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Some of the best information for preventing accounting violations is received from employees who have observed the unethical behavior (Henning, 2016). However, receiving information about accounting violations or other unethical behavior in organizations requires employees to voluntarily report the behavior. Employees may be particularly hesitant to report unethical behavior when the behavior benefits them. Employees may also justify their own unethical behavior as morally appropriate when their moral identity allows the behavior. The authors draw on psychology and ethics literature to examine the relationships among moral identity, moral disengagement, and unethical behavior. In the exploration of behavior, the authors examine both commissions and omissions. While unethical commissions are violations directly committed by an individual without cooperation from others, unethical omissions are violations resulting from an individual failing to take steps necessary to correct another's unethical behavior.

The authors conduct a survey about cheating with a sample of college students. Using structural equation modeling, the authors find that intentions to engage in unethical commissions are positively associated with moral disengagement, while unethical omissions do not appear to create the moral disengagement that can arise from cognitive dissonance. The authors also find a feedback loop from moral disengagement to future intentions, which suggests moral disengagement created from one unethical act increases intentions for future unethical behavior. Finally, the authors find a simple intervention that can help to increase the moral intensity of observed unethical behavior.

This study examines the effect of delegation of decision rights, moral justification (MJ), and ethical climate (EC) on managers’ misreporting in the financial services sector. We employed an online research panel called Qualtrics, to collect data based on a sample of 127 middle-level managers from various US financial services firms. We find that MJ mediates the relation between delegation and misreporting, suggesting delegation of decision rights increases employees’ misreporting indirectly by increasing MJ. We also find that EC significantly moderates the relationship between MJ and misreporting. Furthermore, our test of the moderated-mediation effect reveals that the indirect effect of the delegation of decision rights on misreporting through MJ is stronger when there is a higher level of instrumental climate (IC) and a lower level of principle climate (PC).

This paper seeks to emphasise the importance of firms being responsible to society.

The paper examines firms' omissions and commissions in the various functional areas of management while they focused on profit. Examples of such omissions and commissions are also discussed. Support from businessmen and authors who share such a viewpoint is mentioned

In the long term, firms that are socially responsible are successful.

Practising social responsibility consciously, firms can make the world a better place for all people. It can be beneficial for the entire society.

Omissions and commissions arising out of being profit‐focused are the author's original contribution. The paper is of value to researchers and practitioners of corporate social responsibility and business ethics. Firms need to understand that they cannot succeed and excel for long if they neglect stakeholders other than shareholders.

Corporate finance is under attack. Commentators mention that corporate managers have enriched themselves and shareholders, and in the process have failed to consider the interests of all stakeholders (Hennessy, 1989, Alkhafaji, 1989, Newton, 1989, Dunfee, 1989, Steidlmeier, 1989, Jones and Hunt, 1991). They cite the active corporate control market that produced hostile takeovers, leveraged buyouts, and corporate restructuring activity, all presumably causing a reduction in social welfare. This view is now beginning to permeate itself into the financial education debate. For example, Hawley (1991) suggests that financial educators are abdicating their responsibility of helping prepare corporate managers to recognize and deal with business ethics‐social responsibility effectively. Hawley proposes that the shareholder wealth maximization model for corporate management rationalizes the commission of unethical or socially irresponsible actions. Because of this ongoing criticism being levied against the practice of corporate finance, financial educators are now moving to incorporate ethics in the finance curricula. Although this move may be welcomed, we suggest that financial educators proceed with caution.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how some of the information and communication practices of the Tech Media and specifically of Facebook, constitute media corruption. The paper will examine what the professional role of Facebook is regarding its information/communication practices and then demonstrate that Facebook is essentially a media company and not merely a “platform,” therefore liable to the same normative responsibilities as other media companies.

Applying the dual obligation information theory (DOIT), a normative information and communication theory that applies generally to all media companies that disseminate and share information, the paper demonstrates that Facebook’s role of mediating and curating the information of its users places upon it a normative editing responsibility, to ensure both the preventive detection and corrective editing of fake news, as well as other forms of misinformation disseminated on its platform. Finally, applying a philosophical model of media corruption the paper will demonstrate that Facebook’s role in the Cambridge Analytica case was not only unethical but moreover, constituted media corruption.

The paper concludes that Facebook’s media corruption illustrated in the Cambridge Analytica case is not a one-off case but the result of a systemic and inherent conflict of interest between its business model of selling users’ information to advertisers and its normative media role rendering the conflict of interest between those two roles conducive to media corruption.

The paper's originality is twofold. It demonstrates that Facebook is a media company normatively accountable on the basis of an original theory the DOIT and moreover, on the basis of an original media corruption theory its actions in the Cambridge Analytica case constituted media corruption.

To attempt, or aim, to control money laundering by regulating those sectors which facilitate and therefore (wittingly or not) encourage and sustain its practice is rather to miss the point. The concentration on curing or solving the phenomenon of money laundering through regulation is, for two key reasons, ultimately self‐defeating.

This study examines the salesperson-driven unethical behavior toward consumers in the retail banking context.

Consumer posts on an online social platform were analyzed using content analysis. Cluster analysis and word association analyses were conducted to analyze the posts across ethics dimensions, customer intentions and banking services.

Complaints about salesperson-driven unethical behavior were classified into three clusters: disrespect, fee deception and other deception. Four themes of consumer intentions emerged from data: expecting an action regarding the staff, fixing the problem, exiting the bank, or just expressing the problem on the social platform. There was a significant difference among clusters in terms of intentions. The deception clusters had a stronger association with fixing the problem, while the disrespect cluster had a stronger association with consumers’ willingness to express their complaints and requests regarding corrective actions for the salespeople.

Banks must differentiate their service recovery approach depending on the problem. While a refund can be more appropriate for recovering deception, a corrective action regarding misbehaving sales staff is expected by the customers for the disrespect problem.

This study contributed to the need for current research on personal selling practices and salesperson ethics in banking services. The unethical sales practices were linked to customer intentions, and several associations were found. An unethical sales behavior framework that can be used in future research was represented.

Occasional, highly publicized examples of unethical behavior by executives of major businesses such as the unethical/illegal brokerage and financial reporting practices uncovered recently by New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's investigation of the insurance industry may be thought to have arisen from some rather unique set of ethical problems that differ significantly from the ethical dilemmas encountered daily by those working in the business. In reality, they did not. Instead, these highly publicized unethical activities on the part of leading brokerage firms and insurers are shown to be attributable to several of the same key ethical issues identified repeatedly by insurance professionals as presenting the greatest ethical challenges for those working in the insurance industry over the last decade and a half.