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The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of setting access restrictions to legislative drafting records – specifically in New Zealand.

Various international archival institutions and other offices which create legislative drafting records were contacted to see what access restrictions were placed on any legislative drafting files that they held. The information provided by these institutions, together with written theoretical information regarding public access and legal professional privilege, was the basis for the research.

There is no standard approach to allowing public access to legislative drafting records across the institutions researched. The level of accessibility varies, as does the period of restriction. In New Zealand legislative drafting records are considered to be protected by legal professional privilege and therefore are restricted unless the privilege is waived.

The main form of communication used to contact the various institutions was e‐mail. A large number of institutions and offices from which information was requested did not reply, and some that did reply did not provide answers specific to legislative drafting records. The research is therefore limited to the information that was received.

There is very little published information available regarding legislative drafting records and public access to them. These records are unique due to debate over whether or not they are, or should be, covered by legal professional privilege. Because of the unique nature of these records, there is no common or widely available precedent to follow when applying access restrictions to them.

The field of nonmarket strategy has expanded rapidly over the past 20 years to provide theoretical and practical guidance for managers seeking to influence policymaking. Much of this scholarship has built directly on spatial and “pivotal politics” models of lawmaking. While extremely helpful at identifying crucial targets for lobbying, these models treat all policymakers as identical in their abilities to advance legislative agenda items through various policymaking hurdles. We build upon these earlier models, but include policymakers who vary in their relative effectiveness at advancing measures through the legislative process. We identify how the implications of our model deviate from those of conventional (pivotal politics) analyses. We then present an empirical strategy for identifying effective Lawmakers in the United States Congress, and illustrate the utility of this approach for managers developing nonmarket strategies in legislative institutions, relying on the case of banking and financial services reforms between 2008 and 2011.

The purpose of this paper is to examine a curvilinear effect of legislative constraints on foreign debt.

A cross-sectional, time-series data analysis of 68 developing countries during the period from 1981 to 1999 was performed.

Foreign borrowing is most likely to increase at both low and high levels of legislative constraints, while it is most likely to decrease at moderate levels.

The paper is a first-cut empirical analysis of a curvilinear relationship between legislative constraints and foreign debt.

The objective of this study is to understand the budgetary role of national legislatures in euro area (EA) countries and to analyse implications for fiscal discipline.

Building on the budget institutions literature, a legislative budgetary power index for all the 19 euro area (EA) countries is constructed using Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and European Commission data as well as data generated from questionnaires to national authorities. A two-way fixed effects panel data model is then used to assess the effect of legislative budgetary power on the budget balance in the EA during 2006–2015.

Overall, in the EA, formal legislative powers vis-à-vis the national budgetary process are weak, but there is more legislative involvement in Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) procedures, and legislative budgetary organisational capacity is generally quite good. In contrast to the traditional view in the budget institutions literature, this study’s empirical findings show that strong legislative budgetary power does not necessarily result in larger budget deficits.

Data on legislative budgeting were available from different sources, and time series data were very limited.

There is scope to improve democratic legitimacy of the national budgetary process in the EA, without necessarily jeopardising fiscal discipline.

The constructed legislative budgetary power index covers all the 19 EA countries and has a broad scope covering various novel institutional characteristics. The empirical analysis contributes to the scarce literature on the impact of legislative budgeting on fiscal discipline.

The purpose of this study is to examine the role of independent institution as moderation between community involvement and legislative institution responsiveness in Mataram City.

This research is explanatory research, which explains the effect between variables by hypothesis testing. This research was conducted in Mataram City, West Nusa Tenggara. Population in this study included all stakeholders involved in Mataram City’s participatory planning, including community leaders, legislative institutions (starting from the village/subdistrict, district to city levels) and independent institutions. The sampling was performed using nonprobability sampling technique, namely, quota sampling. The research model with inferential analysis used a structural equation modelling (SEM) with WarpPLS to answer the statements of problems and test the desired hypotheses.

The research results conclude that community involvement has a direct effect on legislative institution responsiveness and legislative institution responsiveness has a direct effect on the success of participatory development planning. This indicates that all variables in this research influence the success of participatory development planning. However, the indirect effect of legislative institution responsiveness on the success of participatory development planning through the role of independent institution is not significant.

The role of independent institutions as a moderation of the relationship between community involvement and legislative institution responsiveness can be learned as the novelty in this study.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of changes to the Arkansas budget process brought about when the people of Arkansas voted to move from a biennial to an annual budget period in 2008. The paper describes the legislative changes necessary for annual budget review and explores the impact of annual budget review on revenue forecasting, supplemental appropriations, special sessions, legislative staff workload, executive branch oversight and state spending. This research assesses legislative perceptions of annual budget review across several factors including knowledge of the state budget, ability to check the powers of the governor and overall efficacy of annual budget review.

This exploratory research uses interview data from the Legislative Fiscal Director and data from an online survey of Arkansas state legislators. The interview and survey data were supplemented by an analysis of documents produced by legislative staff regarding supplemental appropriations, special sessions and state general revenue.

The Legislative Fiscal Director interview indicates that the change in budget period had little impact on revenue forecasting, special sessions and state government spending, with the exception that supplemental appropriations for Big 6 agencies increased in a statistically significant way following the advent of the fiscal session. The legislative survey finds that the change in budget period is viewed positively by Arkansas legislators. Most legislators indicated that they prefer annual budget review to biennial budget review.

Because of the exploratory approach, the research results may lack generalizability.

This paper surveys legislators on the efficacy of annual budget review which has seldom been done in previous research.

Many studies of the budgetary process focus on the national government while ignoring the state budgetary process and state budgetary actors. Executive budget analysts and legislative budget analysts are important gatekeepers in the budgetary process. These actors were surveyed to ascertain what influences their decisions and to determine what responsibilities are included in their job duties. The results show that many similarities exist between executive budget analysts and legislative budget analysts. Legislative budget analysts are more involved in the budgetary process than many believe. Consequently, they play important “gatekeeping” roles in the budgetary process.

This paper develops a new theory arguing that party change results from ruptures in political parties’ ties to civil society organizations. I demonstrate the utility of this approach by using it to explain why the Rhode Island Democratic Party (RIDP) changed from a hierarchical machine to a porous political field occupied by multiple interlegislator cliques and brokered by extra-party political organizations and professionals. While others attribute party change to bureaucratization, electoral demand, or system-level changes, I analyze historical, observational, and interview data to find that a severance in the RIDP’s relationship with organized labor prompted party change by causing power to diffuse outward as leadership lost control over nominations and the careers of elected office holders. In the spaces that remained, interest groups and political professionals came to occupy central positions within the party field, serving as brokers of the information and relationships necessary to coordinate legislative activity. This analysis refines existing theories of party change and provides a historically-grounded explanation for the institutionalization of interest groups and political professionals in American party politics.

We show that, in the US telecommunications industry, market participants have a sophisticated understanding of the political process, and behave strategically in their allocation of contributions to state legislators as if seeking to purchase influence over regulatory policy. We find that interests respond defensively to contributions from rivals, take into account the configuration of support available to them in both the legislature and the regulatory commission, and vary their contributions according to variations in relative costs for influence by different legislatures. This strategic behavior supports a theory that commercially motivated interests contribute campaign resources in order to mobilize legislators to influence the decisions of regulatory agencies. We also report evidence that restrictions on campaign finance do not affect all interests equally. The paper therefore provides positive evidence on the nature and effects of campaign contributions in regulated industries where interest group competition may be sharp.

The death penalty has existed in a state of steady decline for the last two decades, during which state legislatures have been at the center of abolition efforts. Successful abolition is, however, very rare in contrast to how often death penalty repeal bills are introduced across state legislatures, year after year. Indeed, abolition is not a sudden event, but may be many years in the making. Research on the early phases of this process, where the groundwork for enacted legislation is laid, is nevertheless limited. This chapter explores patterns of death penalty bill introductions across all active death penalty states from 1999 to 2018, providing not only an overview of legislative activity at state level but also an analysis of potential factors fueling the activity. It argues that individual legislators play a significant role in the current trend of increased legislative support for a restricted, if not entirely abolished, death penalty, evident both in terms of persistency over time and cooperation across party lines. It also problematizes partisan aspects of legislative activity in the context of legislation on capital punishment.