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This study aims to explore the interplay between market concentration and implicit tax burdens in Brazil, offering a fresh perspective on the conventional belief of perfect competition.

Data was sourced from Brazilian firms on the B3 stock exchange between 2011 and 2021. Multiple linear regression techniques were employed to analyze the relation of explicit tax rates to firms’ pre- and post-tax returns.

Dominant firms in the market tend to bear a lower implicit tax burden and have the capacity to extend tax incentive benefits to shareholders.

The findings highlight Brazil’s intricate corporate tax fabric, particularly regarding implicit taxes. They provide a foundation for deeper inquiries into how market dominance, taxation policies, and corporate strategies converge.

Regulators and business leaders can harness this knowledge to recalibrate tax strategies and market regulations. Specifically, a closer examination of the dynamics that permit reduced implicit tax implications in monopolized markets is essential for equity.

Companies with pronounced market concentration can mitigate their implicit tax burdens, potentially offloading them to consumers and suppliers. This points to potential inequities in current tax structures.

This research unveils nuanced insights into Brazil’s multifaceted interrelations between corporate influence, taxation strategies, and market forces.

We are the first to investigate the relationship between seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and anchoring on historical high prices in China.

We use the ratio of the recent closing price to its historical high in the previous 12–60 months (anchoring-high-price ratio) to study its impact on the market timing of SEOs.

Empirical results show that the anchoring-high-price ratio significantly and positively affects the probability of additional stock issuances. Contrary to the USA market, the Chinese stock market reacts negatively to the SEOs at historical highs. Moreover, the anchoring-high-price ratio exacerbates the negative effect of announcements and leads to long-term underperformance. Finally, we investigate the impact of the anchoring-high-price ratio on a company’s capital structure, showing that the additional issuance anchoring on historical highs reduces the company’s leverage ratio in the long run. Overall, our findings support the anchoring theory and can help understand better the anchoring behavior of managers and the company’s decision on additional stock issuances.

We are the first to use the anchoring-high-price ratio to study the timing of SEOs. We find that the anchoring-high-price ratio positively affects the probability of SEOs. Unlike the USA, the Chinese stock market reacts negatively to SEOs at high prices. SEOs anchoring on historical highs reduce a firm’s leverage ratio in the long run. Finally, our results support the anchoring theory.

Press reports have indicated that firms frequently underprice restricted stock and employee stock options. I test for underpricing of stock and options.

I examined a sample of 5,333 private firm stock and option issuances between 1985 and 2017. I tested for underpricing using two approaches: assuming investors have no special market-timing ability and assuming instead they have perfect market-timing ability.

I find evidence of widespread stock and option underpricing by private firms before they go public reflecting large discounts that exceed reasonable compensation for lack of marketability. Unreported underpricing is more frequent in the last pre-IPO private equity transactions that offer the last opportunity to give such discounts before the stock is publicly traded, but the discounts are greater in the earlier pre-IPO transactions where unreported discounts are presumably tougher for the SEC to detect. Underpricing is still detected even when the actual DLOMs are tested against a benchmark that assumes investors have perfect market-timing ability.

Firms frequently underprice restricted stock and employee stock options. Firms tend to underprice stock options more frequently than restricted stock, but restricted stock tends to be priced at deeper discounts when recipients are assumed not to have any special market-timing ability.

Private firms issue restricted stock and options as incentive compensation. Lowballing the valuation transfers wealth from outside stockholders to employees/insiders. Wealth transfers take place through the issuance of equity claims to employees/insiders before firms go public. I found that more than a quarter of the DLOMs exceed the theoretical maximum by, on average, between 16% (median) and 20% (mean). This finding raises two questions worthy of investigation. First, to what extent do the frequency and magnitude of DLOMs above the theoretical maximum depend on whether a board of directors obtains an independent appraisal of a stock’s fair market value? Second, if DLOMs above the theoretical maximum are observed even when the stock is independently appraised, how do appraisers justify such large DLOMs?

The wealth transfers that take place through the issuance of equity claims to employees/insiders before firms go public benefit employees/insiders at the expense of outside shareholders.

My paper is the first to furnish evidence of widespread stock and option underpricing by private firms before they go public; demonstrate that the unreported underpricing is more frequent in the last pre-IPO private equity transactions that offer the last opportunity to give such discounts before the stock is publicly traded and show that the discounts are greater in the earlier pre-IPO transactions where unreported discounts are presumably tougher for the SEC to detect.

Usually, a construction contract ends because the Parties have performed all their obligations thereunder but sometimes the need to terminate the contract arises before this. This need may have various reasons, e.g. one of the Parties goes into bankruptcy without the funds available for continuing the project, a substantial risk materialises to the detriment of the continuation of the project (e.g. substantial sub-surface issues, pollution etc.), other risks materialise, substantially increasing the cost of the project, or the Employer simply no longer has a need for the Works. The GC include provisions for the termination of the Contract before the Parties have fully performed all their obligations under the Contract; termination by the Employer is provided for in Clause 15 [Termination by Employer] and termination by the Contractor in Clause 16 [Suspension and Termination by Contractor]. Termination is an extreme remedy, regardless of who terminates the Contract. In all but a very few projects, a termination will cause both Parties to suffer substantial loss; not all such losses are recoverable from the defaulting Party. Thus, termination is a remedy that should be reserved for extreme cases. In addition, the right to terminate depends on an interpretation of the Contract provisions and the application of these provisions to the situation at hand, including whether a specific default is sufficiently severe to entitle the other Party to terminate. Because the consequences of a termination are serious, the applicable Laws usually require a serious (substantial) default before a Contract may be terminated. Furthermore, the procedures prescribed in the GC must be followed because a failure to comply with the relevant procedure may render a termination ineffective or invalid.

With the continuous deepening of China's mixed-ownership reform, the participants in the reform have gradually expanded from state-owned enterprises to private enterprises. Whether state-owned equity participation in private enterprises can facilitate the development of environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance in private enterprises is a question that needs urgent examination. This study aims to investigate the impact of state-owned equity participation on the ESG performance of private enterprises.

Using Chinese listed companies as the research sample, this study uses econometric methods such as multiple regression to analyze the relationship between state-owned equity and the ESG performance of private enterprises. Additionally, it explores the underlying mechanisms and influencing factors of this relationship.

There is a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between state-owned equity and the ESG performance of private enterprises. Mechanism analysis reveals that resource effects and governance effects play a mediating role in this nonlinear relationship. Furthermore, the authors find that environmental regulation and managers' attention to the environment positively moderate the relationship between state-owned equity participation and ESG performance.

A reasonable equity structure is crucial for enhancing corporate ESG performance. Moderate state-owned equity participation helps to leverage resource integration and governance advantages, which will assist private enterprises in maximizing ESG performance and achieving sustainable development.

In advancing the process of mixed-ownership reform, the government should maintain an appropriate proportion of state-owned equity to avoid excessive intervention in enterprise decision-making. At the same time, it should ensure that enterprises can genuinely undertake their social and environmental responsibilities while pursuing economic benefits. This is of great significance for promoting sustainable economic and social development.

This study integrates state-owned equity, ESG and nonlinear relationships into a single research framework. It explores the internal mechanisms and influencing factors of their relationship, overcoming the limitations of previous studies and provides a new perspective for understanding the impact of state-owned equity on corporate ESG performance.

This study aims to examine the effect of CEO compensation risk, as measured by the proportion of equity-based pay (option and stock awards) relative to total compensation and pay sensitivity to stock volatility, on CEO pay for luck asymmetry. This paper also empirically examines CEO compensation risk as a mediating variable between the regulatory changes and CEO pay for luck asymmetry.

This paper test the proposed two hypothesis that CEO compensation risk is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry; and the pay related regulations implemented around 2006 could mitigate the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry using the fixed-effects regression models.

Consistent with the managerial talent retention hypothesis, this paper finds that CEO compensation risk, as measured by the equity-based pay as a proportion of CEO total compensation and CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility, is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, this paper find that CEO pay for luck asymmetry is significantly reduced by the major regulatory changes on executive compensation implemented around 2006.

This study is among the very few studies exploring the impact of CEO compensation risk on pay for luck asymmetry in the literature. While the major purpose of the widely used stock options is to align executive interests and shareholder values, it also tends to increase the risk level of CEO compensation. So, a well-designed CEO pay package should protect risk-averse CEOs from bad luck for the retention purpose, which is also beneficial to shareholder wealth maximization. Therefore, future research on executive compensation needs to examine the issue from various perspectives.

For board of directors who is responsible for the compensation of CEOs, it is necessary to consider a broad range of factors when designing an optimal CEO pay package.

The findings on the impact of regulations on CEO pay for luck asymmetry suggest that the executive-pay-related regulations around 2006 have indeed achieved some of their intended goals to significantly lower pay for nonperformance asymmetry, whereby CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility has been identified as a major mediating variable.

This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck asymmetry in several perspectives. First, this paper finds that CEO compensation risk has a positive impact on the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. Second, this paper finds that the CEO pay for luck asymmetry has been mitigated after 2006 when various regulatory changes on executive compensation began to be implemented in the USA. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is among the very few studies investigating these issues in the literature.

The aim of this article is to assess the macroeconomic consequences of some specific aspects of financialization (i.e. share buy-back) using a hybrid post-Keynesian model of growth and distribution based on Kaldorian and Kaleckian characteristics.

The study follows a post-Keynesian approach and deals with financialization issues by implementing several numerical simulations.

The numerical simulations reveal the negative real impacts of massive share repurchases on the rate of accumulation because they immediately siphon off revenues directly intended for investment projects. Moreover, the negative effect of share buy-backs is reinforced especially when firms' investment decisions are more sensitive to a variation in retained earnings. Next, this macro-model also reproduces several well-known figures of the Kaleckian tradition and the paradox of costs.

The present article can be considered as a starting point for further theoretical extensions and requires empirical validation.

The Kaldor-Kalecki macro-model could be useful for policymakers who are interested in containing some of the negative excesses of financialization.

This study aims to provide empirical evidence on the return and volatility spillover structures between Bitcoin, Fintech stocks and Asian-Pacific equity markets over time and during different market conditions, and their implications for portfolio management.

We use Time-varying parameter vector autoregressive and quantile frequency connectedness approach models for the connectedness framework, in conjunction with Diebold and Yilmaz’s connectivity approach. Additionally, we use the minimum connectedness portfolio model to highlight implications for portfolio management.

Regarding the uncertainty of the whole system, we show a small contribution from Bitcoin and Fintech, with a higher contribution from the four Asian Tigers (Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Thailand). The quantile and frequency analyses also demonstrate that the link among assets is symmetric, with short-term spillovers having the largest influence. Finally, Bitcoins and Fintech stocks are excellent diversification and hedging instruments for Asian equity investors.

There is an instantaneous, symmetric and dynamic return and volatility spillover between Asian stock markets, Fintech and Bitcoin. This conclusion should be considered by investors and portfolio managers when creating risk diversification strategies, as well as by policymakers when implementing their financial stability policies.

The study’s major contribution is to analyze the volatility spillover between Bitcoin, Fintech and Asian stock markets, which is dynamic, symmetric and immediate.

Based on stakeholder, agency and institutional theory, this study aims to examine the role of institutional ownership in the relationship between environmental, social and governance practices and CEO compensation.

Utilizing a fixed-effect panel regression analysis, this research utilized a panel data approach, analyzing data spanning from 2014 to 2021, focusing on US companies listed on the S&P500 stock market index. The dataset encompassed 219 companies, leading to a total of 1,533 observations.

The analysis identified that environmental scores significantly impact CEO equity-linked compensation, unlike social and governance scores. Additionally, it was found that institutional ownership acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between the environmental score and CEO equity-linked compensation, as well as the association between the social score and CEO equity-linked compensation. Interestingly, the direction of these moderating effects varied between the two relationships, suggesting a nuanced role of institutional ownership.

This research makes a unique contribution to the field of corporate governance by exploring the relatively understudied area of institutional ownership's influence on the ESG practices–CEO compensation nexus.

The research aims to provide empirical evidence on the relationship between financial statement comparability (FSC) and cost of equity (COE) in an emerging market.

Specifically, this study examines the relationship between FSC and COE of Vietnamese listed firms. The research uses the System Generalized Method of Moments regression techniques for a panel data set of 454 companies for the period 2015–2022.

The authors find that firms with high comparability of financial statements have lower COE. To confirm the research findings, the authors conduct the robustness test by using different proxies for the cost of equity. Consistent results are found.

The study contributes to the overall understanding of the relationship between FSC and COE, and suggests policy implications for relevant stakeholders such as managers, regulatory bodies and investors. Especially, regarding policymakers, this study could provide more insight into how the accounting convergence process impacts the effectiveness of a firm’s capital allocation.