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Some of the best information for preventing accounting violations is received from employees who have observed the unethical behavior (Henning, 2016). However, receiving information about accounting violations or other unethical behavior in organizations requires employees to voluntarily report the behavior. Employees may be particularly hesitant to report unethical behavior when the behavior benefits them. Employees may also justify their own unethical behavior as morally appropriate when their moral identity allows the behavior. The authors draw on psychology and ethics literature to examine the relationships among moral identity, moral disengagement, and unethical behavior. In the exploration of behavior, the authors examine both commissions and omissions. While unethical commissions are violations directly committed by an individual without cooperation from others, unethical omissions are violations resulting from an individual failing to take steps necessary to correct another's unethical behavior.

The authors conduct a survey about cheating with a sample of college students. Using structural equation modeling, the authors find that intentions to engage in unethical commissions are positively associated with moral disengagement, while unethical omissions do not appear to create the moral disengagement that can arise from cognitive dissonance. The authors also find a feedback loop from moral disengagement to future intentions, which suggests moral disengagement created from one unethical act increases intentions for future unethical behavior. Finally, the authors find a simple intervention that can help to increase the moral intensity of observed unethical behavior.

In this paper, the moderating roles of leader reward omission and person–supervisor fit in the relationship between job autonomy and knowledge hiding are investigated.

Using a sample of 248 employees in a two-wave survey, we performed a hierarchical regression analysis to test the hypotheses.

The results revealed that employees with high job autonomy were less likely to engage in knowledge hiding. Moreover, when employees experienced leader reward omission, the negative relationship between job autonomy and knowledge hiding was weakened, and this interesting effect varied by person–supervisor fit.

This study does not explore the mediating mechanism by which job autonomy affects employee knowledge hiding. Moreover, as this research was conducted in a Chinese context, the generalizability of our findings is unclear.

This research has fulfilled its practical aims by providing advice on knowledge-relevant job characteristic factors that can be used to stage interventions regarding the provision of autonomy in jobs, and by carefully considering how to create interdependence between jobs without pushing people to engage in knowledge-hiding behaviors. Furthermore, it is important for leaders to help employees identify work goals and directions and not engage in reward omission.

This study contributes to theoretical advancements in the field of knowledge hiding by revealing boundary conditions that mitigate or enhance the impact of job autonomy on knowledge hiding.

Based on social dilemma theory, the authors analyze the impact of leader reward omission on employee knowledge sharing and the boundary conditions in their relationship.

This study tested the theoretical hypotheses based on empirical data obtained from 264 employees using a two-wave survey method.

The results indicate that leader reward omission significantly negatively affects employee knowledge sharing. An employee's proactive personality weakens the negative relationship between them; the weakening effects of an employee's proactive personality would decrease along with the perceived increase in organizational unfairness.

This study provides the first insight that leader reward omission can inhibit employee knowledge-sharing behavior. In addition, this study shows that an individual proactive personality and perceived organizational unfairness moderate the relationship between leader reward omission and employee knowledge behavior. Thus, this study provides a more comprehensive understanding of whether and when leader reward omission affects employee knowledge sharing.

For firms listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange, which is a relatively thinly traded market, the purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of stock returns associated with a dividend omission announcement when computations specifically address thin trading, and whether specific firm characteristics affect the likelihood and nature of a dividend omission.

First, event study analysis is used to check if dividend omissions actually do impact share prices in terms of short-term abnormal returns and longer-term cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in a thinly traded market. Second, binomial logistic regression analysis is used to determine what, if any, company characteristics are associated with the decision to omit a dividend. Third, multinomial logistic regression analysis is employed to determine what firm characteristics are associated with continuing (or ending) a phase of no dividends before a dividend resumption.

Dividend omissions generate immediate negative abnormal returns, and there is a longer-term persistence of negative CARs. The size and duration of these abnormal returns are smaller, but still significant, when thin-market-specific methodology is employed. With respect to firm characteristic, smaller firms, firms with decreased earnings, a higher level of extraordinary charges, greater leverage and firms with a higher book-to-market value are associated with a greater likelihood of making an omission. With respect to the length of time between an omission and resumption of dividend payments, earnings decreases, a higher book-to-market value, a higher level of extraordinary charges and a decrease in firm debt level become significant.

This paper adds value in two dimensions. First, it considers dividend omissions in three different, but inter-connected ways. Second, the use of multinomial logistic regression to examine an aspect of the non-payment hiatus breaks new ground.

This research uses identity theory to examine the individual variability in moral behavior for acts of commission (committing a bad act) and omission (failing to do a good act). Most research using identity theory has examined behavior in the active sense as in doing something while neglecting behavior in the passive sense as in not doing something. Doing something may carry more information as to who one is than not doing something. Thus, behavior in the active sense may be more likely to implicate the self and thus activate the identity process than behavior in the passive sense. I investigate this by placing individuals in the moral dilemma of a testing situation in which they have the opportunity to cheat (an act of commission) (Condition 1) or not report that they were over-scored on a test (an act of omission) (Condition 2). Participants' moral identities and emotions are obtained. The results reveal that the identity process helps explain moral behavior and emotions for an act of commission but not an act of omission. The results suggest that compared to an omitted act, a committed act generates more cognitive processing as to who one is thereby activating the identity process. Furthermore, in omission, individuals may not see themselves as responsible for an outcome, thus failing to frame the situation in moral terms – as having done a bad thing.

This paper investigates the use of deception in two negotiation studies. Study 1 (N = 80) demonstrates that direct questions and solidarity curtail deception. Study 2 (N = 74 dyads) demonstrates that direct questions are particularly effective in curtailing lies of omission, but may actually increase the incidence of lies of commission. These findings highlight the importance of misrepresentation to the negotiation process and suggest approaches for contending with deception.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of the comply-or-explain principle in the Italian context. In particular, the analysis will evaluate, which factor impact on firms' voluntary adoption of this tool to adequate their non-financial reports to the legal requirements of Directive 95/2014/EU.

The methodology consists of two different levels of analysis. The first part is statistical descriptive, and it consists of a rhetorical analysis on the justifications provided by the firms about their omissions to comply with Directive 95/2014/EU. The second part is inferential and its aim is to evaluate, which factors impact on comply-or-explains adoption.

The findings reveal how the comply-or-explain application in Italy has been characterized by several criticisms. The result highlight how the justifications adopted by the firms is influenced by their sector of activity and omission's type. Moreover, the analysis suggests how the sector of activity and the level of adherence to global reporting initiative influenced the average number of omissions.

The limitations of the research are represented by the focuses on a single country and by the short period of analysis. In this sense, future research could be addressed to the analysis of countries different from Italy. Moreover, accounting scholars could provide further contributions to the political debate through the evolution of the “comply-or-explain” principle’s strategies over the years.

The practical implications connected to the present research are twofold. The first one is represented by the possibility for policymakers to increase the degree of attention about the use of comply-or-explain as legitimization's tool. The second one is represented by the possibility for practitioners to identify a new reporting framework.

The social implications are represented by the possibility for stakeholders to evaluate the reliability's degree of the disclosure produced by Italian public interest entities after the implementation of Directive 95/2014/EU.

Despite the growing attention paid by academics regard Directive 95/2014/EU, this is the first attempt to analyze the comply-or-explain from a rhetorical perspective.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the voluntary disclosure of risk-related issues, with a focus on credit risk, in graphical reporting for listed banks in the major European economies. It aims to understand if banks portray credit risk-related information in graphs accurately and whether these graphs provide incremental, rather than replicative, information. It also investigates whether credit risk-related graphs provide a fair representation of risk performance or a more favourable impression than is warranted.

A graphical accuracy index was constructed. Incremental information was measured. A multi-level linear model investigated whether credit risk affects the quantity and quality of graphical credit risk disclosure.

Banks used credit risk graphs to provide incremental information. They were also selective, with riskier banks less likely to use risk graphs. Banks were accurate in their graphical reporting, particularly those with high levels of credit risk. These findings can be explained within an impression management perspective taking human cognitive biases into account. Preparers of risk graphs seem to prefer selective omission over obfuscation via inaccuracy. This probably reflects the fact that individuals, and by implication annual report’s users, generally judge the provision of inaccurate information more harshly than the omission of unfavourable information.

This study provides theoretical insights by pointing out the limitations of a purely economics-based agency theory approach to impression management.

The study suggests annual reports’ readers need to be careful about subtle forms of impression management, such as those exploiting their cognitive bias. Regulatory and professional bodies should develop guidelines to ensure neutral and comparable graphical disclosure.

This study provides a substantive alternative to the predominant economic perspective on impression management in corporate reporting, by incorporating a psychological perspective taking human cognitive biases into account.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate Chinese stock market reaction to the announcements of dividend reductions and omissions.

The data sets cover the period from 1990 to 2009. A rolling portfolio approach is performed and the Fama–French three-factor model is used to calculate the post-announcement long-term abnormal returns. The matching method and the sub-sample tests are used to examine the robustness.

After controlling for firm size, the unexpected earnings and government ownership, no evidence of the dividend announcement drift is found. The results also show that the government ownership and the large trading play a role in explaining the post-announcement abnormal returns.

This is the first study concerning the Chinese market that examines the Chinese stock market reaction to dividend cut and omission using a long-time period of data.