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The chapter analyses Chinese and Russian hybrid warfare and their strategies. Although still under debate, it is increasingly recognised that both countries integrate and apply hybrid warfare in their strategic thinking. In doing so, they are able to increase their sphere of influence, promote authoritarian regimes and weaken democracies. It is therefore vital that we better understand their strategies in order to identify and bring to light the processes that encourage today’s rise of nationalism and populism, withdrawal from international organisations and an overall distrust in the global institutional order. Approaching the puzzle from current weaknesses in the EU and the United States, the chapter proposes a framework to analyse Chinese and Russian hybrid warfare. The chapter demonstrates that Western liberal democracies are not only unprepared for these new forms of warfare, but appear unwilling to take the necessary measures. In doing so, these countries leave the door open for (further) destabilisation and a risk of increased domestic polarisation.

This chapter looks at a new form of a hybrid perpetrator within the field of individualized political violence. We reveal, that the new thing about (transnational) terrorism overcomes current oppositions and contradictions regarding terrorists and persons running amok, which (strategically) leads to an individualization of terrorism and thereby to a hybridization of a terroristic warfare.

By outlining organizational and structural changes in terroristic strategy within the framework of using both modern and antimodern elements, economic thinking, acting global as well as local, and by using network structures, the individualization of terror to the point of hybrid perpetrators is presented.

The new thing about (transnational) terrorism is the evolution of individualized perpetrators, radicalizing themselves without a clear connection to terroristic organizations. This leads to a hybridization of terroristic warfare, and within individualized single perpetrators it can be described as terrok. A terrorist running amok or a gunman on rampage with a radicalized mindset, equipped with his very individual ideology, who carries out his attacks logistically and operatively on his own while accepting his own death constitutes a new strategic way of irritating western society.

Currently, terrorists and persons running amok are separated into sharply distinguished categories. But regarding new tendencies in terroristic attacks committed by single perpetrators, this separation seems to be no longer able to capture the individualization of terrorism and thereby the linked hybridization of a terroristic warfare adequately. But in combining findings from both approaches, the new concept of terrok is able to do so.

As fake news and other disinformation are spread primarily online and erode trust in experts and institutions, they challenge the role of librarians as information gatekeepers. Experts have advocated for libraries to educate the public to resist misinformation, yet libraries cannot assume sole responsibility for information literacy work. In this chapter, the authors explore several successful information literacy programs in Ukraine, whose fake news problems made global headlines in 2014, when the Russian annexation of Crimea was accompanied by a flood of crude but effective disinformation. The authors look particularly at the Learn to Discern programs established by the international non-profit organization IREX to foster information literacy using techniques grounded in interdisciplinary expertise and carefully evaluated through pilot studies and follow-up evaluations. These programs train instructors through workshops and provide them with materials. In the first program, aimed at the general public, many of the instructors were librarians, and library facilities were heavily used to deliver the public training. In the second program, information literacy was integrated into the public school curriculum and thousands of teachers were trained to deliver expertly designed materials for particular grade levels and subjects. The authors also consider the special challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, both as a source for new forms of misinformation and as a disruptor of training previously delivered in tightly packed libraries and classrooms. These Ukrainian programs demonstrate the potential for fighting fake news and other misinformation on a scale far beyond what could be accomplished by individual libraries acting alone.

Constant transformation plays a crucial role in the future success of the NATO Alliance. In the contemporary security environment, those who can get the latest technology to the war fighter faster will tend to enjoy a comparative advantage, unless that technology in turn blinds the organization to alternatives. Thus, the author lays out a strategic vision for AI enabled transformation for the Alliance detailing NATO's ability to adapt throughout history, introducing contemporary efforts for AI enabled tech solutions for NATO, but also pointing out the necessity of organizational learning.

His conclusion is that in an age where technological development is exponential, the Alliance appears increasingly unable to deal with the problems related to the exponential technology disruption. Complex contexts require a different mindset, and NATO has to look for new AI enabled tools, to face the increasing number of wicked problems. Most importantly he points out that building a platform with AI enabled technological solutions is only one side of the coin. There is a need for an organizational one as well which connects the different components together, and creates interoperability within the Alliance. As NATO incorporates new AI solutions, there is a need for introducing radically new training and education solutions, and create a framework for what the author calls Mission Command 2.0.

From the 1990s to the present, decision-makers around the world have sought to identify the most appropriate legal framework to support the energy transition. This research aims to analyze the institutional dynamics of renewable energy promotion, focusing on regulatory aspects at the European and national level and emphasizing the case of Romania through several comparative approaches. In the context of the conflict in Ukraine, we focused on the issue of coal, which was reconsidered given the dependence of some European countries on this resource. The main research methods used in this study are comparative analysis and analysis of chronological information in a historical context, with correlations being made. The study was structured in three stages, the first from the 1990s until the European Energy Union formation, the second during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the third from the emergence of the conflict in Ukraine, which determined the recalibration of previously adopted measures. Starting from the hypotheses formulated and considering the regulatory scenario conducive to the transfer of public funds to achieve climate neutrality, the results of the study show the fact that, at this stage of the research, the states of the European continent are determined to fight for zero carbon by 2050. One result we found interesting is that almost a year after the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, less than a quarter of European states have moved past their assumed deadline for phasing out coal in the national mix.