors. The strategies through which these occur are: reconstituting the board of directors, influencing senior executive recruitment, and changing the firm's operating and strategic rules.

Developing countries like India usually display low standards of CG. Such standards tend to evolve slowly in line with the country's stage of development. The literature has not hitherto identified ways in which this process can be hastened. This study finds that standards can be raised above the prevailing standards through the governance practices imported into developing countries by private equity funds that are primarily owned by developed country investors. Hence, the findings of this paper contribute to the understanding of how globalization influences CG.

Contemporary organisational landscapes offer opportunities for hybrids to thrive. Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are one thriving hybrid form incorporating the use of resources and/or structures from both public and private sectors. The study examines the impact of such a hybrid structure on governance and accountability mechanisms in a context of institutional complexity.

This study uses an approach that draws on institutional logics and hybridity to examine governance arrangements in the PPP policy created for the delivery of UK schools. Unusually, it employs a comparative case study of how four local governments implemented the policy. It draws on a framework developed by Polzer et al. (2017) to examine the level of engagement between multiple logics and hybrid structures and applies this to the delivery of governance and accountability for public money.

The Polzer et al. framework enables a study of how the nature of hybrids can vary in terms of their governance, ownership and control relations. The findings show how the relationships between levels of engagement of multiple logics and hybrid structures can impact on governance and accountability for public money. Layering and blending combinations led to increased adoption of private sector accountability structures, whilst a hybrid with parallel co-existence of community and market logics delivered a long-term governance structure.

The paper examines the operation of hybrids in a complex education PPP environment in only four local governments and therefore cannot provide representative answers across the population as a whole. However, given the considerable variation found across the four examples, the paper shows there can be significant differentiation in how multiple logics engage at different levels and in varying combinations even in the same hybrid setting. The paper focuses on capital investment implementation and its evaluation, so it is a limitation that the operational stage of PPP projects is not studied.

The findings have political relevance because the two local government bodies with more robust combinations of multiple logics were more successful in getting funds and delivering schools in their geographical areas.

The study extends Polzer et al.'s (2017) research on hybridity by showing that there can be significant differentiation in how multiple logics engage at different levels and in varying combinations even in what was planned to be the same hybrid setting. It shows how in situations of institutional complexity certain combinations of logics lead to differentiation in governance and accountability, creating fragmented focus on the related public accountability structures. This matters because it becomes harder to hold government to account for public spending.

The aim of this paper is to explain the organizational changes along supply chains when a geographical brand, i.e. a place name that has value for commercial purposes, becomes a geographical indication (GI).

Using a case study research design, this paper compares GI vs non-GI supply chains in the European Union and describes the organizational changes that occur in supply chains when a GI is adopted.

When a GI is adopted, an additional “public” level of governance is added along the supply chain that forces it to reallocate and specialize quality controls between the public and private levels of governance to avoid redundancies and to adopt more market-oriented mechanisms of governance in dyadic relationships. The paper argues that these changes occur because the private and public levels of governance complement one another.

More aspects of supply chain management (the power balance or relationship stability) and a more systematic longitudinal analysis using supply chains in various agrifood industries should be considered to generalize the conclusions. An econometric analysis formally testing the main conclusions (propositions) is also required.

The changes needed to successfully adopt a GI are identified, and an explanatory map of these changes is offered.

The structural governance tensions created by the use of common-pool resources within supply chains are explored. It is hypothesized, first, that when a “common-pool resource”, namely, a geographical name, is used in a supply chain, some type of public level of governance that promotes cooperation is required to preserve its value. Second, this public level of governance complements the dyadic mechanisms of governance, requiring the specialization and reallocation of quality controls and the move toward more market-oriented transactions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the legitimacy of the Equator Principles as a form of private governance of the investment banking industry.

The project finance industry is first described, followed by a consideration of the theories of private governance and legitimacy. The governance of project finance by the Equator Principles is then examined against the backdrop of private governance and legitimacy theory. Cases regarding project finance and the Equator Principles are discussed.

The moral legitimacy of the governance of the Equator Principles is highly questionable, a serious issue for private governance schemes. There are large gaps in the governance structure, and the processes and content of much of the Principles are left to each bank, with little mandated transparency or accountability, particularly at the level of individual deals.

The Equator Principles have legitimacy problems arising from their governance structure. These issues are examined at some length, and specific suggestions are offered for repairing certain of the flaws in the system.

Private governance is increasingly important in international arenas, attempting to enforce standards that individual governments often leave to the private sector. This paper examines the legitimacy and governance issues in one system, and makes recommendations to increase the value and structure of the Equator Principles.

This paper seeks to provide an overview and context for the emerging field of public policies for scaling voluntary standards, or private regulations, on the social and environmental performance of business and finance, to promote sustainable development; in order to stimulate more innovation and research in this field.

The paper takes the approach of a literature review of texts from intergovernmental and non‐governmental organisations, to develop a synthesis of issues, before literature review from management studies, development studies and international relations, to revise the synthesis and identify policy relevant future research.

Governance at all levels but particularly the international level involves corporations and their stakeholders. Together they have created non‐statutory corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards which now influence significant amounts of international trade and investment, thereby presenting new benefits, risks and challenges for sustainable development. Governments around the world are now innovating public policies on these standards, which can be categorised to inform policy development: governments prepare, prefer, promote and prescribe CSR standards. Therefore, a new dimension to collaborative governance is emerging and would benefit from research and technical assistance. As concepts and practices of regulation and governance are moving beyond state versus non‐state, mandatory versus voluntary approaches, so issues about transparency, accountability and democratic participation remain important for any new manifestation of regulation or governance.

By contextualising public policy innovations on CSR standards within new theories of governance, including “private regulation” and “collaborative governance”, the paper helps to clarify a new agenda for policy making and related research.

In the era of financial capitalism, how to manage and hold global corporations accountable has become too multifarious a topic for a solitary focus of one theme, to sufficiently outline the whole gamut and implications of their activities. Capitalism is characterized by several well-organized antinomies and contrasts, with reflections of critical dualities that bear a resemblance to the primeval paradoxes of Hellenic philosophy. The challenge of governance of capitalism to be effectual entails breaking out of the entrenched precincts of habitual academic silos. Various standpoints while reasonably informative falls short to explain fully the complex interlinkages between the concept of global governance and the state’s capacity to put into effect its will on corporate power.

Spotlighting on assessing the praxis of political economy at global and national level and the corporate reality, this chapter aims to provide a renewed thrust for the focused recalibration of global regulatory regime. In this chapter, the inquiries take the regulation as the main explanandum for elucidation of the shifting governance framework.