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The chapter analyses Chinese and Russian hybrid warfare and their strategies. Although still under debate, it is increasingly recognised that both countries integrate and apply hybrid warfare in their strategic thinking. In doing so, they are able to increase their sphere of influence, promote authoritarian regimes and weaken democracies. It is therefore vital that we better understand their strategies in order to identify and bring to light the processes that encourage today’s rise of nationalism and populism, withdrawal from international organisations and an overall distrust in the global institutional order. Approaching the puzzle from current weaknesses in the EU and the United States, the chapter proposes a framework to analyse Chinese and Russian hybrid warfare. The chapter demonstrates that Western liberal democracies are not only unprepared for these new forms of warfare, but appear unwilling to take the necessary measures. In doing so, these countries leave the door open for (further) destabilisation and a risk of increased domestic polarisation.

Information warfare (IW) is a novel and poorly understood threat to the international community, which may be used more commonly as a foreign policy tool in the future. By identifying the key components of modern IW, this paper seeks to formulate policy recommendations for how best to deal with this new threat. The general overview of the topic that this paper provides contributes to current efforts to develop strategies to counter IW operations around the world.

The goal of this paper is to break down the components of modern IW and provide policy recommendations for domestic and international governance on the issue. These recommendations will be based in part of historical initiatives to counter IW and existing literature on cyber governance. Central to the framework used to analyze the cases of Russian and North Korean IW operations are the seven defining features of “strategic” IW established by a 1996 RAND Corporation report, modified to incorporate the importance of cyberspace to cases of IW in the modern day.

Modern IW presents a new, multifaceted threat to states. Because of the value of IW as a tool by weaker states to counter stronger ones and the weakness of existing legal and normative frameworks, use of IW can be expected to be increasingly common. States can take action to promote international governance on the issue and develop policy frameworks for protecting themselves against IW.

IW has historically been a very tricky tactic to define and identify. By analyzing IW’s basic features, this paper provides a framework for breaking down IW into its component parts, which reveals valuable policy implications. Preventative efforts against IW can help restore trust to global information networks and lower the risk of conflict.

Formal scholarship on modern IW and related subjects is lacking in comparison with higher visibility threats. Increased awareness of this issue, especially amongst civilian leaders, can augment global efforts to counter IW.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the needs of the supply-chain (SC) network when coping with permanent and temporary demands, this paper analyzes the Swedish emergency preparedness SC network. This network comprises planning procedures and resources, as well as numerous organizations and other participants in civil society that take part in the system to cope with threats and ongoing crises. Planning constitutes a critical infrastructure because the system must develop the ability to shift SC functions from permanent to temporary networks in ongoing crises and war.

A research study is performed based on data gathered by three qualitative methods concerning the SC network of emergency preparedness planning.

This study demonstrates the relevance of a wide empirical field challenging several theoretical perspectives of the SC network in preparedness planning and the shift to ongoing crises. Further research targeting key capabilities is needed to further improve understanding of the challenges for developed countries in managing potential threats and crises.

Actors taking part in the preparedness system have found it challenging to coordinate. Due, in part, to the lack of a common threat profile, key capabilities remain outside preparedness planning, e.g., military, commercial and voluntary actors as well as unclear and inconsistent regulations. Thus, building the SC network demonstrates the need to target the military, the voluntary and commercial sectors and their ability to develop the networks in preparedness planning. In a reformed system, all actors must strengthen civil defense in an all-hazard approach, which in planning encompasses the entire threat scale, demonstrating key functions and the ability to shift to temporary networks responding to ongoing crises, including war.

The purpose of this study is to evaluate not only changes in eating behavior and food security parameters of the civilian population experiencing war but also the likelihood of developing a number of eating disorders against this background.

This descriptive, cross-sectional study was conducted in March–April 2022 using the Google Forms tool among adult residents of Ukraine. The questions included four categories: general demographic data and body mass index (BMI); the question of the most frequently consumed food groups since the beginning of the invasion; SCOFF questionnaire; and questions to assess the state of food security.

A change in eating behavior was reported by 72.3% of respondents. SCOFF screening showed two or more positive responses for 42.7% of respondents. For respondents who were not in active hostilities areas, only 25.0% reported positive results. The average pre-war BMI was within the normal range, which suggests that the majority of respondents did not have problems with food security. The study shows that 74.9% of respondents believe they have an unbalanced diet. About 40% of respondents were cutting back on meals or skipping meals, and 50% reported running out of food and not being able to restock. These facts indicate that most respondents experienced food insecurity after the invasion.

The resulting quantitative sample structure of respondents was not optimal for such studies. But taking into account the rather difficult state of the country and the conditions of the population in it, the expansion of the sample in combat areas was quite seriously limited. Therefore, the use of a limited sample should probably be considered a reasonable and practical choice for conducting research.

The results indicate deep problems with food security, a sharp change in eating behavior under the pressure of circumstances and, as a consequence, the appearance of a high probability of the development of eating disorders in the future.

This chapter looks at a new form of a hybrid perpetrator within the field of individualized political violence. We reveal, that the new thing about (transnational) terrorism overcomes current oppositions and contradictions regarding terrorists and persons running amok, which (strategically) leads to an individualization of terrorism and thereby to a hybridization of a terroristic warfare.

By outlining organizational and structural changes in terroristic strategy within the framework of using both modern and antimodern elements, economic thinking, acting global as well as local, and by using network structures, the individualization of terror to the point of hybrid perpetrators is presented.

The new thing about (transnational) terrorism is the evolution of individualized perpetrators, radicalizing themselves without a clear connection to terroristic organizations. This leads to a hybridization of terroristic warfare, and within individualized single perpetrators it can be described as terrok. A terrorist running amok or a gunman on rampage with a radicalized mindset, equipped with his very individual ideology, who carries out his attacks logistically and operatively on his own while accepting his own death constitutes a new strategic way of irritating western society.

Currently, terrorists and persons running amok are separated into sharply distinguished categories. But regarding new tendencies in terroristic attacks committed by single perpetrators, this separation seems to be no longer able to capture the individualization of terrorism and thereby the linked hybridization of a terroristic warfare adequately. But in combining findings from both approaches, the new concept of terrok is able to do so.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief answer to the following questions: in the arena for State and non-State actors, who and how may guarantee the balance between democracy, State and market? How can the citizens’ economic well-being be prioritized, in terms of national security?

Adapting both the link analysis approach and the order of Pierce’s inference stages, the author illustrates the state of the art, some economic indices and Italy’s need for countermeasures.

Starting from the notion of “social sustainability of the political decisions,” given by the author, the paper highlights the opportunity to rethink the concept of political warfare, in view of a productive fabric characterized by both a high number of small and medium-sized enterprises and the pervasiveness of mafia-type organizations. At the end, the author shares some proposal in the fields of Public Law and Social Marketing and a broader definition of the above-mentioned concept.

This study shows the link between security studies, people’s perception of grey areas and polarization of opinions and wealth, giving the reader a bottom-up input to the comprehension of the contemporary complexity.

This paper aims to understand whether Portugal, being a relatively peripheral country – in political, economic and military terms – of Southwest Europe, was recently a target of hybrid threats. The prevalence of a specific type of threat was found. Thus, this paper analyses the non-kinetic hybrid threats in Portugal, in a temporary hiatus of two years (2017-2018).

This study has two parts: a conceptual analysis of hybrid threats created by us and, based on the typology previously presented, an analysis of the hybrid threats in Portugal between 2017 and 2018. The first part relied on source analysis, as the result of a desk review methodology, supported by monographs, declassified official documents and reports. The second part is also the result of source analysis, but more extensive. In addition to the desk review methodology, the study included semi-structured interviews with different stakeholders from the Portuguese security and armed forces, who asked not to be quoted. Media content analysis was also carried out – for trends and fact-check – mostly for the events related to the “narratives led operations” (for propaganda, misinformation, counter-information and strategic leaks).

To date, Portugal – compared with other European states – has not been a significant target for hybrid threats. It is diluted in the Portuguese geopolitical dimension. Nevertheless, not escaping what is happening in Europe, it has also been the target of non-kinetic hybrid threats, especially in cyberspace. In the field of so-called “narrative-driven operations”, there have been some occurrences – whether related to fake news, far-right movements or strategic leaks. In addition, cyberattacks from foreign groups for information and data gathering have increased in recent years, making governmental and private critical infrastructures more vulnerable.

One of the characteristics of hybrid threats is their difficult identification. Therefore, information is scarce, which has complicated the research, leading us to assume, in many cases, speculation about the threat. It should also be taken into account that, in the case of cyberspace, until 2018, 90% of the occurrences were not reported, and the study has dealt with only official numbers.

It is not a policy paper. Although it neither points out national vulnerabilities to this type of threat nor makes procedural recommendations or considerations, it is fundamental in identifying the peculiarity of hybrid threats in a democratic state.