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The U.S. Army has been fighting the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq for over 10 years and in the process produced a new military doctrine called mission command. Mission command doctrine was conceived from a wartime environment to allow followers in the field to act according to the dictates of the situation on the ground, giving them maximum discretion. The concept of mission command fits nicely into followership research and theory. For a military widely dispersed both by geography and mission, this concept represents an effective way to empower followers and encourage them to take initiative and accept prudent risk. Mission command doctrine expects officers and exemplary followers to be courageous. It requires them to act on their own, be wise in assuming risk, be actively engaged in executing the commander’s intent, and find multiple ways and options to accomplish the mission. Since mission command is a philosophy born of our recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the question remains of how this philosophy will fare in an inter-war period of forced reductions, downsizing, and substantial budget reductions.

This study proposes targeted modernization of the Department of Defense (DoD's) Joint Forces Ammunition Logistics information system by implementing the optimized innovative information technology open architecture design and integrating Radio Frequency Identification Device data technologies and real-time optimization and control mechanisms as the critical technology components of the solution. The innovative information technology, which pursues the focused logistics, will be deployed in 36 months at the estimated cost of $568 million in constant dollars. We estimate that the Systems, Applications, Products (SAP)-based enterprise integration solution that the Army currently pursues will cost another $1.5 billion through the year 2014; however, it is unlikely to deliver the intended technical capabilities.

Globalisation of working life means that many organisations are manned by people from different countries. A potentially critical factor is how members from various nations are looked upon by their partner countries. Such perception may be more or less accurate and affect organisational outcomes. The military is no exception as modern warfare is characterised by multinational composition of task forces. The aim of this paper was to gain a deeper understanding of how military officers from other nations perceive Swedish military officers and their leadership qualities in particular.

Interviews were conducted with 20 military officers representing ten nations. Interview questions were deduced from the Developmental leadership model. Responses were first coded inductively according to the constant comparative method. Generated categories were then deductively related to this leadership model.

The analysis resulted in positive and negative patterns. The positive picture included Swedish officers being perceived as calm, competent and generally good at exhibiting exemplary leadership behaviour, showing individualised consideration and creating an inspiring atmosphere. The negative side included opinions such as Swedish officers being too emotionally restrained, exhibiting poor self-confidence, discussing too much before making decisions and having difficulties giving negative feedback. The results are discussed in relation to the Developmental leadership model and the stereotype concept.

Small sample size and a focus on military organisations imply a low degree of generalisability.

Three suggestions regarding Swedish officer education are presented: officer students should be given an increased awareness of how they are perceived by others, decision-making without group support and giving negative feedback in a constructive, straight forward, but still considerate way, should be practiced and more attention should be paid to emotion management.

The paper addresses an increasing tendency in work organisations – a multinational composition of the work force. The foundation of study in leadership theory and the stereotype concept is new.

Officers in post-cold war military operations frequently encounter situations that are not easily handled through central control and chain of command, but demand a more flexible leadership style and the ability to yield some control to subordinates. This study aims to investigate what it takes to train military leaders to master such Maneuver Warfare skills in a culture that still, unconsciously, fosters a chain of command structure.

Using a quasi-experimental pre-post design, the authors studied 30 teams of naval cadets (n = 228) in three separate Leadership Development Programs, each of 12 months full time duration. In the three otherwise identical programs, the authors varied one of the major exercises (sailing) both in duration and degree of structure and challenge. Parameters of team interaction were measured using the Systematizing the Person-Group Relation method and summarized in a construct labeled synergy.

One of the cohorts showed a significant positive effect. This cohort sailed a barque for ten weeks, crossing the Atlantic during winter storms. Apart from the clear mission of sailing the ship safely back to its home haven, they received no further instructions or training. Although the duration and the challenge likely count for part of the result, the authors argue that the lack of initial structure combined with a shared mission were more important.

Because of the cost and time involved in each program, it was not possible to independently vary duration, structure and mission. As a result, conclusions as to the reason for the greater positive effect seen in one of the programs cannot be definitively determined.

The study contributes to the understanding of the effect of unstructured situations on building Maneuver Warfare skills.

The purpose of this paper is to explore human issues within subordinate and leader interaction and guide police leaders in how they can achieve success. Although focussed on uniformed services, leaders from all areas will find the arguments presented here useful.

The paper draws on a number of catastrophic case studies, including the collision of two war ships, two Jumbo Jets, the defeat of the Spanish Armarda and the failure of Hitler’s military to respond effectively to the D-Day landings. It will examine work by Rittel and Webber (1973) and Grint (2005), who propose different styles of leadership for different problems.

The paper will find that humans are inherently obedient and reluctant obedient, reluctant to challenge authority and introduces the concept of blind obedience into police leadership. A distinction will be drawn between commanding in critical situations, which are rare, and leading in routine situations; the paper will conclude that to lead the police service through the turbulent times ahead, police leaders must be on guard against blind obedience and create an environment where subordinates have a voice and will be heard. The paper also finds that “micro-management” from a remote location is ineffective and that staff must be afforded time and space to undertake tasks and that strategic leaders must allow their subordinates, at the tactical and operational levels, freedom to act with the overall strategy; the paper recommends leaders adopt a mission command approach.

The paper will contribute to understanding how subordinates and leaders interact and will be of value to all who lead, particularly in structured organisations like the police, where rank plays a factor in establishing a strict hierarchy. It introduces the concept of blind obedience into police leadership and warns that police leaders, and indeed leaders in all hierarchal organisations, must be on constant guard against it.

Constant transformation plays a crucial role in the future success of the NATO Alliance. In the contemporary security environment, those who can get the latest technology to the war fighter faster will tend to enjoy a comparative advantage, unless that technology in turn blinds the organization to alternatives. Thus, the author lays out a strategic vision for AI enabled transformation for the Alliance detailing NATO's ability to adapt throughout history, introducing contemporary efforts for AI enabled tech solutions for NATO, but also pointing out the necessity of organizational learning.

His conclusion is that in an age where technological development is exponential, the Alliance appears increasingly unable to deal with the problems related to the exponential technology disruption. Complex contexts require a different mindset, and NATO has to look for new AI enabled tools, to face the increasing number of wicked problems. Most importantly he points out that building a platform with AI enabled technological solutions is only one side of the coin. There is a need for an organizational one as well which connects the different components together, and creates interoperability within the Alliance. As NATO incorporates new AI solutions, there is a need for introducing radically new training and education solutions, and create a framework for what the author calls Mission Command 2.0.

The goal of our initial study was to assess the usability of the prototype OCU and establish associated training issues. Seven participants completed self-paced training, guided by a training manual produced by ARI. Training was divided into three modules: (1) introduction and autonomous control, (2) manual control, and (3) creating and editing autonomous missions. Primary focus was on how to use the OCU to fly the MAV. Modules did not include elements such as fueling, setup, or tactics. A facilitator was present at all times to observe user interaction with the system and to manage the software. Data captured included time to complete each training module and related practical exercises, user feedback on questionnaires, and a written test on training content. Participants had either graduate-level experience in human factors psychology, prior military experience, or both. They were, therefore, able to provide valuable insights while they learned to operate the simulated MAV.

In this chapter, we raise awareness of the larger network in which multiteam systems (MTSs) are situated. We posit that in the complex operations conducted by military units, MTSs are not isolated entities, but rather exist in exponentially complex systems that include additional challenges for both research and practice.

An operational example involving an Army Brigade Combat Team Headquarters is presented to explain the details of the exponentially complex MTSs inherent in military operations, raise awareness about challenges that plague successful mission accomplishment, and discuss the way forward for research and practice.

The Army Brigade Combat Team Headquarters is characterized as a traditional MTS, embedded in a system of hierarchical MTSs, further embedded within a parallel structure of MTSs. Challenges inherent in these organizational structures provide direction for research and practice to address the exponentially complex meta-systems that are prevalent throughout the military.

While researchers have begun to address teams existing in larger networks, or MTSs (Mathieu, Marks, & Zaccaro, 2001), much of the existing research is based on small or isolated systems. As a result, our understanding of the meta-systems in which many of these MTSs exist is limited. This chapter provides concrete examples of an exponentially complex MTS within a military environment and highlights challenges to be addressed in both research and practice.