Search results

This study examines how project uncertainties (environmental uncertainty and participant uncertainty) affect guanxi and contractual governance and assesses the mediating role of guanxi governance between project uncertainty and contractual governance.

Data were collected in two stages from Chinese contractors. First, in-depth interviews were conducted with nine construction engineering project practitioners in different contracts as a pilot for questionnaire designing. Second, a cross-sectional questionnaire survey was conducted with professionals and practitioners of construction enterprises to collect primary data. Partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) was used to test seven hypotheses based on data collected from 198 respondents.

Project environmental uncertainty promotes the use of guanxi governance, while project participant uncertainty hinders it; the relationship between both types of uncertainty and contractual governance is the same as with guanxi governance. Furthermore, guanxi governance promotes contractual governance and partially mediates project environmental uncertainty and contractual governance and a complete mediating role between project participant uncertainty and contractual governance.

As the interviewed samples are mainly from China, the study should be replicated using large representative samples from East Asian countries, such as Japan and South Korea, to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the influence of guanxi governance. Further, while the internal consistency reliability and convergent validity of the questionnaire data in this study align with the standards, a larger sample size would improve the reliability and validity of the research results and better represent the overall work situation of contractors, owners and public policymakers.

The results provide insights into project governance research and have implications for construction practitioners in deploying governance-related resources.

Given the pivotal influence of institutional forces, an important yet underexplored question in supply chain management literature is how contractual and relational governance jointly affect supplier performance under weak legislative environments. This study tends to solve the debate by distinguishing contractual definability from contractual enforceability and by considering the contingent role of legal development in China.

Using a combined dataset of secondary data and a survey of 224 buyer–supplier dyads in China, this study examines how contractual definability and contractual enforceability interact with relational governance differently in driving supplier performance, and assesses the contingent role of legal development.

This study finds that contractual definability complements yet contractual enforceability substitutes relational governance in affecting supplier performance. Moreover, legal development weakens the complementary effect but strengthens the substitutive effect.

The study firstly enriches supply chain management literature by classifying the roles of contracts into contractual definability and contractual enforceability and showing their differential interplay with relational governance. Second, the study contributes to the complements–substitutes debate by revealing the shifting role of legal development. Third, the research enriches the understanding of supply chain management in the Chinese market.

The purposes of this study are to examine how contractual and relational governance mechanisms influence total value created in a buyer–supplier relationship and to investigate how supplier’s information sharing and information sharing asymmetry between two exchange parties differentially moderate these associations.

The study is conducted with a sample of 110 buyer–supplier matched dyads in various industries in Vietnam.

This study confirms that contractual governance and relational governance have curvilinear effects on total relationship value. Governance mechanisms have distinct interactions with supplier’s information sharing and information sharing asymmetry to influence total relationship value.

Future study could expand the sample to various countries to investigate the role of cultural factors in the effects of contractual and relational governance.

This study draws implications for supplying managers about how to govern a relationship with a buying firm with which they are sharing information. It also provides implications about how to use contractual and relational governance to control the effects of supplier’s information sharing and information sharing asymmetry, on total relationship value.

This study extends the information sharing literature by looking into the effect of supplier’s information sharing on both parties’ relationship value. It contributes to the governance literature by investigating curvilinear effects of contractual and relational governance on relationship performance.

Over the last decades, horizontal cooperations between logistics service providers (LSPs) have become a well-established organizational form and their use is expected to grow even further in the future. In spite of this increasing importance of horizontal LSP cooperations, little research has been done to reveal how to govern these relationships successfully. Particularly, the role of contractual governance and its interplay with operational governance mechanisms remain to be investigated. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

This research analyzes the influence of contractual governance on the effectiveness of two types of operational governance (a formal and a relational type). It relates contractual governance and operational governance to two major outcome dimensions of horizontal cooperations between LSPs (cooperation-based firm performance and cooperation-based learning) and uses multivariate statistical methods.

The results reveal that contractual safeguarding is able to partly replace process formalization when aiming for better cooperation-based firm performance and complement process formalization when aiming for cooperation-based learning. At the same time, relational capital is always complemented by contractual safeguarding independently from the desired cooperation outcome.

This is the first study analyzing the role of contractual safeguarding in horizontal cooperations between LSPs. It shows its interplay with operational governance mechanisms, and, thereby, not only considers a relational type of operational governance, but also a formal type.

This study aims to (1) validate the efficacy of contractual and relational governance in enhancing operational performance and (2) explore the influence of product complexity on the effectiveness of these governance mechanisms, thereby determining the optimal approach for varying levels of product complexity.

By utilizing a comprehensive theoretical framework encompassing transaction cost economics, social exchange theory and contingency theory, this research explores the intricate interplay between governance mechanisms, product complexity and operational performance, drawing insights from a dataset comprising 246 responses within Mainland China’s manufacturing sector. To rigorously test the proposed hypotheses, this study employed a hierarchical regression analysis.

The findings of this study are summarized as follows: (1) while both contractual governance and relational governance have a significant impact on operational performance, relational governance is found to be more effective than contractual governance in enhancing operational performance; and (2) the moderation effect of product complexity is evident, as it weakens the impact of contractual governance while simultaneously enhancing the positive influence of relational governance on operational performance.

The study uncovers a moderation effect of product complexity on the relationship between governance mechanisms and operational performance. This finding adds an original contribution to the literature by highlighting how product complexity can interact with governance strategies, providing practical insights for industries dealing with varying levels of product complexity.

Drawing on the transactional cost economics (TCE) perspective, we aim to investigate the effects of the balance and imbalance between contractual and relational governance on a firm's bridging responses to supply chain disruptions. By adopting the institutionally contingent perspective, we further examine the moderating effect of cultural distance on the relationship between governance mechanisms and bridging responses.

Based on data collected from 183 firms in China, we use polynomial regression and response surface analyses to test our research model.

The bridging responses increase along with an increasing balance level between contractual and relational governance and decrease along with an increasing imbalance level between contractual and relational governance. Moreover, the positive effect of balance between contractual and relational governance is strengthened by a large cultural distance. We also find that a large cultural distance amplifies the negative effect of the combination of high relational governance and low contractual governance yet weakens that of the combination of high contractual governance and low relational governance.

Our study provides nuanced insights into the effects of the balance and imbalance between contractual and relational governance on bridging responses and into the cultural boundary conditions under which these effects vary.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the effects of cooperation history on contractual governance and the moderating effects of dependence asymmetry on those relationships from the perspective of a weaker firm in emergent economies. Drawing from resource dependence theory and contingency theory, this paper develops a conceptual model to investigate the impact of cooperation history on contractual governance.

The authors use data from 188 buyer–supplier relationships in China

The authors find that cooperation history is positively associated with contractual governance when dependence asymmetry is high but negatively associated with contractual governance when dependence asymmetry is low. Furthermore, the negative moderating effect of dependence asymmetry on the relationship between cooperation history and contractual complexity is stronger than the relationship between cooperation history and contract enforcement.

This study contributes to a better understanding of how cooperation history affects contractual governance with respect to the various levels of dependence on partners by incorporating a contingency view. This study also advances the literature on interfirm governance by distinguishing contractual governance into contractual complexity and contract enforcement.

This study aims to investigate how contractual vs. informal governance influences the performance of collaborative innovation projects considering their exploitation vs. exploration character.

Data are collected from a sample of 218 companies that have developed innovative projects in collaboration with other organizations. Regression models are estimated to test the hypotheses.

The results indicate that contractual governance is the most effective for co-exploitation projects compared to informal governance. Specialization in either contractual or informal governance is more effective for co-exploration projects.

Developing collaborative innovation projects with other organizations is an alternative for firms to innovate either by exploiting complementary assets or by exploring new opportunities. Thus, the success of the collaborative innovation project is significantly affected by the way the collaboration is governed. On the one hand, for co-exploitation projects, companies should rely on contracts to improve their performance. On the other hand, for co-exploration projects, governance may specialize in either contracts or informal mechanisms to reach higher performance.

Despite previous studies analyzing the effect of contractual or informal governance on the performance of collaborative innovation projects, no research has focused on comparing simultaneously these effects, by using the innovation character of the project of co-exploitation or co-exploration as a moderator. Therefore, this paper explores comparatively the most effective type of governance mechanism for co-exploitation and co-exploration projects.

The purpose of this paper is to study the mechanisms governing dynamic changes in relational and contractual governance at different stages of government-funded mega construction projects (MCPs) by studying their different effects on project performance and participants’ opportunism.

Partial least squares structural equation modeling was used to test eight hypotheses based on data collected from 147 respondents in different participating organizations in Chinese MCPs.

First, contractual governance has a stronger positive impact on project performance than relational governance in the early stage of MCPs, while relational governance exerts more positive effects on project performance than contractual governance in the middle and late stages. Second, opportunism is a mediator variable between governance mechanisms and project performance, and relational governance is more effective than contractual governance in restricting opportunism.

In contrast to a static analysis of project governance mechanisms, this study examines dynamic changes in the governance mechanisms of MCPs in the Chinese context by considering the mediating role of opportunism as well as guanxi as an element of relational governance, thus filling in gaps in the literature on MCP governance and contributing to the development of MCP management theory.

This study aims to understand how firms in developing economies acquire knowledge about social sustainability by leveraging the social capital embedded in firms' social network, through optimally governing relationships with network members. The study proposes that relational and contractual governance mechanisms interact with various structural facets of the network, resulting in varying degrees of social sustainability related knowledge acquisition.

Primary data collected with a multiple respondent survey design from 204 manufacturing firms located in major industrial cities in Pakistan were used. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) followed by hierarchical regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses.

The study finds that both relational and contractual governance mechanisms are positively related to a firm’s social sustainability-related knowledge acquisition, but their effectiveness is impacted by the structural facets of the network. Network size positively moderates the relationship between relational governance and social sustainability related knowledge acquisition, whereas both network range and strength of ties negatively moderate the relationship between contractual governance and social sustainability related knowledge acquisition.

Practitioners with resource-constrained firms should interact with their social network to leverage the knowledge and resources embedded within. The findings prescribe optimal governance strategies for different combinations of network structure variables to gain maximum knowledge about social sustainability.

The literature lacks information on the effect of network structure on the relationships between social network governance and social sustainability-related knowledge acquisition for resource-constrained firms in the developing economy context, making this study’s contributions unique.