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This paper analyzes an individual lending credit market in a rural society, where potential borrowers have a dynamic incentive of strategic default, and a benevolent lender gives them a credible threat to cut future credit when loands are not repaid. A crucial issue is that social sanction of default depends on the default rate in the society. Our analysis suggests that for a relatively small financing cost, a credit market exists where borrowers have little motivation to default voluntarily, associated with intense social sanctions. The results also reveal that a relatively large financing cost causes the credit market to collapse, since it raises motivation of default, associated with less intense social sanctions. These results could justify government support to reduce the lender’s financing cost. The model further illustrates the plausibility of two equilibria: a low default rate associated with a low lending rate and intense social sanctions, and a high default rate with a high lending rate and less intense social sanctions. This could explain the possibility that the default rate is different from village to village even though these societies seem to share an almost identical environment.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

The chapter studies strategic default using an experimental approach.

The experiment considers a stochastic asset process and a loan with no down-payment. The treatments are two asset volatilities (high and low) and the absence and presence of social interactions via a direct effect on the subject's payoff.

I demonstrate that (i) people appear to follow the prediction of the strategic default model quite closely in the high asset volatility treatment, and that (ii) incorporating social interactions delays the strategic default beyond what is considered optimal.

The study tests adequately the strategic default using a novel experimental design and analyzes the neighbor's effect on that decision.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Index by subjects, compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

To provide a selective review of most recent developments in experimental economics of banking and lending and to summarize and synthesize the experiment designs and results in banking under asymmetric information.

The review includes recently published or working papers (2006–2013) that exclusively employ experimental economics methodology, especially for studying the impact of formal or informal institutions on lending in credit markets.

The results of the reviewed experimental studies provide support for the important role of both informal (e.g., relationship banking and reputation) and formal (e.g., third-party enforcement; collateral) institutions and their impact on credit market performance, as well as the importance of studying the interaction of the two types of institutions.

The number of studies reviewed is fairly small but growing, indicating that this is the area of growing significance.

Controlled economic experiments are better able to address the questions regarding the direction of causality in empirical relationships. Economic experiments are particularly useful in studying complex markets like credit and capital and in eliciting specific effects of institutions on credit market performance. Such well-established empirical relationships will be able to provide guidance for policy making for financial market reform.

This is the first review of laboratory research in banking and lending under asymmetric information that aims to call attention to this area of research and serves as a starting point for an interested researcher and provide future direction.

Aims to examine the issue of industrial strategy (IS), paying particular attention to the case of Britain. Sets out to assess the possibility and nature of an industrial strategy for Britain, in Europe, and within the global scene, taking into account the world we live in as we see it. Accordingly, the perspective is driven and shaped by a quest for a realistic, feasible and sustainable industrial strategy. In order to achieve these objectives, first examines the theoretical arguments behind much of British, and more generally, Western industrial policies. Following this, outlines and assesses British industrial policy post‐Second World War then compares and contrasts British industrial policy with that of Europe, the USA, Japan and the newly industrialized countries. Then examines recent developments in economics and management which may explain the “Far Eastern” miracle, and points to the possibility of a successful, narrowly self‐interested, IS for Europe and Britain, based on the lessons from (new) theory and international experience. To assess what is possible, develops a theoretical framework linking firms in their roles as consumers and/or electors. This hints at the possibilities and limits of feasible policies. All these ignore desirability which, in the author′s view, should be seen in terms of distributional considerations, themselves contributors to sustainability. Accordingly, discusses a desirable industrial strategy for Britain in Europe which accounts for distributional considerations, and goes on to examine its implications for the issue of North‐South convergence. Concludes by pointing to the limitations of the analysis and to directions for developments.

The purpose of this paper is to estimate the effectiveness of the credit evaluation system using the borrowing data from China’s leading P2P lending platform, Renrendai.com.

The current credit valuation systems are classified into the forward-looking mechanism, which judges the borrowers’ credit levels based on their uploaded information, and the backward-looking mechanism, which judges the borrowers’ credit levels based on their historical repayment performance. Probit models and Tobit models are used to examine the effectiveness of credit evaluation mechanisms.

The results show that only the “hard” information reflecting borrowers’ credit ability can explain the default risk on the platform under the forward-looking credit evaluation mechanism. The backward-looking credit evaluation mechanism (BCEM) based on the repeated borrowings produces both promise-enhancing and “fishing” incentives and thus fails to explain the default risk, and weakens the effectiveness of forward-looking credit indicators in explaining the default risk because it encourages borrowers to invest in forging forward-looking credit indicators. Additional information such as the interest rate and the repayment periods reveals borrowers’ credit and thus can also be used as a predictor of borrowers’ default risk.

The findings suggest that current ex ante screening based on the information collected from the borrowers or repeated borrowings is inadequate to control the default risk in P2P lending markets and thus needs be improved. Ex post monitoring and sharing on defaulter’s information should be strengthened to increase the default cost and thus to deter potential bad borrowers.

To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper classifying the credit evaluation system in online P2P lending market into the forward-looking type and the backward-looking type, which is important since they provide different incentives to borrowers. The paper also investigates and provides evidence on the promise-enhancing and “fishing” incentives of BCEMs.