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The aim of this chapter is to assess the real exchange rate misalignments. A smooth transition autoregressive model (STAR) is used for Tunisian exchange market. This model allows us to see whether these differences are temporary or persistent over the period 1975–2012. We start by defining the exchange rate’s fundamental determinants to provide the equilibrium exchange rate value. Then, we study the observed exchange rate adjustment toward its equilibrium level. Vector autoregressive model and vector error correction model are applied to characterize the joint dynamics of variables in the long run. The results indicate a long-run relationship between variables. In order to consider the nonlinearity for better results, we will move to nonlinear smooth transition model. We found there is a high degree of exchange rate misalignment. We recognized that this difference decreases in the long run and disappears at the end.

Hypocrisy is a widely recognized concept in both academic literature and popular media. However, very few studies have examined the reflections of hypocrisy in leader's behaviors in organizational behavior literature. Leader hypocrisy mainly refers to the misalignment between words and deeds of a leader. This chapter first provides a review of the concept of hypocrisy and its various conceptualizations in philosophy, social psychology, and organizational behavior literatures. The chapter then focuses on the implications of leader hypocrisy for organizations and its members by presenting the studies conducted on the emotional, attitudinal, and behavioral consequences of leader hypocrisy (word–deed misalignment) and leader behavioral integrity (word–deed alignment). Moreover, some of the gaps in the literature are identified, and suggestions are made for future research on the topic.

The aim of this chapter is to provide equilibrium exchange rates values for a large set of currencies and to study the adjustment process of observed exchange rates toward these levels by paying special attention to emerging Asian countries. Relying on panel smooth transition regression models, we show that real exchange rate dynamics in the long run are nonlinear for emerging Asian countries, and linear for the G7 currencies. Especially, there exists an asymmetric behavior of the real exchange rate when facing an over- or undervaluation, the adjustment speed being higher in the case of undervaluation in Asia. Although this result may be explained by the international pressure to limit undervaluation, the undervaluation may still persist over time, as has been observed since the beginning of 1990s.

A recent stream of research in strategy has demonstrated the effect of boundary of the firm decisions on firm performance by integrating concepts and methods from organizational ecology with predictions from transaction cost economics (e.g. Silverman et al., 1997; Bigelow, 1999; Nickerson & Silverman, 2003; Argyres & Bigelow, 2005). This work has confirmed that managing organizational boundary choices (or governance structures) efficiently has ramifications for firms’ survival chances. But further questions delineating the conditions under which governance structure alignment has a greater or lesser effect on firm survival remain. In this paper, we consider how selection pressures may differ according to a firm's adoption of either a mature or an evolving technology. Using ecological insights regarding competitive intensity and sub-population density, we test for the evidence of the role of sub-population organizational (governance) structure within a technology class. We present preliminary results using an 18-year panel of the population of U.S. automobile manufacturers from 1916 to 1934.

The primary preliminary findings: Within a population, individual misalignment diminishes survival. However, the aggregate governance structure of firms within a technology sub-population has a greater effect on the survival of a focal firm than the governance choice of the individual firm. These findings suggest that governance choices in aggregate within technologically localized sub-populations may influence firm survival. Further, this paper adds to a body of work that utilizes ecological concepts to extend organizational theory.

In this paper, we present and apply a new framework – the Poles of Production for Producers/Poles of Production for Users (PFP/PFU) model – to empirically study how one particular group of academic scientists has responded to neoliberal changes in science policy and funding in Canada. The data we use are from a qualitative case study of 20 basic health scientists affiliated with a research-intensive university in a large Canadian city. We use the PFP/PFU model to explore the symbolic strategies (the vision of scientific quality) and practical strategies (the acquisition of funding and production of knowledge outputs) scientists adopt to maintain or advance their own position of power in the scientific field. We also compare similarities and differences among scientists trained before and after the rise of neoliberal policy. The PFP/PFU model allows us to see how these individual strategies cumulatively contribute to the construction of dominant and alternate modes of knowledge production. We argue that the alignments and misalignments between quality vision and practice that scientists in this study experienced reflect the symbolic struggles that are occurring among scientists, and between the scientific and political field, over two competing logics and reward systems (PFP/PFU).

Why and in what direction do organizations change?¹ Early responses to these questions generally fell into two camps. Adaptationist scholars proposed theories based on the assumption that organizations have wide latitude to change their structure, strategy, and scope. In the adaptationist view, organizations are able to change in the direction dictated by their environment or by the choices of organizational decision makers, whether in the pursuit of rational action (e.g., Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Williamson, 1985) or blind action (Weick, 1979). In its extreme form, the adaptationist view implied that firms can and do adapt nearly frictionlessly, suggesting that if there is a performance penalty associated with inappropriate organization, misaligned firms will change so as to reduce or eliminate this misalignment. Alternatively, selection-based theories, notably structural inertia theory within organizational ecology, contended that inertial forces tend to stymie attempts at organizational change (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). In its extreme form, the selectionist view implied that firms can rarely change successfully; instead, if there is a performance penalty associated with misalignment, misaligned firms will be “selected out” of the population.

Studies of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and stakeholder engagement have recently gained traction in the global strategy field. However, they have mostly developed as parallel streams, thereby limiting the cross-fertilization between global strategy research and stakeholder theory. We believe that because the CSR context in essence calls for the simultaneous participation of a large and heterogeneous set of local and global stakeholders, it requires a novel theorizing of multinational enterprises’ (MNEs’) worldwide practice implementation. Thus, we develop a series of propositions in the context of CSR to highlight the role stakeholders play in MNE subsidiaries’ implementation of initiatives, depending on the complex institutional pressures that they undergo, their distance from the parent’s home country, and their level of network embeddedness. We focus in particular on the role of stakeholder demands alignment in subsidiaries’ CSR implementation. Our conceptual propositions are enriched by the consideration of illustrative data on initiatives undertaken by Iberdrola from 2008 to 2014.

This paper distinguishes exchange rate variability from exchange rate misalignments and presents statistical measures in this regard. It uses PPP as a crude approximation of equilibrium exchange rates and shows that during periods of possible misalignments, the exchange rate variability of some EMS and other currencies tends to increase.

In the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) contemporary business environment intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) play a central role. Their objective is to align member countries for collective global problem solving activities under the guidance of the organization. They aim at providing global stability and security through the creation of supranational institutions. While political sciences have studied IGOs from a global political perspective, little is known about the influence of these IGOs and their supranational institutions on country institutional environments and business environments. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to understand how IGOs influence these national institutional environments, especially considering the countries’ development levels. By using regime and institutional theory we are able to conceptualize the relation of supranational and national institutions within the differently developed countries. We identify two interconnected factors that impact this analysis, the strength of the national institutional environment of member countries and their power in the IGO. Using these factors, we identify a clash and misalignment of national and supranational institutions in emerging countries, which is leading to enhanced VUCA business environments. We provide an exemplary case that discusses institutional schisms created by the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) influence in Argentina. Moreover, the impact of IGOs is significant in least developed countries and has little to no impact in highly developed countries.

We investigate the implications of the misalignment between manager and shareholder interests and the effects of initial ownership stakes and reinvestment of unpaid dividends on managerial self-dealing.

We collect and analyze data from controlled laboratory experiments with an experimental setting which captures the role of ownership in managerial considerations.

We see the emergence of both investor-aligned outcomes and managerial self-dealing outcomes. We find that increasing managers’ initial endowment of shares makes it harder for managers to coordinate on an outcome and lowers return on investment. Moreover, allowing managers to reinvest unpaid dividends results in a transfer of wealth to management.

The results and the conclusions are drawn upon data from the particular setting we investigate. Generalizing them beyond the specific setting should be done with caution.

Higher managerial ownership stake means that managers have a greater incentive to reward shareholders, but we find that it may also imply a more difficult coordination problem between managers – sometimes to the detriment of shareholders.

This study is the first to consider the direct relationship between managers’ portfolios and voting decisions regarding dividends and investment levels.