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Critical infrastructure (CI) sectors and their resilience are vital for societies to function. In many countries, vital societal functions (VSFs) and CIs depend on inter-organizational and international supply chains (SCs) which combine public and private actors with often competing interests and unclear responsibilities that create discontents. While collaborative supply chain risk management (SCRM) can increase the robustness and resilience of VSF&CIs, their inherent characteristics complicate SCRM. To understand this, supply chain risk governance (SCRG) has conceptually been introduced, suggesting collaborative mechanisms that facilitate inter-organizational SCRM. The purpose of this study is to elaborate on and substantiate the theoretical and practical relevance of an existing SCRG framework, by empirically exploring governance of collaborative SCRM and suggesting future research.

An abductive case study was performed in a VSF&CI, the Swedish food system, to contextualize top-level governance of collaborative SCRM and elaborate on the conceptual SCRG framework. Archival data supplemented expert interviews with public and private actors representing direct and indirect SC actors.

Current discourse and interventions in the Swedish food system’s SCRM confirmed discontent in governance and the importance of SCRG mechanisms and supported further conceptualization, e.g. of legal mechanisms vs economic incentives, the importance of government inquiries and the understanding of the influence of indirect public SC actors.

Considering the geographical scope of the study, transferability is limited but invites comparisons with both other countries and the SCRG of other VSF&CIs. Proposed research avenues guide future conceptualization and contextualization of SCRG.

The framework can support CI actors to jointly find and reduce discontents related to inter-organizational SCRM and support policymakers to increase public–private collaboration.

The novelty lies in empirically studying SCRG in critical infrastructures by combining SCRM and risk governance lenses.

Drawing motivation from the greater exposure to uncertainty and condition changes that affect large projects due to their long lifecycle, this paper aims to investigate how the time factor affects the use of governance mechanisms to pursue the success of these projects.

To pursue its aim, the article applies the dichotomization between the hard and soft mechanisms of project governance to the analysis of a historical case study, whose findings are organized over the short, medium and long periods. The case selected is referred to the peculiar water system, made up of tunnels named “bottini,” that was in use in Siena (Italy) as the old aqueduct. Specifically, the study focuses on the project of expansion of this water system that was realized during the 14th century for the construction of the “Bottino maestro di Fontegaia.”

This article highlights the different relevance that, during the lifecycle of large projects, is assumed by hard and soft governance mechanisms, with the former having main relevance in a short and medium period, and the latter usually emerging in the medium period and, subsequently, playing a growing role for the project success in the long period.

The article contributes to the literature on large projects by providing novel insights about how the time factor impacts the governance of these projects. Furthermore, the case study, with its unique history, highlights the relevance of combining effectively the hard and the soft dimensions of project governance to pursue success.

Inter-organisational governance is an important enabler for information processing, particularly in relationships undergoing digital transformation (DT) where partners depend on each other for information in decision-making. Based on information processing theory (IPT), the authors theoretically and empirically investigate how governance mechanisms address information asymmetry (uncertainty and equivocality) arising in capturing, sharing and interpreting information generated by digital technologies.

IPT is applied to four cases of public–private relationships in the Dutch infrastructure sector that aim to enhance the quantity and quality of information-based decision-making by implementing digital technologies. The investigated relationships are characterised by differing degrees and types of information uncertainty and equivocality. The authors build on rich data sets including archival data, observations, contract documents and interviews.

Addressing information uncertainty requires invoking contractual control and coordination. Contract clauses should be precise and incentive schemes functional in terms of information requirements. Information equivocality is best addressed by using relational governance. Identifying information requirements and reducing information uncertainty are a prerequisite for the transformation activities that organisations perform to reduce information equivocality.

The study offers insights into the roles of both governance mechanisms in managing information asymmetry in public–private relationships. The study uncovers key activities for gathering, sharing and transforming information when using digital technologies.

This study draws on IPT to study public–private relationships undergoing DT. The study links contractual control and coordination as well as relational governance mechanisms to information-processing activities that organisations deploy to reduce information uncertainty and equivocality.

Despite agreement on the importance of adopting governance structures for developing competitive advantage, we still know little about why or how governance mechanisms are adopted in the first place. We also acknowledge that family businesses with formal governance mechanisms in place still resort to informal means to make decisions, and we lack knowledge about why certain governance mechanisms are sometimes, but not always, effective and functional. Given these research gaps, and drawing on institutional theory, we aim to explore: How are governance structures adopted and developed in family firms? Once adopted, how do family businesses perceive these governance structures?

Using Mokken Scale Analysis, a method suitable to uncover patterns/sequences of adoption/acquisition over time, we analyze a dataset of 1,488 Spanish family firms to explore if there is a specific pattern in the implementation of governance structures. We complement the analysis with descriptive data about perceived usefulness of such structures.

Our findings highlight two important issues. Family businesses follow a specific process implementing first business governance (board of directors, then executive committee), followed by family governance (family council then family constitution). We suggest they do so in response to institutional pressures, given the exposure they have to business practices, and their need to appear legitimate. Despite formal adoption of governance structures, family businesses do not necessarily consider them useful. We suggest that their perception about the usefulness of the implemented governance structures may lead to their ceremonial adoption, resulting in a gap between the implementation and functionality of such structures.

Our article contributes to the family business literature by bringing novel insights about implementation of governance structures. We take a step back to explain why these governance mechanisms were adopted in the first place. Using institutional theory we enrich governance and family business literatures, by offering a lens that explains why family businesses follow a specific process in adopting governance structures. We also offer a plausible explanation as to why governance structures are ineffective in achieving their theorized role in the context of family businesses, based on the family's perception of the unusefulness of such structures, and the concept of ceremonial adoption.

There is no single recipe that can serve the multiple needs of different family businesses. This indicates that family businesses may need diverse levels of development and order when setting up their governance structures. Accordingly, this study constitutes an important point of demarcation for practitioners interested in examining the effectiveness of governance structures in family firms. We show that an important pre-requisite for examining the effectiveness of governance structures is to start by investigating whether these structures are actually being used or are only adopted ceremonially.

Our paper expands current knowledge on governance in family firms by taking a step back hinting at why are governance structures adopted in the first place. Focusing on how governance is implemented in terms of sequence is novel and relevant for researcher and practitioners to understand how this process unfolds. Our study uses institutional theory, which is a strong theory to support the results. Our paper also uses a novel method to study governance structures in family firms.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how chair-chief executive officer (CEO) generational difference is related to debt financing.

This paper adopts the pooled ordinary least squares and system generalized method of moments estimation procedures to analyze listed firms in Malaysia from 2013 to 2017.

The results reveal that chair-CEO generational difference is negatively associated with leverage. The evidence suggests that substantial age gaps between the chair and CEO precipitate cognitive conflicts, which lead to better monitoring and control. This results in better governance and less information asymmetry, causing firms to depend less on debt as a board monitoring mechanism. The findings provide support to the theory posited in this paper on the substitutability of chair-CEO generational difference and debt financing.

This is the first attempt to investigate the substitutability of chair-CEO generational difference and debt financing.

Discretionary accruals are earnings quality proxies that illustrate that the greater the value of discretionary accruals, the greater the practice of earnings management and vice versa. High-quality financial reports (especially earnings quality) are expected to help investors and potential investors to make decisions. This study analyses the factors that affect earnings quality, such as pre-managed earnings, liquidity and efficiency. Furthermore, the authors identify the moderating effect of the governance mechanisms proxied by the proportion of independent commissioners in conventional commercial banks listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange.

This study uses 226 banking data in the pre-corona crisis period 2013 until 2019. The data were analyzed using EViews 10 for hypothesis and MS Excel for a differential test.

The results show that pre-managed earnings, liquidity and efficiency affect earnings quality. The governance mechanisms can moderate liquidity and efficiency on earnings quality, while pre-managed earnings cannot be moderated. The different bank categories (BUKU) of earnings management mechanisms are shown for each BUKU (BUKU 1, 3 and 4 perform earnings management by increasing earnings, BUKU 2 lowering earnings). Another thing is information on the earnings quality between BUKU 2 with BUKU 3 and BUKU 4 because of differences in capital and bank operating coverage regulations.

Further research expects to analyze the factors affecting banking earnings quality concerning applying IFRS 9 (PSAK 71) in Indonesia. Future researchers expect to apply mixed methods to verify the financial statement data and provide comprehensive discussion and genuine insight from their study. Future research requires more samples from companies or an international scale (cross country) to obtain maximum results and be generally accepted.

This study implies that managers should have more control over pre-managed earnings and bank liquidity as manager's incentive to do earnings smoothing. Managers should also pay attention to cost-efficiency and effective implementation of governance mechanisms to maximize earnings quality. This study also implies that policymakers can encourage commercial banks to apply more prudential principles in terms of a reserve for failed loans to minimize earnings management in banking.

The significance of this study revealed in the discussion of the difference test between bank core capital categories (BUKU) and its relation to earnings quality.

The current scenario shows increased adoption of off-chain voting applications in decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) to avoid complexity and costs for user engagement in their governance. This paper aims to comprehend the trends and patterns within the DAO community with off-chain voting systems and blockchain usage.

This exploratory study uses a two-pronged quantitative approach, combining descriptive statistical analysis and fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis. Input data from different DAO proposals and votes were analyzed.

Results indicate that the 179 DAOs analyzed account for 26,538 proposals and 1,268,474 followers of the entire Snapshot base in January 2023, showing high concentration in engagement. The preferred social media communication channels are Twitter and GitHub, showing a decrease of Ethereum as a main chain, with Polygon and Binance Smart Chain already accounting for 22%. Basic voting can lead to greater user involvement in the voting process.

This study complements the traditional governance theory perspective and advances in the emerging literature on DAOs and blockchain with an empirical analysis.

As blockchain technology gains increasing adoption, comprehending trends and patterns within the DAO community becomes pivotal in identifying opportunities and challenges for innovation and improvement.

Findings can facilitate the development of improved governance models and decision-making processes for DAOs, leading to a more robust and sustainable ecosystem.

This study presents a broader IT-based governance foresight via blockchain while providing an understanding of the voting process, technology features and governance mechanisms for social community engagement and decision-making in DAOs.

This study explores the awareness (AWN) levels of good governance amongst Thai credit union cooperatives' (CUCs) members and the factors hindering good governance practice in Thai CUCs.

This study used a survey questionnaire from 629 members of 36 selected CUCs in Thailand. This study analysed the determinants of governance AWN levels of Thai CUCs' members using the ordered probit model. The study also employs OLS estimation to investigate the factors hindering good governance practices.

The study shows that members of different CUC types and sizes have different levels of governance AWN. Members' characteristics, experiences, and perceptions significantly influence CUC members' AWN of governance issues. The findings also suggest that a lack of morality, transparency, participation, responsibility and accountability are key obstacles that hinder good governance practices of Thai CUCs.

This is the first study that attempts to assess the level of AWN amongst Thai CUCs' members in different CUC sizes and types. This is also the first research that identifies the factors that hinder good governance practice in Thai CUCs based on members' evaluations. The study's findings provide important reference and implications for Thai policy makers and CUCs' board of managers to enhance members' AWN and CUCs' governance performance, and thus increase income and living standard of CUCs' members in the long term.

Past studies show that companies’ connection with the government (or politically connected companies (PCCs)) contributed negatively to their financial performance. The grabbing hand theory suggests that political connection demand companies to serve political and social obligation that exhaust companies’ financial resources. The purpose of this paper is to extend the previous studies by examining the role of monitoring mechanisms, specifically corporate governance mechanism and institutional ownership (IO), whether they weaken or strengthen the financial performance of PCCs in Malaysia.

The sample consists of all companies listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia (previously known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) for the year of 2004-2007. The time periods were chosen because there were no significant economic and political events that could possibly distorted the financial and non-financial data.

The findings show that companies’ political connection (the presence of political figure or government representative as members of board of director) has consistently showing negative relationship with performance. The result is consistent with the grabbing hand theory that argues that companies’ connection with government would actually destroy companies’ value. The monitoring role of corporate governance as measured by the percentage of independent board members does not have any significant effect on firm’s performance. The monitoring role of corporate governance as measured by the composition of independent board members have shown a positive significant effect on the company’s performance. However the second monitoring mechanism, the percentage of institutional investors, have a tendency to weaken the company’s performance.

The findings of this study provide an additional understanding of the consequence of government intervention on companies’ performance. This study also highlights the role of monitoring mechanism (independence board members and IO) in strengthening or weakening the performance. The findings suggest that the proper appointment criteria for board members should be seriously considered to ensure better corporate governance structure. Therefore, the formation of the nomination committee as suggested by the current Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance play an important contribution to ensure candidates nominated as board members have proper credentials and qualifications to carry out responsibilities as board members.