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This purpose of this paper is to examine four separate though interconnected questions concerning corporations operating, in Anglo American jurisdictions.

The paper first examines the nature of the limited liability corporation as an entity dedicated to maximizing shareholder value, and how far this role is consistent with the pursuit of wider policies of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Second, it reviews the ownership arrangements of the corporation, the fiduciary duties of board directors and how this is translated into the task of maximizing shareholder value through the pursuit of profits. Third, it investigates how directors position themselves commercially in maximizing shareholder value and whether shareholders express views on how shareholder value can best be maximized. Finally conclusions are drawn on how best corporations and their directors can address the challenge of meeting shareholder value and how far this implies realignment in terms of wider societal expectations. The method of research used includes an examination of statute law governing the corporation, judge's law, regulatory law, other soft law in the context of outsider controlled capital markets. Relevant published research material is also declared in the bibliography.

Conclusions drawn suggest that the premise of maximization of shareholder value may very well entail the pursuit by directors of wider social and economic objectives consistent with CSR, if this is consistent with the enhancement of shareholder value. They also point to a lack of clarity on the question of what is expected of directors in meeting their fiduciary and broader director's duties as expressed in the objective of maximizing shareholder value. Evidence suggests that there is little effective communication between shareholders and directors on how best shareholder value can be maximized. Specifically the analysis focuses on how best to overhaul the mechanisms of governance and accountability if directors and the shareholders they represent are to develop and execute rational commercial policies aimed at maximizing shareholder value.

The paper breaks new ground in linking CSR to the enhancement of shareholder value and in suggesting that directors may be negligent in their duty to promote shareholder value if they fail do so. The paper should be of interest to company directors, company legal advisors; other corporate lawyers involved in litigation against directors, and policy makers in government.

The article outlines the arguments by the proponents and opponents of maximizing shareholder value and identifies the true threat the concept poses to U.S. businesses.

The author quotes authorities on both side of the debate over the validity of maximizing shareholder value as a driving principle of management and points out the risks and the alternatives. He notes that many long-established public corporations in the U.S. have chosen to bow to the power of shareholders and reward them instead of attempting risky initiatives that might create new customers or enhance customer value.

Maximizing shareholder value is either the guiding principle of business success that provides a rightful reward for investors or a corrupting influence that thwarts investment in employee talent, sustaining innovation, product quality and customer loyalty.

Since the C-suite is hugely compensated for increases in the current stock price, decisions based on “shareholder value” tend to be decisions that boost the current stock price.

As evidence the problem is being recognized, some CEOs have already spoken out against preferentially rewarding stockholders instead of investing to sustain the organization.

The author concludes that shareholder value theory has not only failed on its own narrow terms of making money for shareholders. It has been steadily destroying the productive capacity and dynamism of the entire economy.

Many investors view maximizing shareholder wealth as the only obvious and defensible, corporate objective function. But to contradict this view, the paper aims to consider the shortcomings of the “shareholder first” view and offer an alternative.

To make strategic tradeoffs effectively the whole organization needs a clear sense of what it is trying to achieve, and how choosing between specified alternatives serves its highest goal. Organizations need a “best metric” for the corporate strategy. The paper considers what ultimate end should corporations – that is, the managers who run them – refer to when making these difficult and sometimes painful tradeoffs?

The widely held shareholder‐value view holds that every choice should be made with an eye to creating as much financial wealth as possible for the providers of equity capital. But none of the familiar justifications for this view stand up to scrutiny. It is not true that: shareholders are owners; shareholders bear the most risk; maximizing shareholder value is a clear goal; and maximizing shareholder value is a legal requirement.

The corporation‐first view is a better alternative principle. It is that the ultimate purpose of the corporation is the survival of corporation itself. The corporation should not seek to maximize the interests of shareholders, or employees, or suppliers, or the environment, or anyone or anything else. The Costco model is examined.

This paper provokes some serious soul‐searching about the largely unquestioned primacy of shareholder interests as the objective function of the corporation and makes the case for a better alternative.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the claim that the pursuit of maximum value (wealth) for shareholders optimises economic and social benefits for society as a whole.

Evidence cited in support of the claim and the methodology employed by its supporters are examined. Counter‐evidence from a wide range of disciplines, including accounting, economics, finance, and medical sociology, is considered.

The evidence does not support the claim. Bias and severe methodological flaws in its supporters' research is revealed. Considerable evidence of adverse consequences is identified.

This paper draws from an unusually wide range of disciplines to expose the fallacy and a number of powerful myths about the economic and social benefits of making maximizing shareholder value the primary aim of corporate governance.

Discusses the agency issues underlying corporate governance, refering to research on managerial attitudes/incentives for maximizing shareholder value and pressures to align the interests of directors and shareholders. Reports a survey of finance executives in 175 large firms in 7 EU countries to analyse their strategies and the influence of pressure groups on strategy choice. Shows that market leadership and increased operating margins are the most successful operating strategies; changing productive capacity, generating new/better products and buying business with complementary products are the best investment strategies; and a leveraged buyout is the most effective capital strategy to maximize shareholder returns. Adds that UK managers (like US managers) have a shorter term focus than other European managers, perhaps because their relationships with institutional investors are less close.

The paper was written with the intention of drawing attention to a fundamental dysfunction that is widespread in large organizations today – a myopic focus on maximizing shareholder value.

The paper identifies the source of the dysfunction, the reasons why it has spread, and explains the corrective measures required, namely, a shift in goal from maximizing shareholder value to delighting the customer.

The dysfunction is widespread and dangerously counterproductive to long‐term business success.

Further quantification is needed, both of the business results over time of firms that have failed to make the shift and of those firms that have made the transition.

The paper proposes transformation of business practices throughout the world – the adoption of radical management and goals that produce stakeholder value.

The findings and implications of the paper, which draw on recent work by writers such as Roger Martin, will be controversial to many business executives and academics.

This paper aims to examine the nature and role of contemporary CSR in the current neoliberal age. It offers an insight into the tension that exists between the ideologies of “neoliberal” shareholder value and that of “effective” CSR, and argues that both ideologies are fundamentally antithetical. It aims to identify and analyse the inter-connected but distinguishable barriers (ideological, practical and political) that militate against the realization of effective CSR.

The method applied is a critical evaluation of concepts and a thorough review of existing literature on neoliberalism, shareholder value and contemporary CSR. It uses existing literature to highlight the inability of contemporary CSR to transform into an effective mechanism for development.

The paper emphasizes the failure of contemporary CSR to equate to a successful mechanism for development. It concludes that the existence and operations of these barriers militate against the realization of an effective CSR regime capable of leading to development.

Given the current dominance of the “maximizing shareholder value” model of corporate governance internationally, it appears unreasonable to pin too much hope on contemporary CSR as a mechanism for development, especially in emerging economies. Neither the culture of corporations nor the pressures to which they are currently subjected encourage socially responsible behaviour.

The paper extends the body of knowledge in the area of contemporary CSR, by identifying and analysing the inter-connected but distinguishable barriers that render the CSR practices of corporations ineffective.

Shareholder‐value proponents claim a new, economically sound way to maximize profits, create wealth, measure performance, and reward executives. That invalid claim is dangerous. Stocks of shareholder‐value firms appreciated barely 15 percent as much as another, time‐tested strategic‐management system. Shareholder‐value strategies are easily countered. Shareholder value mis‐allocates resources, revives old fallacies, and debases the reputation of economics as a useful business discipline.

This study aims to present a pedagogical approach that allows students to discuss and debate the differences between two competing models of corporate governance – the shareholder primacy philosophy and the stakeholder value viewpoint.

This study first presents the conceptual bases for each framework, noting that while shareholder primacy is the historically dominant approach to corporate governance that guide strategic business actions in the USA, pressures from investor and societal groups and government agencies have forced publicly traded companies to recognize the need to take stakeholder interests into account in strategic decision-making, as is the dominant model in Europe and other parts of the world. This study then provides a pedagogical structure on how these opposing perspectives can be used to foster discussion, debate and reflection within the classroom.

This paper presents a pedagogical structure that allows students to recognize the competing pressures that businesses face of maximizing profits versus concerns over social causes. There are a number of positive pedagogical outcomes that can be realized from a classroom discourse on the differing perspectives on strategic management, corporate governance and social responsibility.

This pedagogical structure should help future business leaders throughout the world understand the differences between the two models of corporate governance. This study offers suggestions on how this pedagogical structure can be used in the student assessment process.

This study fills a gap in the literature by providing a pedagogical structure to guide discussion and debate on the competing theories of corporate governance and how organizational decision-makers can devise strategies to manage the potential competing demands that can arise from the shareholder versus stakeholder models. It is highly relevant and well-suited for courses such as Business Law, Business Policy, Business and Society and Ethics.

This paper aims to investigate the extent to which the ideology of shareholder value is compatible with that of transformative corporate social responsibility (CSR). It traces the transformation of corporations from quasi-public institutions at inception to purely private enterprises beginning from the middle of the nineteenth century and attempts to locate the ideology of CSR within the wider viewpoint of shareholder value.

This paper adopts a doctrinal approach through a critical evaluation of the nature and implications of the shareholder value ideology. Using existing literature in the area, it traces the evolution of the shareholder value ideology and how it is antithetical to any meaningful CSR regime.

The paper finds that there is a fundamental tension between ideas about the desirability of effective CSR and the belief that it is to the benefit of society as a whole for corporations to be run solely in the interest of their shareholders and for managers to seek to maximize shareholder value. This ideological tension renders contemporary CSR ineffective.

The paper offers a fresh insight or analysis into the transformation of corporations from quasi-social institutions to purely private enterprises in the middle of the nineteenth century. It does this by engaging in a historical narrative of the evolution of the corporate form and how contemporary ideas of shareholder value have resulted in the emergence of a contemporary CSR devoid of the radical spirit of CSR in the 1950s and 1960s.