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This article surveys available research on the contingent‐claims approach to risky debt valuation. The author describes both the structural and reduced form versions of contingent claims models and summarizes both the theoretical and empirical research in this area. Relative to the progress made in the theory of risky debt valuation, empirical validation of these models lags far behind. This survey highlights the increasing gap between the theoretical valuation and the empirical understanding of risky debt.

To propose a new methodology to infer the risk‐neutral default probability curve of a generic firm XYZ from equity options prices.

It is assumed that the market is arbitrage‐free and the “market” probability measure implied in the equity options prices to the pricing of credit risky assets is applied. First, the equity probability density function of XYZ is inferred from a set of quoted equity options with different strikes and maturities. This function is then transformed into the probability density function of the XYZ assets and the term structure of the “option implied” XYZ default probabilities is calculated. These default probabilities can be used to price corporate bonds and, more generally, single‐name credit derivatives as “exotic” equity derivatives.

Equity derivatives and credit derivatives have ultimately the same (unobservable) underlying, the XYZ assets value. A model that considers any security issued by XYZ as derivatives on the firm's assets can be used to price these securities in a consistent way to each other and/or detect relative/value opportunities.

The paper offers both a pricing tool for traded single‐name credit risky assets or a relative value tool in liquid markets.

We develop a credit-risk model to study the informational role of investment in an economy susceptible to large liquidity shocks. Firms' investment decisions carry information about their asset quality, thereby mitigating informational frictions when firms enter bankruptcy. An increase in aggregate investment can reduce the informational value of investment, depressing firms' recovery values. Therefore, policies boosting investment can decrease debt and firm values by reducing the informational value of investment. The presence of debt overhang may enhance firm value by making firms' investment decisions more informative. We present suggestive empirical evidence consistent with model predictions on the relation between firms' investments and recovery rates.

The objective of this paper is twofold: first, to model the value of the firm in the presence of contingent capital and multiple growth options over its life cycle in a stochastic universe to ensure financial stability and recover losses in case of default and second, to clarify how contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds as financial instruments impact the leverage-ratio policies, inefficiencies generated by debt overhang and asset substitution for a firm that has multiple growth options. Additionally, what is its impact on investment timing, capital structure and asset volatility?

The current paper elaborates the modeling of a dynamic problem with respect to the interaction between funding and investment policies during multiple sequential investment cycles simultaneously with dynamic funding. The authors model the value of the firm in the presence of contingent capital that provides flexibility in dealing with default risks as well as growth options in a stochastic universe. The authors examine the firm's closed-form solutions at each stage of its decision-making process before and after the exercise of the growth options (with and without conversion of CoCo) through applying the backward indication method and the risk-neutral pricing theory.

The numerical results show that inefficiencies related to debt overhang and asset substitution can go down with a higher conversion ratio and a larger number of growth options. Additionally, the authors’ analysis reveals that the firm systematically opts for conservative leverage to minimize the effect of debt overhang on decisions so as to exercise growth options in the future. However, the capital structure of the firm has a substantial effect on the leverage ratio and the asset substitution. In fact, the effect of the leverage ratio and the risk-shifting incentive will be greater when the capital structure changes during the firm's decision-making process. Contrarily to traditional corporate finance theory, the study displays that the value of the firm before the investment expansion decreases and then increases with asset volatility, instead of decreasing overall with asset volatility.

The study’s findings reveal that funding, default and conversion decisions have crucial implications on growth option exercise decisions and leverage ratio policy. The model also shows that the firm consistently chooses conservative leverage to reduce the effect of debt overhang on decisions to exercise growth options in the future. The risk-shifting incentive and the debt overhang inefficiency basically decrease with a higher conversion ratio and multiple growth options. However, the effect of the leverage ratio and the risk-shifting incentive will be greater when the capital structure changes during the firm's decision-making process.

The firm's composition between assets in place and growth options evolves endogenously with its investment opportunity and growth option financing, as well as its default decision. In contrast to the standard capital structure models of Leland (1994), the model reveals that both exogenous conversion decisions and endogenous default decisions have significant implications for firms' growth option exercise decisions and debt policies. The model induces some predictions about the dynamics of the firm's choice of leverage as well as the link between the dynamics of leverage and the firm's life cycle.

The paper aims to explore the optimal strategies of inventory financing when the risk-averse retailer has different objectives, in the presence of multi-risk, i.e. demand risk, non-operational risk and retailer's strategic default risk.

This paper develops an inventory financing model consisting of a bank and a risk-averse retailer with strategic default. This paper considers two scenarios, i.e. the capital-constrained retailer cares about its profit or firm value. In the first scenario, the bank acts as a Stackelberg leader determining its interest rate, and the retailer acts as a follower determining its pledged quantity. In the second one, the bank capital market is perfectly competitive. Lagrange multiplier method is adopted to solve the optimization.

The optimal strategies in inventory financing scheme in two scenarios are derived. Only when the initial stock is relatively high, the retailer pledges part of the initial stock. Retailer's risk aversion reduces its pledged quantity and performance. The strategic default reduces its profit. When it is relatively high, the bank refuses to offer the loan.

Analytical inventory and financing strategies are specified to help retailers and banks to better understand the interaction of finance and operations management and to better respond to multi-risk.

New results and managerial insights are derived by incorporating partially endogenous strategic default and risk aversion into inventory financing, which enriches the interfaces of operations management and finance.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the drivers of default in the Malaysian housing market in the light of various policy interventions by the country’s central bank, and the government’s expressed concern to ensure balanced growth in the market. This paper assesses the importance of considering the endogeneity of loan-to-value (LTV) in predicting housing loan default and its implications.

In this paper, the author addresses the endogeneity problem in the LTV variable using two instrumental variables (IV) in this probit regression: national residential property gains tax and the statutory reserve ratio of Bank Negara Malaysia. This study uses the instrumental variable probit model to consider endogeneity bias. This study assumes a latent (unobservable) variable (Y*), representing a borrower’s tendency to default, which is associated linearly with the borrower’s and loan characteristics and other variables (Xi). This study uses individual borrower-level information of 43,156 housing loan borrowers from the files of a well-established housing bank in Malaysia.

This study’s results confirm that endogeneity causes a substantial difference in the magnitude of the estimated effects of LTV on the default tendency. At the lower values of LTV, the probability of default is over-estimated, and at the higher values, the default probability is substantially underestimated. Endogeneity bias also affects the estimated coefficients of loan and borrower characteristics. The authors find that the interest rate is less relevant in predicting loan default. Other loan characteristics, such as loan age, tenure, payment amount and the built-up area, are relevant. This study’s result confirms that the borrower’s location matters, and an increase in state gross domestic product per capita and an increase in the supply of residential units reduce default probability.

The present study did not explore the applicability of the “equity theory of default” in the Malaysian housing market. This study did not assess “strategic default” issues and the effect of borrowers’ characteristics, personality traits and self-control of Malaysian housing loan borrowers in the mortgage decision-making process. The evolving dynamics of the Malaysian housing market microstructure in property valuation remained unexplored in the present study.

The findings have crucial relevance in the decision-making process of commercial banks, the central bank and the government to frame policies to foster balanced growth and development in the housing market. The authors argue that striking a subtle balance between the concerns of financial stability and productive risk-taking by commercial banks in Malaysia remains a continuing challenge for the country’s central bank. The authors also argue that designing suitable taxation policies by the government can deliver its cherished goal of balanced development in the housing market.

Empirical research on the Malaysian housing market based on micro-level data is scarce due to a paucity of relevant data. This study is based on the individual borrower-level information of 43,156 housing loan borrowers from the files of a well-established housing bank in Malaysia. In this analysis, the authors find clear evidence of endogeneity in LTV and argue that any attempts to decipher the default drivers of housing loans without addressing the issue of endogeneity may lead to faulty interpretation. Therefore, this study is unique in recognizing endogeneity and has gone deeper in identifying the default drivers in the Malaysian housing market not addressed by earlier papers.

The authors examine the optimal consumption decisions of households in a micro-founded framework that introduces endogenous default. They study default in the context of a two-period process, assuming three non-overlapping steps of non-payment: delinquency, non-performing loans and bankruptcy (default).

In their model, the authors extend the analysis of loan default to two periods and include agent heterogeneity by considering also saving households. In the optimization problem, the authors obtain first-order conditions for borrowers who do not repay all of their loans (comparing them to those who fully repay them) and also for savers. In addition, by using nonlinear Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), they obtain consistent estimates of the household preference parameters and present the impulse responses of borrowers' consumption to demand shocks.

The authors derive an augmented consumption Euler equation for borrowers, which is a function inter alia of an expected default factor. They estimate this equation and find non-negligible differences in preference parameters relative to values reported in the literature. Further, an ordering by size of the household discount factors is provided empirically. Finally, the impulse responses of borrowers' consumption to a demand shock are found to last more for borrowers who do not fully repay their debts.

This work represents a promising line of research by introducing default in one of the basic components of DSGE models, making the latter more appropriate for analyzing monetary and macro-prudential policies.

This paper aims to investigate the nexus between banks’ foreign assets and sovereign default risk in a panel of 15 developed economies. The empirical evidence suggests that banks’ foreign exposure is an important determinant of sovereign default probability.

Using data from the consolidated banking statistics (total foreign claims on ultimate risk basis) by the Bank of International Settlements, the author constructs a measure of bank international exposure to peer countries. This measure is then used as the target variable in a panel regression for sovereign credit default swaps. The model includes 15 European and non-European developed economies. Identification is discussed extensively in the paper.

Quantitatively, a 1% increase in banks’ cross-border claims increases sovereign default risk by about 0.19%. The relationship is weaker when banks are more capitalised. On the other hand, governments are more vulnerable to credit risk spillovers from banks’ international portfolios when having higher debt to GDP ratios.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first paper that attempts explicitly to establish an empirical connection between banks’ international assets and sovereign default risk. To the author’s opinion, this paper represents a contribution to our understanding of how sovereign credit risk spills over across countries. It also extends significantly the existing literature on the determinants of sovereign risk (that primarily focused on fundamentals, market characteristics – such as liquidity – and global factors). This paper ultimately sheds some new light on the role of intermediaries in the international transmission of credit risk, also adding to today’s discussion about the linkages between banks and sovereigns.

This paper analyzes an individual lending credit market in a rural society, where potential borrowers have a dynamic incentive of strategic default, and a benevolent lender gives them a credible threat to cut future credit when loands are not repaid. A crucial issue is that social sanction of default depends on the default rate in the society. Our analysis suggests that for a relatively small financing cost, a credit market exists where borrowers have little motivation to default voluntarily, associated with intense social sanctions. The results also reveal that a relatively large financing cost causes the credit market to collapse, since it raises motivation of default, associated with less intense social sanctions. These results could justify government support to reduce the lender’s financing cost. The model further illustrates the plausibility of two equilibria: a low default rate associated with a low lending rate and intense social sanctions, and a high default rate with a high lending rate and less intense social sanctions. This could explain the possibility that the default rate is different from village to village even though these societies seem to share an almost identical environment.

In fraudulent conveyance cases, plaintiffs allege that by entering into a complex leverage transaction, such as an LBO, a firm’s former owners ensured its subsequent collapse. Proving that the transaction rendered the firm insolvent may allow debtors (or their proxies) to claw back transfers made to former shareholders and others as part of the transaction.

Courts have recently questioned the robustness of the solvency evidence traditionally provided in such cases, claiming that traditional expert analyses (e.g., a discounted flow analysis) may suffer from hindsight (and other forms of) bias, and thus not reflect an accurate view of the firm’s insolvency prospects at the time of the challenged transfers. To address the issue, courts have recently suggested that experts should consider market evidence, such as the firm’s stock, bond, or credit default swap prices at the time of the challenged transaction. We review market-evidence-based approaches for determination of solvency in fraudulent conveyance cases.

We compare different methods of solvency determination that rely on market data. We discuss the pros and cons of these methods and illustrate the use of credit default swap spreads with a numerical example. Finally, we highlight the limitations of these methods.

If securities trade in efficient markets in which security prices quickly impound all available information, then such security prices provide an objective assessment of investors’ views of the firm’s future insolvency prospects at the time of challenged transfer, given contemporaneously available information. As we explain, using market data to analyze fraudulent conveyance claims or assess a firm’s solvency prospects is not as straightforward as some courts argue. To do so, an expert must first pick a particular credit risk model from a host of choices which links the market evidence (or security price) to the likelihood of future default. Then, to implement his chosen model, the expert must estimate various parameter input values at the time of the alleged fraudulent transfer. In this connection, it is important to note that each credit risk model rests on particular assumptions, and there are typically several ways in which a model’s key parameters may be empirically estimated. Such choices critically affect any conclusion about a firm’s future default prospects as of the date of an alleged fraudulent conveyance.

Simply using market evidence does not necessarily eliminate the question of bias in any analysis. The reliability of a plaintiff’s claims regarding fraudulent conveyance will depend on the reasonableness of the analysis used to tie the observed market evidence at the time of the alleged fraudulent transfer to default prospects of the firm.

There is a large body of literature in financial economics that examines the relationship between market data and the prospects of a firm’s future default. However, there is surprisingly little research tying that literature to the analysis of fraudulent conveyance claims. Our paper, in part, attempts to do so. We show that while market-based methods use the information contained in market prices, this information must be supplemented with assumptions and the conclusions of these methods critically depend on the assumption made.